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Abstract 
The thesis analyses, from an international political economy perspective, the 
negotiations and lobbying that took place to achieve the European Union Savings Tax 
Directive. The theoretical approach is mainly based on Professor Susan Strange’s 
doctrinal framework of the four structures of power. 
 
Some of the primary documents from and a number of newspaper reports on the 
negotiations have functioned as the main sources for the study. The thesis  concentrates 
on structural factors that have facilitated and constrained the negotiation process. These 
are described on three different analytical levels – the world systemic, the inter- and 
transnational and the national levels. Special and equal emphasis is put on the analysis 
of states and international organizations, as well as market forces and private actors. 
 
The thesis argues that the juxtapositions of the negotiations originate primarily in 
historical factors and the different market conditions of the national financial industry. 
The disparities are most noticeable between high-tax industrialized countries and tax 
havens. But countries like Belgium, UK and USA have also slowed down the process 
by taking principled positions in certain matters. One of the most important conclusions 
of the thesis is that agreement on the directive was finally achieved because perseverant 
positions were discarded in favour of relevant transfers of resources for security, 
production, finance and knowledge justifiable to all parties.  
 
The necessary compromises have tended to limit equality between the parties and to 
accentuate the structurally strong position of the richest. Smaller investors suffer more 
from negative effects of the directive than big ones and some of the strongest financial 




Avhandlingen analyserar förhandlingarna och lobbyaktiviteten kring Europeiska 
Unionens direktiv för beskattning av inkomster från sparande (EUSTD) ur den 
internationella politiska ekonomins perspektiv. Den teoretiska approachen baserar sig i 
huvudsak på professor Susan Stranges referensram om fyra maktstrukturer.  
 
Med stöd av tidningsreferat om förhandlingarna och valda ursprungsdokument 
analyseras strukturella faktorer som å ena sidan befrämjat förhandlingarna men som å 
andra sidan också begränsat dem. Dessa beskrivs allmänt på tre nivåer – den 
världssystematiska, den internationella och transnationella, samt den nationella. Speciell 
vikt har lagts på att analysera såväl staters och internationella organisationers som 
marknadskrafters och privata aktörers inflytande på förhandlingarna ur ett perspektiv 
som utgår från att alla aktörer behandlas jämlikt. 
 
Avhandlingen argumenterar för att de motsatsförhållanden som uppstått staterna 
emellan har sitt ursprung dels i historiska faktorer och dels i olika marknadsvillkor för 
ländernas finansiella industrier. Tydligast är skillnaderna mellan högbeskattande 
industriländer och s.k. skatteparadis. Men även länder som Belgien, Storbritannien och 
USA har satt käppar i hjulet för direktivet och ofta intagit orubbligt principiella 
positioner. En av de viktigaste slutsatserna är att enighet om direktivet slutligen 
uppnåddes efter att principiella ståndpunkter övergivits och man istället gått in för att 
beakta relativa överföringar av säkerhets-, produktions-, kunskaps- och finansiella 
resurser, vilka var skäliga för alla involverade parter. 
 
De nödvändiga kompromisserna har tenderat att begränsa det rättvisa och framhäva de 
rikaste parternas strukturellt starka position. Mindre investerare lider, relativt sett, mera 
av direktivet än de förmögna, och de allra starkaste finansiella centrumen – New York, 
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Prologue: A Short History of the EU Savings Tax Directive 
The history of the European Union Savings Tax Directive (EUSTD) has been a lengthy 
saga of bargaining and horse-trading, full-stops and redraftings, but in the end the 
directive passed and will be ratified as from July 2005. In many ways the story starts in 
1987 when the European Commission proposed a directive eliminating all capital 
exchange controls within the European Communities (EC). The free movement of 
capital was generally welcomed by the member states as an important step toward a 
single European capital market. But it also aroused worries of tax competition and of 
the EC eventually turning into a single large tax haven. France and Italy were 
particularly concerned that the liberalization of capital movements would undermine 
their fiscal position. (Dehejia & Genschel 1999, 412.)  
In order to calm these fears, an additional paragraph was added to the capital 
movements directive before it was passed in 1988. This instructed the Commission to 
make proposals on how to prevent tax competition and committed the Council to decide 
on these proposals by mid-1989. Thus the Commission proposed the introduction of a 
common 15 percent withholding tax on interest income from savings and bonds. Some 
members already levied such taxes, but the rates varied greatly, with Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Denmark not levying any withholding taxes at all. A common tax rate 
seemed necessary to prevent free capital movements from creating a race to the bottom. 
After the plan had been put on hold in late-1989, it was relaunched by Belgium and 
Germany in 1993. The reactions to the proposals were almost identical at both 
occasions. (Ibid., 413) 
 
Attempt Number One - and a Half 
The 1989 suspension of negotiations and their resumption in 1993 were both due to 
changes in the German position. In 1989 Germany had introduced a national 
withholding tax that had caused serious problems for the German financial sector and it 
was quickly withdrawn. The similarity of the German tax to the Commission's proposal 
- and the near coincidence of its introduction - worked as powerful reinforcement. With 
the withdrawal of the German tax came also the (surprising) withdrawal of German 
support for the EC negotiations. (Bonte 2002, 3) 
Since Germany joined the ranks of the dissenters in the negotiations as well, the hopes 
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of winning unanimous agreement on a common European withholding tax were dashed. 
The problem of tax competition did not however go away. Some member states lowered 
their withholding tax rates or extended tax exemptions in order to prevent domestic 
funds from flowing out and encourage foreign funds flowing in, in an effort to 
counteract the effects of the free capital movements. This was particularly true for 
Belgium, which was losing a lot of funds to its low-tax and secretive neighbour 
Luxembourg. (Ibid., 3.)  
In 1993 Belgium joined forces with Germany to relaunch the plan for a common 
withholding tax. In early 1993 Germany had reintroduced a national withholding tax 
and again suffered a massive outflow of funds. The main beneficiaries were 
Luxembourg and the German banks doing business there. Struggling to finance German 
unification, the German government demanded Community action to 'plug the loophole' 
that was Luxembourg. (Ibid., 4; Dehejia & Genschel 1999, 413.) 
On both occasions the British government flatly denied the necessity for any tax co-
ordination and supported 'full tax competition'. The British government was the most 
outspoken of all members in its criticism of the Belgian-German initiative. It argued 
that a common withholding tax would drive financial business away from London to 
New York and Tokyo because of the increased costs it would mean. The British thus 
called for ‘a free market in taxation.’ (Ibid., 413.) 
Luxembourg complained that the proposed tax was 'anti-European' and would drive 
money away from the EC mainly to offshore financial centres (OFCs)1 in jurisdictions 
not affected by the directive that was by now know as the European Union Savings Tax 
Directive (EUSTD). The Luxembourgers argued for co-ordination, if any, on OECD 
level. (Ibid., 413.) 
 
A Second Shot 
The next attempt to revive the tax co-operation negotiations began in the spring of 1996. 
The Commission issued a report on the dangers of tax competition and asked the 
                                                 
1 The definition of OFCs and the use of the word vary. The term offshore comes from the fact that tax 
havens and safe havens are often small islands and from that transactions and activities in these 
locations are made by people who do not live there. OFCs are though not necessarily islands, but are 
jurisdictions that are characterized by any mix of banking secrecy (safe havens), low taxes (tax 
havens) and/or lax financial regulations. Leading OFCs are Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Cayman 
Islands and Hong Kong, but also the Eurobond market in London's stock exchange is usually 
considered an OFC because of the lack of financial regulation connected to it. Austria and Belgium 
are rarely defined as OFCs despite their strict banking secrecy laws. (Engdahl 2004, 15-16.) 
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member states to agree on a comprehensive package of measures to defend fiscal 
revenues from erosion. The so-called tax package included the taxation of cross-border 
savings (the EUSTD), a code of conduct to avoid harmful (corporate) tax competition, 
and the elimination of source taxes on cross-border payments of interest and royalties 
between associated companies. Struggling to meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria, France, 
Germany, and Italy looked quite favourably upon attempts to regulate tax competition. 
(Dehejia & Genschel 1999, 414.)  Once again though, the negotiations proved to be 
difficult.  
A ‘taxation policy group’, chaired by the Commission and consisting of representatives 
of European Union (EU) finance ministers, was formed to advance the proposals of the 
Commission. It experienced difficulties due to the significant differences that existed 
between various member states regarding the co-ordination of tax policy in general, and 
notions of harmful tax competition in particular. The fact that some member states were 
reluctant from the outset to consider any move towards tax co-ordination is a clear 
indication of how difficult a task the Commission and prime movers such as France 
faced when pushing for tax co-ordination reforms. (Gilligan 2003, 57.) 
Nevertheless, the Commission proposed that it should prepare a draft proposal for a 
directive by April 1998. Taking into account the failures of earlier attempts to introduce 
a common withholding tax, the Commission now proposed a dual approach. Member 
states could choose between providing information to the other member states about the 
investment income of their resident individuals or applying a withholding tax at a 
minimum of 20 percent. This co-existence model provided the possibility for e.g. 
Austria and Luxembourg to hold on to their banking secrecy laws, while the United 
Kingdom, because of the negative effects it thought it would have on the financial 
business in London, was opposed to a compulsory withholding tax. The directive was 
agreed to be limited only to interest earnings of individuals, an agreement that was 
carried through to the final directive. Dividends and capital gains from cross-border 
investments will remain free from any disclosure or requirement of tax, as will 
corporate and most trust holdings. (International Money Marketing, Jul 21, 2003.) 
Despite this compromise proposal, the British were not satisfied, and wanted the 
abolition of the withholding tax possibility altogether referring to the advantages of 
information exchange, including that it would guarantee a fairer distribution of tax 
revenues among countries and that 
'(it) would be sufficient to draw the attention of the country of residence to 
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the existence of the income-producing asset - the tax authorities could then 
seek sufficient information from the investor to work out the tax liability. In 
contrast, applying withholding might in some circumstances require a 
financial institution to perform complex calculations not needed for its own 
purposes. In addition, a withholding system would require additional 
administrative costs in order to manage tax deductions or investor 
certification.' (HM Treasury 2000.) 
The British feared the cost of such administrative complications would hit the Eurobond 
market particularly hard. For example  
'a British investor in French bonds could ask for the UK's Inland Revenue to 
levy the withholding tax. However, for that to be accepted, the French 
authorities would have to provide certificates to accompany every interest 
payment' (Paul Tipping of the British Bankers Association quoted in 
European Voice, 18 February 1999).  
Further, the 1998 draft directive did not require selected third countries or EU member 
states' dependencies taking similar or equal measures in order to prevent a flight of 
funds to non-EU safe havens. Luxembourg had raised fears of funds leaving the EU 
altogether already back in 1989, but did not have to articulate their opposition to the 
1998 draft directive, as Luxembourg was able to hide behind the British objections 
(European Voice, 29 June 2000). The Commission and the Finnish presidency had 
hoped to finalize arrangements for the EUSTD at the Helsinki EU Summit in December 
1999. Considering the various national interests affected and the intensity of the 
disagreement it was in the end not surprising that this aim was not achieved. But at least 
the European leaders once again agreed that savings tax evasion was not acceptable and 
they also agreed to give greater consideration to the British proposals for information 
exchange. (Gilligan 2003, 58-59.) 
 
The Final Push 
The EUSTD negotiations continued despite these new challenges; some suspected the 
multiple delays were down to the British 'trying to talk the thing to death' (European 
Voice, 2 September 1999). The principles of a new draft directive and a timetable for its 
adoption (that changed many times since) were agreed during the Portuguese presidency 
in the first half of 2000, resulting in a second draft directive issued in 2001. The aim of 
the agreement was complete information exchange between member states, certain 
British and Dutch dependent territories and countries adopting similar measures (US, 
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Switzerland, and four European microstates), with a seven-year transitory period during 
which Luxembourg, Belgium and Austria (all who have strict banking secrecy laws) 
could instead levy a withholding tax. The EUSTD still formed a part of the larger three 
part 'tax package', the other parts of which had already been agreed upon earlier. 
The initial deadline for the adoption of the new directive was over-ambitiously set for 
the end of 2000. The deadline was pushed forward two years until the end of 2002 when 
the Council recognized not only the difficulties of finding a common position amongst 
member states, but also acknowledging the complexities associated with competing 
regulatory regimes outside the EU. As negotiations on the technicalities of the transitory 
withholding tax regime both within the EU and particularly with Switzerland dragged 
on, the end of 2002 deadline passed. This delay was also in part due to Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi blocking the finalizing of the deal because of unrelated 
issues. However, the directive was finally adopted in July 2003 during the Greek 
presidency, albeit in a watered-down form. Contrary to the 2000 agreements, the 
ultimate aim of information exchange among all countries after a seven-year period was 
abolished. Now, to please Switzerland, the directive has a seemingly indefinite 
transitory period, the end of which is dependent on the success of OECD negotiations.  
(European Communities 1998; 2001; 2003; European Voice, 27 March 2003.) 
But there were still further hiccups on the way to implementation of the directive. The 
original date of implementation was January 1st 2005. But the lengthy and difficult 
negotiations with Switzerland, which were concluded only in May 2004, gave the 
Swiss, and others, too little time for implementing the directive (BBC News, 
2004/05/19). The EUSTD is now applied as of July 1st 2005. When the Swiss deal was 
concluded, deals with the European microstates were quickly reached according to the 
Swiss model. The agreement gives the countries the possibility of becoming members 
of the Schengen, but without judicial and administrative co-operation on direct tax 
fraud.2  
Interestingly there seems to be quiet consent that the US satisfies the EU's criteria, but 
that a similar written deal as with other third states is not necessary with the US. The 
US administration has allowed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to force US banks to 
disclose the amount of bank deposit interest paid to non-resident foreign depositors 
from 15 countries, including most EU members, but excluding Belgium, Austria and 
                                                 
2 Switzerland has signed the Treaty, but the microstates have not yet started negotiations (and might not 
want to do so either) (‘Schengen Treaty’ at Wikipedia website.) 
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Luxembourg. Thus the Bush administration can continue to maintain to its domestic 
audience that it is not signing up to the EU proposal, while signalling to Brussels that it 
is prepared to co-operate. (Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, Sep 15, 2002.) 
Controversially, the UK had already in early 2003 committed its dependencies to the 
EUSTD, although its right to do so was not apparent. This caused the Cayman Islands to 
threaten to go to court with the issue. Such legal action would almost certainly have 
dragged into 2005 and held up the implementation of the EUSTD. The Caymans finally 
agreed to participate as the result of horse-trading with the British government, 
consequently no further delays were caused. (Financial Times, Feb 3 2004; 
International Money Marketing, March 2004.)  
Cayman Islands officials and bankers were also reported to be angry that the directive 
does not cover Bermuda, another British dependency. Bermuda has apparently been left 
out by oversight in the EU administration. The 2000 principles state that 'dependent or 
associated territories in the Caribbean and Channel Islands' are affected by the EUSTD. 
Bermuda of course is in the mid-Atlantic, not the Caribbean... (International Money 
Marketing, Nov 2003; The Royal Gazette, Jun 5, 2003.) This inconsistency was like a 
jewel in the crown of a directive that had failed live up to its original principles on so 
many other occasions. 
Considering the complexity and length of the negotiations, the reader is advised to 
consult the table below (table 1), when necessary, in order to place events in relation to 
the total timeline of the negotiations. The table provides a summary of the main 
developments of the negotiations. 
 
Table 1: Timeline 
 
1989 – Commission proposal for an EC-wide withholding tax 
1989 – Germany withdraws support for Commission proposal 
1993 – Germany and Belgium push for a restart of discussions 
1996 – Commission report on tax competition 
1998 – First Commission draft directive: the co-existence model 
2000 – British report argues for the exclusive use of information exchange 
2001 – Second Commission draft directive: information exchange 
2003 – Directive adopted with significant amendments 
2004 – Negotiations with Switzerland concluded 




'Politics, n. Strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles.' 
Ambrose Bierce (1842 - 1914), The Devil's Dictionary   
 
This crudely sums up how 15 years of negotiations on the European Union’s Savings 
Tax Directive (EUSTD) were hoped to usher in a new era in global financial principles, 
but in the end achieved too little, too slowly.  
The EUSTD has for the first time in history introduced an automatic cross-border 
exchange of banking information. The directive will have a very tangible impact for the 
savers it targets, the states that tax and the financial business community. The impact 
will be felt – if nowhere else - at least in the amount of bureaucracy to handle.  
The indirect impacts could in the long term turn out to be very significant indeed. 
Automatic cross-border exchange of information could, in time, establish a principle 
and contribute to a change in the overall climate for international business and tax 
policy (Radaelli, 7 July 2005). It also represents the first important intra-EU deal on 
direct taxation, a policy area that has so far been considered to be the exclusive 
competence of individual member states' national legislation. Success with EUSTD 
could boost the chances of tax policy one day becoming subject to deeper European 
integration. And if it proves unsuccessful, calls for tightening up the EUSTD will 
certainly get stronger. Finally, the EUSTD is designed to ease possible tax competition 
in one of the most visible attributes of a state's tax system, namely the top tax rates that 
it levies on its wealthiest citizens. The tax race to the bottom is seen by many non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) as one of the main challenges of globalization3 and 
the EUSTD is clearly an attempt to answer this challenge in part.  
Until only a few months before the conclusion of the agreement with Switzerland in 
May 2004, few of the targets of the directive believed in the chances of the EUSTD ever 
carrying through.  
‘(The conclusion of the EUSTD) presupposes that Switzerland’s argument on 
linkage of other issues is resolved (…). But since the Savings Tax Directive 
took at least 14 years to see the light of day [in the intra-EU negotiations], 
perhaps we shouldn’t hold our breath.’ (International Money Marketing, Mar 
2004.) 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Tax Justice Network website 
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Moreover, a good deal of established theories of politics and negotiations (e.g. rational 
choice and game theory, see Dehejia & Genschel 1999) suggested a low probability of 
success in the EUSTD negotiations.  
At times EUSTD negotiations brought out unexpected national objections or linkages; 
both Italian cows and Nazi administration have been used in the debates around the 
deal.4 The many twists and turns that the directive has experienced during the 
negotiation process can be illustrated by the fact that Belgium, one of the prime 
initiative-takers for the regulation of cross-border savings, now actually has seen it 
necessary to negotiate itself an exception to the EUSTD.  
Not only have there been the expected clashes between EU member states, but also 
fundamental differences of philosophy between two international organizations, namely 
the EU and the OECD (European Voice, 3 December 1998). The financial business 
community - without doubt a very powerful and influential lobbying group5 - played an 
active role in lobbying and even in submitting direct proposals for a revised directive. 
To add a final interesting twist to the extraordinary mix of interests in the EUSTD 
negotiations, the directive is dependent not only on EU member states, but also equal 
measures being taken by selected third countries, including the United States and 
Switzerland, as well as member states' tax haven dependencies. This gives the whole 
process a unique international political dimension. It is not often that national and 
subnational, as well as international and transnational interests are so clearly present in 
one set of negotiations. 
It has been a lengthy saga of bargaining and horse-trading, full stops and redraftings, 
but in the end – despite the difficulties and even the occasional sense of despair - the 
directive was approved and is now being implemented. This however raises the main 
question of the thesis: Why is the EUSTD a fact of today? What – including structural 
mechanisms and forms of power - has generated the change of norms in international 
political economy that is embodied in the EUSTD? 
This thesis focuses on the negotiation and lobbying process leading up to the conclusion 
and ratification of the EUSTD, starting in 1989 and ending in 2004. It will seek to 
explain, not simply describe, the events of the negotiating process. It will go beyond the 
                                                 
4 A Jersey official has been quoted as pointing out that 'it was the Nazis who introduced many of the 
banking secrecy rules when they occupied the island in World War Two', while Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi made it clear at an EU summit that he would renege on the EUSTD deal if Rome 
was not given 30 years to pay a €650 million fine for exceeding milk quotas (European Voice, 20 
January 2000; 27 March 2003). 
5 See e.g. Mahoney 2004. 
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surface of the at times dramatic exchange of words to try to find regularities that might 
have caused the actors to act the way they have. This requires a deeper probing of the 
historical circumstances of the negotiations. The short historical outline in the prologue 
represents the surface, which will be both expanded and deepened throughout the 
analysis. Instead of looking only at the articulated interests of the actors, the aim is to 
systematically organize and describe those factors that have caused the interests to be 
formulated and advanced the way they have.  
These factors are presumed to form structures of power within which each actor 
operates. These structures, which may be limiting for some and to the advantage of 
others, are the primary object of this thesis. In the words of Susan Strange (1989, 24) 
structural power is 'the power to shape and determine structures of the global political 
economy within which other states, their political intuitions, their economic enterprises 
and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate'. On the 
other hand, relational power, 'as conventionally described by realist writers of textbooks 
on international relations, is the power of A to get to B to do something they would not 
otherwise do' (Ibid., 25). It is argued that in the competitive games now being played 
out in the world system, it is structural power that counts far more than relational power.  
A closer study of structural power in the context of the EUSTD negotiations can be 
helpful in bringing up new information and conclusions which could be of relevance 
also for future negotiations on direct taxation in the EU and globally. An awareness of 
the structural power that affects negotiations in such issues can give an indication of the 
direction in which the field of direct taxation is heading in the EU, as well as make 
decision-makers and negotiators more aware of hidden issues that could affect future 
negotiations.  
 
1.1 Some Initial Clarifications 
The purpose of the directive is to enable savings income in the form of interest 
payments made in one EU member state, or in Dutch and British dependencies in the 
Caribbean and the Channel Islands6 and in selected third states adopting similar 
measures (the United States, Switzerland, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San 
Marino), to beneficial owners who are individuals with a permanent residential address 
                                                 
6 The Dutch dependencies: The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The British dependencies: Anguilla, 
British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Turcs and Caicos, Cayman Islands, Isle of Man, Jersey and 
Guernsey.  
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in another member state, to be made subject to taxation in accordance with the laws of 
the state in which they are residents. It affects interest payments from savings and 
bonds, but not income from share dividends, unit trusts or insurance policies. Under the 
directive, depositors in offshore centres as well as Luxembourg, Belgium and Austria 
may choose to have tax deducted directly by their banks or to forfeit secrecy and allow 
banks to report the interest paid on their accounts. Customers would then be liable to 
pay tax at home, according to the EUSTD rules. In the other 22 EU countries, 
depositors do not have the secrecy option. (Bloomberg.com, June 30, 2005; see also 
table 2.) 
 
Table 2: Who Pays, Who Tells 
 
EU members exchanging information: 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, United 
Kingdom (incl. Gibraltar) 
 
Other states exchanging information: 
United States 
 
Territories exchanging information: 
Anguilla, Aruba, Cayman Islands, Montserrat  
 
EU members levying the withholding tax: 
Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg 
 
Other states levying the withholding tax: 
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland 
 
Territories levying the withholding tax: 
British Virgin Islands, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man, the Netherlands 
Antilles, Turks & Caicos Islands 
 
It is important to understand that the EUSTD is not a measure for tax harmonization, 
but for tax co-ordination. Especially in the early days of the EUSTD negotiations, when 
a common 20% withholding tax for interest income in the form of interest payments 
was the primary objective of the directive, it was often interpreted - incorrectly - by the 
media as being tax harmonization. Notably, while tax harmonization is the EU's 
objective with respect to indirect taxes, the concept of approximation rather than 
harmonization is the stated objective for direct taxes (Anthony & Roels 1998, 17).  
The EUSTD aims to give the member states a chance to effectively collect the taxes 
properly due from their residents. Also the withholding tax principle still gives the 
member state the authority to set the actual level of income tax. The EUSTD thus 
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represents a co-ordination of tax policy, which aims to prevent cross-border tax evasion. 
With most countries applying information exchange rather than a withholding tax, there 
can be even less doubt that the EUSTD is a co-ordination measure. This, the 
Commissioner responsible for taxation in the 1990s Mario Monti, described as 'helping 
member states do what they want to do anyway' (Ibid, 2). 
 
1.2 Review of Earlier Research 
The approaches for analysing what drives and explains changes in international tax 
policy are diverse, varying from mathematical models of competition and co-operation7 
to more constructivist approaches such as Gilligan's (2003) case study of the EUSTD. 
Yet the results of earlier studies rather seem to support than contradict each other, if 
only for the obvious reason that there is a myriad of factors that influence policy 
formation. Three wide explanations for changes in the international tax policy dominate. 
These are internationalization, institutions and country size, each of which will be 
opened up below (see Hallerberg & Basinger 1998; Gilligan 2003; Dehejia & Genschel 
1999). 
The mathematical models, tending to be described as economic research rather than 
political science, try to find explanations for one particular factor of influence. The 
descriptive case studies on the other hand, are apt to be more comprehensive in the 
sense that they do not necessarily reject the conclusions of the mathematical models 
(they may well embrace them), but try to give a more complete picture of factors that 
influence changes in tax policy. This study shares with those studies the objective to 
provide a comprehensive, rather than specific or schematic, picture of structural 
influences on tax policy change.  
In a comparative study entitled 'Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in 
OECD Countries' Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) analyse the role that economic and 
political factors played in tax reforms in OECD countries between 1986 and 1990. The 
basis for the analysis is the common perception that internationalization in the form of 
economic integration and technological advances has put pressure towards either a 
harmonization of the tax system or increased (downward) competition, i.e. the race to 
the bottom. They argue that this standard account about economic integration and 
countries adjusting their tax systems overlooks political explanations such as the 
                                                 
7 E.g. Kanbur and Keen 1993. 
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orientation of the government or institutional structure. But they find a weak correlation 
between the orientation of political parties in power and the propensity to lower taxes.  
This conclusion supports the decision to concentrate on the different forms of structural 
power in this thesis, rather than on relational power, which is more closely connected to 
the direct opinions of different actors. It is structures that limit or advance actors' 
possibilities and propensity to drive issues that Hallerberg and Basinger find more 
important. Of these, different forms of economic integration are found to be secondary, 
only giving the reason for initiative. The political structure in the form of the number of 
veto-players (e.g. party coalitions in government, upper houses and lower houses etc.) 
seemed to have the most significance. Countries with fewer veto-players were more 
likely to be able to adjust to the tax pressures initiated by economic integration, while 
those with more veto-players did not have the same possibility to react to the integration 
and would thus presumably be more likely to push for harmonization or co-ordination. 
In a EU setting the conclusions of Hallerberg and Basinger are not particularly 
enlightening; it is hardly news that the compromise-ridden decision-making processes 
in the EU lead to a watering down of policies. But if the conclusion is turned on its 
head, one can ask not only who has veto-power, but also who has the power to drive 
issues forward. This is a particularly important question in connection with the EUSTD, 
which has stayed on the EU agenda for such a long time despite many setbacks.  
Dehejia and Genschel (1999: 'Tax Competition in the European Union'), although 
taking a very different approach in their study, also fail to systematically explain the 
persistence of the EUSTD on the EU's agenda. They set out to prove the irrelevance of 
the prisoner's dilemma model as an explanation to the EUSTD negotiations. They find, 
unsurprisingly, that tax co-ordination is a loss for small tax havens and gains the large 
diversified economies. This is contrary to the prisoner's dilemma model, which 
supposes that there is mutual gain to be found in co-ordination, if only the prisoners can 
see beyond their wish to maximize personal gain. Dehejia & Genschel find that the 
prisoner's dilemma and other game theoretical approaches do not apply to tax 
competition/co-ordination because tax policy co-ordination is neither mutually 
beneficial, nor is the relevant choice between global co-ordination and global 
competition, but rather between regional co-ordination (like the EUSTD) and no co-
ordination at all. Because there might be a leakage of the benefits of the regional co-
ordination to the parts of the world that are not part of the regime, regional co-
ordination might not yield enough intracoalition benefits to make the necessary side 
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payments (to the coalitional losers) feasible because of transaction costs. The gains from 
the EUSTD are thus not obvious in the black and white sense that game theory suggests. 
Yet it has been pushed through, and it will lead to redistribution of power and wealth, if 
not in the simplistic way suggested by game theory. Dehejia and Genschel give no 
suggestions on how to explain decision making in this multifaceted situation, but are 
happy to conclude that no decisions will be made, and the race to the bottom would 
continue. But as is evident from the empirical evidence of the EUSTD, decisions that 
further co-ordination can be made even in complicated environments. 
Gilligan's (2003) article 'Whither or Wither the European Savings Tax Directive?' 
represents a study of tax policy changes much better applied to the specifics of policy-
making in the EU. Gilligan has made an analysis of the EUSTD within the framework 
of regimes, or social capital. Social capital can be interpreted as 'the norms, networks 
and typologies of trust that societies share in order to achieve shared objectives'. The 
EUSTD fits into this description and it can be asserted that the EUSTD is an 
international taxation regime, though a complicated one. He concludes that 'different 
jurisdictions (whether they are EU member states or not) will seek to produce social 
capital for themselves in different ways, and are more than likely to have different 
views of the types of taxation regimes they want to adopt in order to achieve their 
objectives'.  
While Gilligan's article remains an important point of reference for the present study, 
the aim is to go a bit wider, and raise some additional issues. Gilligan mostly answers to 
the question: What are the different opinions of the actors on the EUSTD? It would be 
useful to be able to answer also such questions as: Why does the EUSTD prevail as a 
norm? How have the different opinions been formulated? Within which constraints and 
opportunities have the decisions been made? And what have been the opportunities and 
constraints for raising the issue in the first place? 
Regime change theory, as applied also by Gilligan (2003), tends in practice to direct 
most attention to inter-governmental mechanisms and agreements on policy objectives 
and thus to the decision-making procedures of international organizations. The approach 
focuses strongly on what goes on within the organization, or in the negotiations between 
governments concerning the nature of international 'regimes'. The regime analysis too 
often overlooks or underrates the forces of the market and technology as they affect 
state domestic and foreign policies and distributional outcomes for both states and 
companies. Regimes are reduced to objects that makes it possible 'to analyze the 
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structural environment as a set of given constraints and opportunities and not as 
something that is being continually reshaped by the historically constituted and 
intersubjectively reproduced societal biases' (Guzzini 1993, 475). 
The regime approach starts at the wrong end of analysis, at the developments in 
international organizations, rather than exploring where they emanate from. Simply 
because organizations are slow to change their principles and objectives, or to adapt 
their established procedures, they can be rather distorting mirrors. The analytical 
framework suggested for this thesis tries to not leave these factors out of the political 
economy picture. Following the suggestions of Susan Strange (1989, 199-200) the 
theoretical framework will start with changes in structures of power, rather than starting 
at the other end with the reflections of change in the efforts of intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs). 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis and Empirical Materials 
The theoretical foundations of the thesis are laid in chapter two. By building up a firm 
theoretical framework based on the analysis of structural power, the thesis can 
overcome some of the problems faced in previous analyses of tax co-ordination 
measures. Based on the theoretical framework I will develop a methodological approach 
that I call bargain analysis (chapter 2.3).  
The main analysis of empirical materials, for the most part based on official documents 
and press reports of the negotiations, takes place in chapters three through six. The 
material used for the analysis needs to describe and relate to the process of negotiations 
on the EUSTD, starting in 1989, but with an emphasis on the intensified negotiations 
from 1996 onwards. Looking at the bargains that have been made is the suggested way 
to start drawing the picture of the framework of power. This will in practice mean 
looking at material from both official negotiations and their results, such as minutes and 
press reports and releases of Ecofin8 and Council meetings. Other important materials 
are Commission studies and drafts, as well as opinions given by e.g. countries affected 
by the directive and lobbying groups and comments given to the press by different 
actors.  
The main press resources used are the two leading newspapers on European issues; 
European Voice and the Financial Times, plus International Money Marketing, a 
                                                 
8 Council of Ministers in its configuration of economic and finance ministers. 
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premier source for news and comment on the European and international investment 
industry. The press reports are treated as primary material, a type of historical record 
describing how the negotiations have proceeded. Any analysis that the press reports 
might result in will be evaluated from the theoretical perspective of this thesis before 
being accepted or rejected.  Press reports from non-Anglo-Saxon resources would have 
been a welcome addition, but unfortunately the economic resources for obtaining such 
materials were not available for this thesis. 
In addition, the thesis will also make an effort to put the negotiations into a broader 
historical framework, tracing the bargaining positions back in time, often much further 
than the beginning of the EUSTD negotiations. Secondary sources inform this analysis 
of more distant historical bargaining positions.  The discussion section will also address  
possible future developments.  
The chapters roughly proceed from the systemic level in chapter three via the interstate 
level in chapter four to the domestic level in chapter five. Subchapter 3.1 looks at the 
specific impact of general European integration. The subchapters in chapter four 
concentrate on the roles of specific actors: the EU member states; the OECD; the US; 
and the colonial dependencies. The chapter on domestic issues focuses on the domestic 
constituencies, banks and business associations. Chapter six is a chapter on actors that 
have not played a role in the EUSTD negotiations in spite of their desire to exert 
influence. The chapter explains why these 'non-actors' have not participated and what 
their future possibilities are. 
In the conclusions (chapter seven) the thesis summarizes the main findings and 
arguments of the thesis. The chapter brings together the different aspects of the study, in 
an attempt to make the implicit connections between different dynamics of the 
negotiations more explicit.  A discussion of power relations - who has been left in a 
strong and who in a weak position during and as a result of the negotiations – forms an 
important part of the conclusions. The discussion naturally raises some questions for 




2 Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
The governance of finance is a relevant theme in terms of studying power, and vice 
versa. In the regulation of finance states are increasingly subject to international 
governance. On the other hand, private actors on the national level are subject to less 
public sector regulation while they have become influential participants in the 
regulatory efforts that remain. The EU’s savings tax directive (EUSTD) is a prime 
example of a result of these complex dynamics between different actors.  
Any academic analysis of the international political economy (IPE) and its dynamics 
needs to be based on a theoretical framework that can handle questions of power 
without automatically putting the state at the centre of analysis. Rather, power can be 
seen as floating on a two-dimensional axis, where one axis is a continuum between 
local, national, and transnational and the other is a continuum between private and 
public.  
Taking an IPE approach to an EU policy process can hopefully contribute to the 
mainstreaming of EU scholarship that Wallace (2000, 65) calls for. EU integration 
theories have a foundation in the European experience, and tend to explain the 
processes of the EU as being unique, a sui generis. True as it might be, it does not tell 
very much about the characteristics of the EU in any broader context. There is a need to 
improve theoretical comparison and avoid analytical isolation and self-centredness.  
EU integration theories too often begin with the institutions and their technical set-up. 
They define a certain formula or institutional mechanism that policy processes 
experience. Yet it is recognized that that the process varies greatly from case to case, 
and from one time in history to another. Also it cannot be taken for granted that the EU 
institutions provide the main junction box through which connections are made between 
country level and the global level interactions. (Wallace 2000, 6-8.) The generalizations 
provided by the theories do not give the necessary space for nuances required for an 
accurate picture of policy processes. 
This institutional focus, just as state-centrism, constructs a conception of politics that 
does not provide a full understanding of the human condition. Such a conception of 
politics fails to account for 'the range of entities that have economic and political power, 
and the range of issues and sectors that are actually driving politics.' In analysing an 
issue like the EUSTD, where clearly so many and diverse actors are involved, it is 
essential to have a theoretical framework that does not focus too much on the state or a 
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formal institutional framework.  
Another simple, but fundamental point is that the core of political economy is the link 
between economics and politics. It is a link that needs to be reinforced, as many theories 
tend to emphasize the autonomy of the 'political', show a massive indifference to 
economic forces, to markets and market operators and have a fixation with the state and 
military power. On the other hand, international economics tends to disregard power. 
Further, conventional international relations (IR) theories do not acknowledge the 
absolutely crucial issues of finance/credit and technology.9 (Tooze 2000, 282, 284.) The 
more fashionable rational choice and constructivist meta-approaches offer a more 
inclusive point of departure, but have their own specific problems, as will be discussed 
towards the end of the next subchapter.  
Susan Strange's approach of structures of power in the international political economy is 
unconventional but useful, as it puts the human condition rather than the state at the 
centre of study of IPE. Her approach is a framework, rather than a consistent theory, for 
the analysis of the world economy. In fact, Strange utterly refused to engage in 
theoretical debates and thought IR theories - spearheaded by realism and liberalism and 
their neo-versions - tell students what to think, rather than providing a way to think. 
(Ibid, 282, 284.) Taking into account the rapid development of IPE theory discussions 
since she wrote her key book in 1989, its current relevance lies in its particular view on 
epistemological and ontological questions. The approach is best understood through a 
criticism of other theories.10  
 
2.1 Normative Concerns and Analytical Questions of IPE 
According to Ngaire Woods (2001, 278) the core question of IPE is: what drives and 
explains events in the world economy? The correct answer is not a simple account of 
states versus markets, but rather of states and markets. On the world market everything 
cannot be exchanged as freely and straightforwardly as in the local bazaar. Equally, 
politicians cannot rule the world economy as they like. World markets and countries, 
                                                 
9 IPE has gone to great lengths to overcome these limitations during the past 20-30 years, but - as 
expected in any discipline of social sciences, and especially in such a young one as IPE - significant 
disputes remain over the relevant paradigms of contemporary IPE and global political economy 
theories. See Palan 2000, 2. 
10 Susan Strange (1923-1998). As a 'loner' in the IR debate, as one that utterly detested 'schools of 
thought' and preferring an 'eclectic' approach, it is unlikely that there ever will be a Strangeist school 
of IR/IPE. However, when bracketed among other IPE theories, Strange's approach is usually labelled 
iconoclastic realism. (Palan 1999, 125, 131-132.) 
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local firms, and multinational corporations, which trade and invest within and with each 
other, are all shaped by layers of regimes, i.e. rules, norms, laws, organizations (notably 
banks), and even habits. The study of IPE tries to explain what creates and perpetuates 
these regimes and what impact regimes have on the world economy. This will be the 
task of this thesis with the EUSTD as a concretisation. 
There are several competing explanations for the nature of regimes and the international 
system of political economy. The liberal, mercantilist and Marxist traditions are the 
most important approaches, each of which has a particular moral and analytical angle on 
global economic relations.  
The three theories have quite different ways of thinking about international economic 
relations. The liberal tradition is a prescriptive, broad political economy theory that 
suggests to how a society might be best governed – or left ungoverned. However, it 
does not give much attention to the role of power, which – in my view - is unavoidable 
in the study of international political economy. Mercantlists see the world economy as 
an arena of competition between states, and thus use an explicitly state-centric 
approach. The two approaches represent at least ideotypically rationalist methodologies, 
which will be discussed later. 
Finally, the Marxist approach, and its neo-Marxist versions, has proved particularly 
useful in developing a political economic interpretation of the world system that is not 
entirely based on the concept of a pluralist state system. Yet in today's world the 
emphasis on production and classes seem unavoidably too narrow a perspective. 
Additionally, it can also be argued that the neo-Marxist approaches have developed a 
paradoxically ahistoric analysis that lacks nuances. These structuralist approaches11 
represent a mode of thought broadly akin to the now more prevalent constructivism12. 
(Nederveen Pieterse 2000, 204; Palan 2000, 6-7.) 
In the specific case of the EUSTD, to which the issue of banking secrecy is central, all 
of the three theories face their particular problems: The liberal tradition finds no evident 
correct answer to whether banking secrecy is desirable or not; banking secrecy itself 
undermines the mercantilists' much cherished sovereignty of states; and finance seems 
in this case more relevant than the Marxist emphasis on production. 
Each of the theories focuses on different actors (policy-makers, states, and social 
classes) and driving forces (policy, competition, and conflict) in the world economy, 
                                                 
11 I.e. social realities determined and patterned by macro-structures (Nederveen Pieterse 2000, 204.) 
12 I.e. social realities being socially constrcuted (Ibid., 204.) 
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and each has a different conception of what order means and what is necessary to 
achieve it. Comparing the three different traditions also highlights three different levels 
of analysis: the structure of the international system, the nature of a particular 
government or competition within its institutions, and the role of interest groups and 
societal forces within a country. At each of these levels it is necessary to ask: what 
drives the actors concerned and therefore how might we explain their preferences, 
actions and the results they achieve? In answering these questions the focus of the 
debate shifts to more methodological deliberations, which today divide the study of IPE. 
(Woods 2001, 286.) 
2.1.1 Contemporary Methodological Debates 
The dominating issue of the contemporary methodological debate in IPE is that of how 
one might best explain policies and outcomes in IPE. The core of the debate is centred 
on the question if, or to what extent, one can know what states' and other actors' 
preferences and interests are. If you can, then rational choice approaches to IPE make 
sense. However, if you open up the question as to why and how states and other actors 
come to have particular preferences, as this thesis aims to do, then one is inclined to use 
approaches often labelled as constructivism. 
Instead of focusing on the ideas, personalities, ideologies, or historical traditions and 
other constraints which lie behind policies and institutions, rational choice focuses on 
the incentive structure faced by those making decisions. It is assumed that the actors' 
interests and preferences are known or fixed and that actors make strategic choices as to 
how best to promote their interests. (Gilpin 2001, 51.) The rational choice approach is 
useful even though a particular policy may seem stupid or wrong, because it may well 
have been 'rational'.  
However, actors cannot be credibly said to have only one single aim. What more, actors 
would have to have complete information about their environment to be able to make a 
credibly rational choice. In any situation there are different possible aims, and the 
preferred one undoubtedly is defined by value judgements (the thesis will return to these 
later). This goes to show how the rational choice approach is devised to explain 
anything and everything. Devising a theory leads to the automatic endorsement of the 
status quo, and does not offer any real new information on the functioning of the world 
economy. Rational in this sense means that it was a rational choice for the actor given 
the specific incentives and institutional constraints and opportunities that exist at a 
specific time. (Guzzini 2000, 55.) 
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Much more attention should be paid to the ways in which actors formulate preferences, 
as well as the processes by which decisions are made and implemented. Rather than 
assuming that a state's or decision-maker's preferences reflect rational choices within 
given constraints and opportunities, analysis in the constructivist tradition of IPE 
examine the beliefs, roles, traditions, ideologies and patterns of influence which shape 
preferences and behaviour and outcomes (Gilpin 2001, 19-20).  
This gives a much better chance of predicting future outcomes and recommending 
certain strategies in order to achieve desired outcomes. By showing which patterns of 
influence have shaped the decision-making on the EUSTD, this thesis hopes to add 
knowledge on what might shape the decision-making in the EU in the future on similar 
issues of automatic information exchange on other forms of cross-border financial 
investments.  
It is a point of departure of the theoretical and methodological framework that one 
cannot assume that preferences of actors within the world economic system reflect 
objectively definable competing interests. Rather, the way actors understand their own 
preferences will depend heavily upon prevailing beliefs and patterns of thinking in the 
world economy, many of which are embodied in institutions. The question this 
provokes is: whose interests and ideas are embodied in the rules and norms of the 
system?  
For neo-Gramscians the answer to the question lies in that whose interest is embedded 
in hegemony. The hegemonic power within the system will achieve goals not just 
through coercion in the form of relational power, but equally by ensuring the consent of 
other actors within the system. This means that dominant powers will form institutions, 
ideologies and ideas all of which help to persuade other actors that their best interests 
converge with those of the dominant power. (Woods 2001, 288.)  
This form of power will be called structural power. For example the dominance of neo-
liberalism in today's world economy, a phenomenon often labelled the Washington 
consensus, can be interpreted as a reflection of US interests in the global economy. The 
interests have been successfully projected through structures of knowledge (it became 
the dominant paradigm in top research universities), forceful proponents (such as the 
US dominated IMF), and through broader cultural beliefs and understandings (the very 
language of 'free' market contrasting with restricted or repressive regimes). The ability 
to attain international attention to certain issues, as e.g. anti-globalisation protests have 
done, places them on the agenda of international organizations and meetings and it also 
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puts pressure on political leaders and encourages interest groups and pressures to form 
within a state. As a result, the beliefs, ideas and conceptions of interest in international 
relations change and this can shift the attention, nature and functions of international 
institutions.  
 
2.2 A Framework for Analysing Structural Power 
The theoretical framework of this thesis holds the neo-Gramscian assertion of the 
significance of structures of knowledge as important determinants of structural power as 
essentially correct and necessary in order to achieve an integrated political economy 
framework of analysis. Ideas are obviously important, but there are many material, 
economic and technological constraints that limit the influence of certain ideas (Gilpin 
2001, 20). The Marxist preoccupation with the production structure is thus seen as 
complimentary to, rather than excluding of, the knowledge structure. The framework 
will, however, argue that there is a need to add two more structures of power - namely 
the security structure and the financial structure - in addition to the knowledge and 
production structures for a complete analysis of world political economy.   
Susan Strange developed this typology of four structures of power to overcome the 
limitations of conventional paradigms of IR and IPE theory, such as state-centrisism and 
the artificial separation of economy and politics.13 None of the four structures of power 
are necessarily more important than the others, each of them can affect the others and 
each of them is dependent on the others. The sources of power in the structures are 
control over security, production, credit, knowledge, beliefs, and ideas. What is 
common to all four kinds of structural power is that the possessor is able to change the 
range of choices open to others, without apparently putting pressure directly on them to 
take one decision or to make one choice rather than another. A key argument is that the 
dominant power within the system will achieve goals not just through coercion in the 
form of relational power, but equally by ensuring the consent of other actors within the 
system. (Strange 1989, 29-31.)  
Strange also asserts that the four structures of power are the primary structures of 
power, and that there are many secondary structures, which are dependent on the four 
primary structures. These secondary structures include, for example, trade, welfare, 
                                                 
13 The concept of structual power has been used by other theorists too, with slightly different, though 
related, meanings and definitions. For a thorough discussion, see Guzzini 1993. 
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transport, and energy. This thesis will not pay further attention to the secondary 
structures.  
These structures form the outer limits of actions, but Susan Strange thought that a 
framework that suggests a way to think, rather than what to think, should be based on 
the fundamentals of the human condition. 'We have to start by thinking about the basic 
values which humans seek to provide through social organization, i.e. wealth, security, 
freedom and justice' [emphasis added] she suggests. All organized societies need to 
produce these four values, but give them each a different priority or weighting. Some 
societies put security and order first, compromising the freedom of the individual (North 
Korea is an extreme example). Others give the production of material wealth the highest 
priority. And so on. Societies therefore differ from each other in the proportions in 
which they combine the different basic values. (Strange 1989, 17.) The top part of 
figure 1 represents a visual presentation of a specific ordering of the four values (the 
size and order of the value boxes is in this case irrelevant, for the example they could 
have been any other). 
Observing what weight has been given to these values is essential to the approach. The 
key question is 'Cui bono?' Who benefits? Who benefits from a new international 
financial arrangement; who benefits from free trade; who benefits from advances in 
technology; who benefits from the growth of the corporation; who benefits from the 
dominance of neoliberal ideas? (Tooze 2000, 284.) Or in more colourful terms: 'Who is 
the hammer and who is the anvil? And whose ox gets gored?' as Strange herself (1991, 
48) has put it. What in reality decides the nature of the mix of these values is a question 
of power. The study at hand will try to unveil this power. Strange recommends power 
should be thought of ‘backwards from its effects, and not in terms of intended 
outcomes’ (Guzzini 2000, 61-62).   
To analyse structural power, one needs to investigate both authority and power in 
specific historical circumstances - there is no set of universal generalizations capable of 
providing understanding of the functioning and dynamics of the world economy. 
Strange defines structural power as 'the power to shape and determine the structures of 
the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their 
economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have 
to operate'. Structural power, she continues, confers the power to shape frameworks 
within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate 
enterprises. 'Setting the agenda' and the design of international regimes of rules and 
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customs is one aspect of structural power in the world economy, but it is not all. She 
argues that it is impossible to have political power without the power to purchase, to 
command production, and/or mobilize capital just as it is impossible to have economic 
power without the sanction of political authority, without the legal and physical security 
that can only be supplied by political authority. (Strange 1989, 24-25.)  
Strange's approach is not to be understood as an overarching theory to unify 'economy' 
and 'politics'. Rather it is unifying in the sense that it searches for common points; the 
effects of the four structures of power in the policy-outcomes as seen in the weighing of 
the four values, mediated by institutions (including in a broader sense states), markets, 
and technology. (Cox 1996, 175; Strange 1991, 38-39.) 
Strange’s conception of power is structural in two senses. Firstly, the diffusion of 
international power, in both its effects and its origins, due to increased nonterritorially 
linked networks. Here, power is structural because of its indirect diffusion via 
structures. Secondly, power is structural because it refers to the increasingly diffused 
sources and agents that contribute to the functioning of the world economy. (Guzzini 
1993, 456-457.)  
Realistically the structures do not only restrict the choices open to actors, but also 
change themselves. The EUSTD is a good example; it is a regime that will have real 
implications for the power structures of the world economy. But for the present 
purposes of analysing the negotiations, and not the results as such, the restrictive nature 
of the structures is of greater importance. It has to be kept in mind though, that the 
EUSTD might indeed have had some real world implications and entailed some changes 
even before it has stepped into force.14 Based on Strange’s (1989, 29-31) motivations, 
let me in the following give a few examples of the significance of the structures in 
relation to the EUSTD.  
The greater the perceived threat to security, the higher price will be willingly paid and 
the greater risk accepted that the same defence force that gives protection will itself 
offer another kind of threat to those it claims to protect. The obvious example with 
relevance for the EUSTD would be the September 11th attacks, which put pressure for 
increased regulation and transparency of offshore investments. This happened in spite 
of the earlier perceived harm of such actions. (Stiglitz 2002, 228.) At the same time the 
                                                 
14 'For the lesson that perceptions count in politics, whether national or international, is one of the 
fundamental axioms learned by every student of international relations. It is apt to be overlooked by 
economists, although, as noted earlier, it is central to Soros' concept of the reflexive principle in 
social science' (Strange 1998, 69 reference made to Jervis 1976.)  
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slightly changed US attitude to the question has raised criticism among a significant part 
of the economic elite of the US, the possible increased regulation measures pose a new 
kind of a threat, they claim, to economic success. This can be seen as a balancing act, or 
a changing of the mix, between values of order and freedom. 
As Cox (1987) and many radical and left wing writers have demonstrated, the mode of 
production is the basis of class power over the markets. In today's markets, geared 
towards a production for world markets rather than national markets, the challenges are 
different and the problems of the classification by class are apparent. But some similar 
developments remain. With the internationalization of production many industries and 
multinational companies (MNCs) can move their factories, or expand elsewhere, while 
the worker cannot move. This has robbed labour unions in industrialized countries of 
some of their power to win concessions by the threat of strike. It strengthens the MNCs' 
positions. MNCs are often also known to be friends of multinational financial 
arrangements, not least involving the banking-secrecy of the OFCs. Controlling where, 
how, by whom, for whom, and what is produced, is structural power. It is also important 
to note that an increasingly important part of the production structure is made up of the 
production of services, such as with regard to the EUSTD, banking and investment 
services. These are also part of new alliances and networks of loyalty in production. 
Finance, or the control of credit, has enormous power to determine outcomes in 
security, production and research. It implies the power to allow or deny other people the 
possibility of spending today and paying back tomorrow. The financial structure can be 
defined as the sum of all arrangements governing the availability of credit plus all the 
factors determining the terms on which currencies are exchanged for one another. 
Taxation is a central factor in the accumulation of capital and access to credit. The 
financial structure is arguably the structure of power the most intimately connected to 
the EUSTD as, essentially, the directive regulates financial flows. 
Fourthly, and finally, knowledge is power and whoever is able to develop or acquire and 
to deny the access of others to a kind of knowledge respected and sought by others; and 
whoever can control the channels by which knowledge is communicated to those given 
access to it, will exercise structural power. At the practical or operational level offshore 
banking has been facilitated by the development of technology, which is dependent on 
knowledge and, knowledge may yet prove it possible to find ways around the EUSTD.  
But the knowledge structure can also be seen as a source of structural power on an 
abstract level of ideas. It could be seen as dominant to the other three structures if it is 
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considered in the light of the spread of the capitalist system. Susan Strange has been 
criticized for 'perhaps (...) underestimat[ing] the autonomy of frameworks, their basis in 
intersubjective meanings, in acquired and deeply rooted habits of thought, sustained, to 
be sure by a hierarchy of real power, but not necessarily shaped consciously to make 
structures.' (Cox 1996, 184.) Indeed, in the analysis of structural power lies a danger of - 
in the end - explaining things from a relational power view, as Strange can be argued to 
do when she speaks of the United States as determining the frameworks. However, this 
only highlights the importance of the power inherent in structures, which may not 
always be the power to consciously make structures. But for the sake of clarity, in an 
study that is conducted at a specific level and not the world-cultural level, it is better to 
consider the capitalist system as an overarching normative umbrella that is affected by 
and consists of the four structures of power, rather than as a part of the knowledge 
structure that automatically affects the other three structures of power. 
 
2.2.1 Annotations on Strange's Theoretical Framework 
The fact that Strange’s theoretical framework embraces both the neo-Gramscian 
constructivist approach (knowledge), the neo-Marxist structuralist approach 
(production), the realist tradition’s views of security, and her own groundbreaking 
thoughts on finance, makes it prone to serious criticism from several intellectual 
traditions. Realism, structuralism and constructivism all represent traditions that make 
assumptions about the functioning of the international system, which are incompatible 
with each other. However, Strange did not see the world as functioning according to 
some single theoretical notion, while theory is still important to unveil the extent of the 
possible (Guzzini 1998, 177; Strange 1998b, 22). Her greatest contribution to the IPE 
discussion lies not in theoretical rigidity, but in her contribution to the conceptualization 
of structural power. 
Structural power approaches, however, run the risk of overplaying their causal strength 
and understating the non-materialist aspects of rule or governance (Guzzini 2000, 54). It 
is thus important to always be as clear as possible in the description of the source of 
power. Yet this is exactly the problem of the structural power approach - it emphasizes 
the results, not the sources of power. This is because the source of power is very 
elusive, a structure; a systemic bias or an unintended result.  
The four different forms of structural power run the risk of becoming a short-circuit for 
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leaving things unexplained despite opposite appearance. Strange's approach includes the 
theoretically equal treatment of sources and structures of power, and their 
interdependence. This implies a fungibility, or exchangeability, of sources of power. 
Yet no formula or theory of how this actually works is presented. However, in the 
constructivist underpinnings that the theory embraces there is an obvious answer: The 
exchangeability of sources of power is an effect of social conventions, not some 
inherent or objective criteria. (Guzzini 2000, 65.) 
Systematic bias effects are only incidental - a theoretically rigid hypothesis of when a 
structural bias will produce a tangible result or effect has not been outlined by Strange, 
nor by anyone else (Guzzini 1998, 181). Are the unintended effects environmental 
constraints or purely random phenomena? Both, perhaps, but that begs the question of 
who is responsible? (Guzzini 1993, 459.) Such an analytical weakness provides the 
basis for strong criticism towards Strange's approach - in her own research she has been 
at times very explicit in pointing a finger at the guilty ones of creating or supporting the 
weaknesses of the world economy. It is hoped - perhaps - that the constant questioning 
of  'cui bono' will show who the winners and the losers are. But are the winners 
synonymous with those responsible? 
Another underdeveloped area of the structural power concept is the non-separation of 
the non-decision, unintended result bias and the systemic bias through conscious 
manipulation. Both lumped together under the term structural power, yet it would seem 
they are quite different in their nature. (Guzzini 1993, 462.) However, the mere fact that 
the structural power concept draws attention to such unconventional forms of power 
makes it valuable, if not (yet) precise enough. 
In conclusion, the structural power approach leaves much to be desired, despite its 
theoretical eclecticism. In particular its inductive methodology combined with the 
apparently random results produced by intended as well as unintended structural 
processes and dynamics, produce theoretical consequences that are difficult to grapple. 
What is the causal and especially the predicative character of the structural power 
approach if context plays such an important role? It has the potential of providing 
detailed and accurate analysis of a particular situation, but as a consequence no 
generalizations are possible. Indeed, discussion may amount to little more than educated 
guesses, but this is preferable to ignoring the problem of making generalizations in the 




2.3 Bargain Analysis 
The aspiration to overcome the divide between domestic and international, as well as 
political and economic research, plus the focus on issues that are rarely considered 
together, such as market, finance, knowledge and power and their interdependencies, 
makes the structures of power approach a powerful tool for providing as complete a 
picture of reality as possible. After having recognized the importance of looking at 
structures in the international political economy - also in the case of the EUSTD - the 
next step is to outline a more concrete way to proceed with the analysis. How can a 
particular situation be analysed so as to discern in more detail where a government, a 
political movement or a corporate enterprise has a range of feasible choices, and what 
possible scenarios might follow, depending on which choices are made? Strange (1989, 
39-42) proposes that one should look at the key bargains in any situation, and then 
decide which might, and which probably will not, be liable to change, altering the range 
of choices for all or some of those concerned. Building on these thoughts, I will develop 
a basic methodological approach of my own that I have named bargain analysis. 
To do this one needs to start by looking at the bargains between different actors and 
display empirical, historical and causal links to these bargains. In order to concretize 
Strange's framework and to gain a systematic formulation of explanatory positions, the 
bargains will be arranged into separate categories under each structure of power. The 
key bargains in the international political economy that in Strange's view one should 
look at are those between (1) authority and market, (2) intergovernmental and (3) 
domestic bargains (and their connections), (4) bargains between central and commercial 
banks, and (5) bargains between private sector actors. These bargains form part of a 
web that constructs the structures of power of the international political economy. 
The basic bargain to look for is often a tacit one, that between authority and market. 
Even in a command economy there is a kind of bargain between authority in the form of 
the state ministries, and market in the form of consumers and producers. To maintain 
the authority of the state, a bargain has to be struck with the producers - managers and 
workers - to reward them sufficiently and to give effective incentives for them to 
produce the goods and services that will sell to consumers.  
Regarding the EUSTD, the relevant authorities in the negotiations on the savings tax 
directive need to be outlined, and a deliberation especially on the role of international 
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organizations and non-state actors is necessary. Also the market must be analysed. The 
market conditions may or may not be vulnerable to change in the power structures. It 
might depend on if the market is in stable or volatile condition, whether there are many 
or few 'buyers' and 'producers' on the market.  
One set of bargains - inevitably in a system in which political authority is so 
concentrated in the hands of many states - is that made between governments of states. 
These are often dependent on the domestic bargains. Such bargains can be between 
political parties, or between the government and representatives of sectoral interests. 
Identifying whose support, political, financial or moral, is indispensable to the partners 
in the key bargains is often an essential stage in the analysis of a dynamic situation. 
Another set of bargains, which is of importance for the world economy today, is the 
bargain between central banks and commercial banks. Bankers should not be too sure 
that the central bank will bail them out in times of crisis, so that there is some limit to 
the risks that are taken. Yet, if they do not have confidence in the willingness of the 
central bank as a lender of last resort, they are unlikely to listen to it and follow its 
warnings.  
With corporations, whether private or state-owned, as well as with commercial banks, 
the bargains struck will differ in character from country to country and from sector to 
sector. Different forms of co-operational structures and organizations between private 
financial institutions on a European and international level might be of particular 
importance in relation to the EUSTD. 
All of these bargains might not have relevance for the EUSTD negotiations under each 
structure of power, but this does in no way diminish the validity of the approach. Part of 
Strange's eclecticism is to allow the researcher to engage with events as they happen 
and not leave out any important facts just to validate a reductionist theory. (Palan 1999, 
126; Tooze 2000, 284.)  
Strange's theoretical framework can be seen to form a web or space of nexuses where 
the bargains between each set of actors is made concerning the four basic values 
(wealth, security/order, freedom/independence, and justice/equality) in each structure 
(security, production, finance, and knowledge). With different combinations of the 
different 'ingredients' there are hundreds of different 'types' of nexuses that can be 
identified (see figure 1). Values are given a specific prioritization or weighting as 
illustrated in the top part of figure 1. These value judgements are made between a 
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specific pair of 'actors' or 'players' (the rows) in a specific structure (the columns). Add 
to this the fact that there may be other values than the four main values described by 
Strange, that there are substructures to the four main structures of power and that the 
nature of actors in any specific bargain may vary greatly. The nuances are so many that 
it is impossible to make any simplification that would accurately describe the 'reality'.  
 
 
Figure 1: The web of nexuses: 442 possibilities. 15 
W = wealth, F = freedom, S = security, J = justice 
 
This almost infinite possibility of combinations describes well the complexity of 
society. The nexuses can be described as dots in a children's 'connect the dots' drawing. 
The nexuses cannot be seen as separate from each other; the connections between them, 
how they affect each other and how they are interlinked, will have to be considered. The 
web that they form, is the structure of power within which, in this case, the negotiations 
and lobbying on tax policy change have been held. In a historical process nexuses often 
form simultaneously; a change in the production structure of banking services is often 
                                                 
15 Central bank/private banks could also be added to the actor column. However, in this thesis their 
relevance towards the EUSTD negotiations is significantly less than the relations between other 
actors. 
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Figure 2: Visualization of a 
nexus 
also a change in the financial structure; change in job security is often also a change in 
wealth, increased order may result in increased or decreased justice.  
It is important to note that the values shall be understood in their broad meaning 
(Strange 1989, 5), security refers to e.g. military security, job security and increased 
order in the form of financial regulation. Justice refers to issues of equal treatment; 
freedom to both economic freedom, often opposed to increased order/regulation and to 
freedom of choice or an entity's independence. Wealth is also a complicated notion, 
even though it at first might seem the most 'quantifiable'. Wealth can be relative or 
absolute, economic or cultural, and it can be measured at different levels (e.g. European, 
national or company level).  
Because of their simultaneousness and their interdependence it is not easy to explicitly 
include the nexuses in written form without obstructing the understanding of the 
historical situation and straining the text by splitting it up according to theoretical 
notions. In this respect I agree with Strange (1989, 6, 229), who thought theoretical 
rigidity never should obstruct the understanding of a historical situation, and also 
concluded that her own analysis of e.g. the transport systems and supply of energy of 
the world became essays in sectoral analysis, rooted in the lived experience.  
This thesis will attempt to give the analysis more theoretical support by incorporating in 
visual form the most important nexuses at each historical passing of events described. 
The nexuses will clarify which value judgements have been discerned, and from which 
the analysis has started, which actors are seen to have been the main bargainers of these 
values, and within which structure of power they have primarily acted. All these choices 
can certainly be criticized, and represent my interpretation of the lived experience, albeit 
often with the support of expert analysis. Following Strange's (1989, 229) 
recommendations, they are 'my own picked strawberries, not a basket of ready-picked 
and packaged fruit'.  
The nexus is formed as a compromise or bargain between 
different values and different actors in one structure (figure 
1). From this I derive a simplified model, that outlines the two 
main values between which the bargain has been weighted, 
and the two main parties (actors) to the bargain (see figure 2). 
Otherwise similar interconnected or simultaneous bargains may only differ in one 
aspect; either in one of the values or in one of the actors. In order to save space, in such 





nexus.  As the four structures are interdependent, the bargains will often happen 
simultaneously in two or more structures. At such instances only the structure judged 
more important will be visualized in a nexus.   
Structural power is not anything clearly touchable or easily definable. Thus the nexuses 
describing part of the extremely complex web that a historical process relies on can 
appear somewhat detached from the text and they may disturb the reading if paid too 
much attention to. They are a heuristic map and serve as theoretical pinpoints along the 
way of the study. While the actors will be quite easy to connect to the text, and also the 
structural context is usually fairly clear, the values are often very implicit. This happens 
because e.g. bringing in new market regulations is not easily reduced to any one of the 
four values. Regulation can bring more justice in distributional outcomes; it can bring 
more security and predictability (order) to the markets; it might entail costs, but it might 
also create more wealth; and usually more regulation means less freedom for markets. 
Their frequent implicitness does not reduce the validity of the approach though, as their 
spelling out in the visualization of the nexuses only constructs a theoretical web upon 
which a more nuanced historical reality exists.  
In conclusion, the greatest advantage of bargain analysis, as opposed to analysis of 
reform in international organizations or abstract economic theory, is that it is more 
likely to result in a feasible prescription for policy-makers in business or in government 
and politics. The bargain analysis can also function as an indication of what changes 
have been and are attempted to be made in the structures of power, and what changes 
face obstacles in the structures of power. (Strange 1989, 42.) 
 
2.4 Detailed Research Questions 
This thesis will avoid the judgements of correct policies that the liberal economic school 
advocates in its approach. Rather it will try to answer the question why certain decisions 
have been made on the EUSTD. The study does not content itself with looking at the 
state as the main actor that affects markets, as does the mercantilist approach. There are 
many other actors that potentially need to be taken into consideration, and the markets 
also affect the states. It is important to look at states and other authorities, as well as the 
market and the balance between them. This study shares the concern about structures 
with Marxism, an approach that also offers a cross-sectoral state-market approach that 
overshadows the artificial division into political and economic studies. Marxism's 
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concentration on only the production structure is seen as not comprehensive enough, 
however. The four relevant structures are production, finance, security and knowledge. 
Synthesizing the aims of the research, the specific research question can be formulated 
as: What has generated the change of norms in the international political economy that 
is embodied in the EUSTD? Although accepting that the EUSTD is an international 
regime, the issue will not simply be analysed within the framework of regime-change. 
In addition to the question 'what were/are the different opinions of the actors on the 
EUSTD?' the thesis aims to answer also such questions as: Why does the EUSTD prevail 
as a norm? How have the different opinions been formulated? Within which constraints 
and opportunities have the decisions been made? And what have been the opportunities 
and constraints for raising the issue in the first place? 
In line with the open-ended approach that Susan Strange's theoretical framework 
provides, the research will also try to determine whether the current set of actors see the 
EUSTD as a completed project or as a work in progress. How do the actors see their 
current opportunities and constraints on the EUSTD issue? Adding another interesting 
perspective the thesis will also consider the potential actors that have been constrained 
to stay outside the EUSTD negotiations, despite their wish to participate: What are the 
opportunities and constraints for potential (not only actual) actors? 
To do the above, the lobbying and decision-making on the EUSTD will be analysed in 
the broad framework of four structures of power in IPE. With some of their main 
features in mind, the study will through bargain analysis discern in more detail where a 
government, a political movement or a corporate enterprise has a range of feasible 
choices, and what possible scenarios might follow, depending on which choices are 
made. The theoretical approach will dent the study towards a narrative nature, including 
ventures into history. 
The study will now proceed by roughly starting from the most general and global level 
(chapter 3), via the state-state dominated international level (chapter 4), to the domestic 
bargains (chapter 5). Because the levels cannot be neatly separated from each other, 
each chapter presents a mixture of interconnected bargains. 
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3 Sovereign States and Offshore Markets 
By looking at the basic dynamics of the global markets (such as competition and 
mobility), the legal foundations of the state system and the political underpinnings of 
sovereignty, and their respective significance for offshore finance, this chapter aims to 
discern the most relevant constraints and opportunities for regulatory efforts such as the 
EUSTD. They define a certain space of possibility for the negotiations and are as such a 
concretisation of structures of power. These dynamics are also historically defined and 
are a result of longue durée16 historical bargains. In the latter part of the chapter the aim 
is to answer the question how these general systematic dynamics lend themselves to the 
introduction of new regulatory efforts such as the EUSTD. 
Offshore finance is essentially a legal device used in connection to many different, 
though interconnected, markets (Palan 1999, 21). One cannot separate a specific 
offshore financial market, but there are many overlapping markets that use offshore to a 
greater or lesser extent. Offshore can be understood as a characteristic describing the 
markets. In the context of the EUSTD the most important markets are the Eurobond 
market and the service market of banks offering offshore savings accounts to 
individuals (Brouwer & Kinnegim 2003, 1). Both carry a degree of offshore traits that 
the EUSTD aims to regulate.  
In his essay on the origins and characteristics of offshore, Ronen Palan (1999, 35) 
concludes that: 'While sovereignty plays an enabling role in the evolution of offshore, it 
equally plays a constraining or distortive role'. This is a good starting point for making 
an important distinction between the enablement and constraining of offshore. What this 
research aims to look at is the constraining of offshore, through the implementation of 
the regulatory regime represented by the EUSTD. So while the research concerns the 
constraining of offshore, it also concerns both the enablement and constraining of 
possibilities for regulation.  
Palan already provides some answers. He says that offshore is: (a) an integrated space, 
(b) supported by the legal framework of the state system, and (c) driven 'unwittingly' by 
interstate competition (Ibid., 35). 
                                                 
16 French historian Fernard Braudel's conception of the longue durée (usually translated rather 
misleadingly as "the long perspective") is not easy to express in non-historical terms as a theoretical 
concept; it is the recognition that human society develops and changes at different rates in relation to 
different underlying forces, and that all the elements within any human situation interact with one 
another. There are underlying geographical constraints; there are natural regularities of behaviour 
related to every activity, whether climatic or seasonal or conventional; there are social customs; there 
are economic pressures. (see Braudel 1969) 
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The legal framework is composed of a state's sovereign right to 
write specialized and targeted laws that affect either a distinct 
geographic area of its territory or a 'virtual' device, such as a 
special booking device that allows for regulatory laxity. 
Offshore defines areas of activity in which states have chosen to withhold some or all of 
the regulations and taxation they otherwise impose on their territories. (Ibid., 25.) Why 
have they chosen (through action or non-action) to do so? The answer lies in 
competition. 
Capital seeks to gain a competitive advantage by locating in 
low-tax jurisdictions with strict banking secrecy and political 
stability. One major source of stability for the otherwise 
politically quite isolated tax havens is – in the case of the 
British dependencies – the use of the sterling pound as their currency, adding to the 
economic stability of the country. Customers are also seeking security at the micro level 
of the banks and other institutions that they use offshore. Most offshore finance centres 
do not offer sophisticated consumer protection legislation or compensation schemes, so 
investors are more likely to use a bank operating in a tax haven if they feel secure in the 
knowledge that a banking crisis would be bailed out by the central bank of a major 
metropolitan power, such as the Bank of England. (Christensen, John, personal 
communication, May 3rd, 2005.) Andorra, Monaco and San Marino have all adopted 
the euro, much for the same reasons (Bonte 2002, 8). Tax havens with a less stable 
currency, such as Vanuatu that uses its own vatu, are invariably less successful. 
Savings and bonds are a particularly mobile tax base, so that the competition for this 
base should be expected to be especially pronounced (Dehejia & Genschel 1999, 412). 
There are two possible ways that capital mobility may affect tax rates. First, capital may 
become more mobile during a given period, which makes states more vulnerable to 
capital flight than they were before. Technological advances, which are widely agreed 
to have enhanced the possibilities of making use of offshore finance, are the most 
obvious example of a means of making capital more mobile. Also, greater economic 
openness may increase the awareness of a high-income person of his or her net worth in 
other countries and of his or her ability more generally to take advantage of different tax 
rates. These two issues are often connected to the process or phenomenon of 
globalization. Bird and Wilkie (2000, 83) write: 
'The villain, of course, is "globalization" - an imprecise term that to some 
finance 






degree has become the mantra of analysts captivated and confused by 
challenges to the relevance and effectiveness of national tax and trade policies 
arising from transnational activity, particularly in contexts such as the EU and 
NAFTA, in which such activity is encompassed in a new(ish) institutional 
framework. Globalization implies the increased intersection of national or 
regional economies, in a setting in which fewer intrinsic characteristics of 
economic activity associate it with any particular political jurisdiction.' 
A second possibility is that capital already is somewhat mobile at a certain time in 
history in which there exists an equilibrium. This equilibrium then changes when one 
country (of particular importance) reduces its tax rate relative to others. (Hallerberg & 
Basinger 1998, 330, 334.) 
But offshore also has its own costs. Among the distortive roles of sovereignty in relation 
to offshore, Palan finds that offshore in contradiction to the theory of comparative 
advantage moves economic activity to geographically irrelevant areas and thereby 
distorts the relocation of international capital. It is also expensive to run offshore 
facilities as vast amounts of resources are diverted from productive investments to 
secondary services such as accountants, lawyers and civil servants. (Palan 1999, 35.) 
Similarly, capital investments are made where profit opportunities are the greatest. 
Whether the savings that finance those investments are filtered through a tax haven or 
not makes little difference for their final destination. If the location of bank deposits had 
any significant effect on business investment, the Cayman Islands would be clogged 
with factories (The American Prospect, Nov 18, 2002).  
Nevertheless, ‘creative’ accountants and lawyers who are highly rewarded for their 
activities aid the offshore process. Financial markets have been instrumental in creating 
new 'high-net worth individuals'; many of the richest people in the world are fund 
managers or, in some cases, petty investors turned millionaires.  (Patomäki 2001, 51; 
Palan 1998, 639.) 
Offshore centres (OFCs) not only compete with each other in 
their particular niches, but also rely on each other’s existence in 
a functional hierarchy. Most banks located in the OFCs are 
branches or subsidiaries of international banks. Their main 
activity is collecting deposits from various markets and channelling them back to their 
parent institutions: The Caribbean locations interact with New York, and the Channel 
Islands with London. The Caribbean and Channel Islands centres are essentially 






are physically made. (Lewis 1999, 84-85.) 
The shutting down of one offshore centre, or one type of 
regulatory activity in a particular OFC, does not prove a 
problem for the structural foundations of offshore. Another will 
simply replace one OFC, e.g. Cuba was by and large replaced in 
the 1960s as an OFCs by the Bahamas (Palan 1999, 33). Not only countries designated 
as OFCs form part of the puzzle. Eleven member states (of the then fifteen members) of 
the European Union do not tax interest on the savings of individuals based in other 
member states, a ploy to attract capital (Financial Times, Mar 15, 1999). Which brings 
us back to the 'unwitting' competition.  
* * * 
The regulatory system of sovereign states that today's world is based on, together with 
the capitalist markets, are of no one's particular construction. However, both the 
Westphalian nation-state system and capitalism largely emerged in Europe and have 
been copied and spread elsewhere. The systems have evolved sometimes with more co-
ordination and sometimes with less. Most of the basic bargains between the authorities 
and markets are tacit ones. Some of the tacit bargains could be changed by the 
(unrealistic) change of world system17. Within the current world system, reversing the 
enabling features of offshore and strengthening the constraining features of offshore can 
change the bargains. 
Consequently, any meaningful regulation must be as global as possible in character and 
the regulator has a set of options open to pursue for the structural enablement of 
regulation: It can seek to increase the costs of offshore activities relative to 'onshore' 
activities; increase the profits of onshore activities; decrease the rewards (wealth, 
reputation) for lawyers and other professionals; aim at any particular level of the 
offshore hierarchy; build on the legal framework provided by different state actors that 
contribute to the offshore system at a selected level of the offshore hierarchy; decrease 
the sovereign rights of any entity to write its own law; physically interfere with the 
technical systems enabling offshore transactions; and constrain knowledge about tax 
rates and benefits in other countries. The mere threat of decreasing sovereign rights or 
physical interference may be enough to make a difference, and these two elements can 
                                                 
17 Some would say the EU is doing just this, with its model of regional co-operation spreading to other 
continents. At the same time there are indications of interregional co-operation, e.g. the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM). 
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also to some extent be categorized as relational power rather than structural power. 
The above is not a list of elements that are included in the EUSTD, but a list of bargains 
that enable regulation of offshore based on a system of sovereign states. They are mirror 
images of the 'regulation-constraining' and 'offshore-enabling' features. Bargains are not 
absolute in the sense that they would represent all or nothing, but they all place on a 
continuum of enabling and disabling (or neutral). Verbs such as increase, decrease, and 
constrain all represent a direction rather than an absolute end; even interfering can be of 
varying intensity. (Only ‘build’ used in connection to legislation work, is more absolute; 
avoiding legislating is not possible in the system of sovereign states.) E.g. if the profits 
of offshore activities change for the worse, there may be less opposition to regulation. 
The thesis will now proceed to discerning in more detail where and why on the 
continuum these general bargains have fallen in the EUSTD negotiations.  
 
3.1 From European Security to European Taxation and Back 
Of the above-presented tacit bargains between market and 
authority, the greater economic openness that particularly 
European market integration has brought deserves careful 
attention when looking at the EUSTD. European integration 
has increased the awareness of tax rates in other countries, and has with the introduction 
of the euro made the comparison of a person's net-worth easier. But, above all, the EU 
and its member states have themselves removed much regulation by eliminating all 
capital exchange controls within the EC during the 1990s. Member states were prepared 
to make his bargain, and it was generally judged to be crucial in increasing the 
competitiveness and wealth of the EU. What historical factors explain the EU member 
states’ positions? 
It is well known that the 'European project' has its origins in 
issues of security, in (particularly the French) attempts to 'tie 
down' Germany (in the 1950s, to begin with, its coal resources) 
through a union with supranational authority. Arguably the 
most serious disruption of the project so far came in the mid-1960s in divergence over 
Germany's and France's respective relations with the United States and the European 
Union. France was uncomfortable with the increasing powers of the Commission, and 
eventually stalled the European project. Also, France under de Gaulle, against American 
finance 






wishes, had opened trade relations with the Soviet Union. A few weeks later France 
withdrew from NATO, declaring the independence of a French nuclear force de frappe.  
France, laying to the west of Germany, could better afford to be a partial free rider on 
American Cold War strategies. Also France, proud of its culture and eager to portray 
itself as a leading figure in world affairs, was not at ease with the ever-stronger 
American influence throughout the world. The French attitude towards America was 
mirrored in financial politics. De Gaulle attacked the 'extraordinary privileges' of the 
dollar in the international gold exchange standard set up under the Bretton Woods 
Agreement back in the 1940s. But Germany failed to stand by France in the debates on 
international monetary reform. (Strange 1998, 64.) Strange (1998, 65) explains: 
'Germany owed its security from the Red Army to the US nuclear umbrella; the 
price, as the United States repeatedly made clear, of the implicit bargain was 
German membership and support for NATO and compliance with US interests in 
the management of money and finance.'  
With increasing uncertainty in the international monetary 
system, due to the growing US deficit on the balance of 
payments18, the EC governments were since the late 1960s 
pushed towards the creation of an internal market and a 
monetary union. Also volatile exchange rates made the agreed interventions prices in 
the common agriculture policy difficult to realize. But due to the power of financial 
markets over governments, both the Werner Plan of the 1970s and the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 1980s and 1990s came apart. As governments 
were not prepared to take the necessary commitments to stymie the markets (e.g. 
committing to treating national reserves as common property), their attempts failed due 
to financial reasons. (Ibid., 66-68.) 
The global financial structure both pushed the Europeans to 
several attempts at monetary integration and tore the attempts 
apart. But contrary to de Gaulle's attempt in the 1960s to 
gather a common European position on financial policy, the 
                                                 
18 The increasingly serious pressure on the US balance of payments, was in turn connected to both the 
security and production structure. The dollar outflow was strong because of American spending on 
security in Western Europe and the Pacific. To reduce the dollar drain, the Americans had either to 
spend less abroad and curtail American globalism or increase exports by lowering American wages. 
The devaluing of the dollar was neither an option, as it would have meant that the US would have to 
sacrifice its unique international monetary position at the centre of the Bretton Woods system. 
Eventually the Americans tried to solve the problem by introducing capital controls. The move led to 
the creation of the Euromarkets. (Frieden 1987, 82-84.) 
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security structure was from the mid-80's onwards pushing the Europeans in a common 
direction. The United States seemed to be more and more inclined to act unilaterally in 
defence and foreign policy in Europe, without bothering to consult the Europeans, 
which upset also the Germans. (Ibid., 68.)   
From this perspective the fact that European monetary integration has considerably 
speeded up since the end of the Cold War - with the advent of the EMU in 1991 - is not 
a mere coincidence. The conflicts in the Western Balkans prompted the development of 
the EU’s own military capabilities (Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 24). By the end of the 
Cold War, the security structure changed so that the Germans were less susceptible to 
pressures from Washington. With the Commission being headed by Frenchmen, the 
Commission was no longer an enemy, but rather a tool of French ambitions. Amongst 
other, the push by the European Round Table of Industrialists for a single European 
market created a euro-euphoria after a long time of stalled integration.19  
The shift from a dominant Keynesian economic consensus 
towards monetarism in the late 1970s and 1980s, narrowed the 
debate on EMU, enabling policy-makers to focus on monetary 
policy without taking broader macroeconomic and fiscal 
implications into considerations (Wallace 2000b, 529).  As earlier attempts had shown, 
without this blind-eye there could be no financial integration in the EU. 
With these political underpinnings the EU member states tried to resolve the problems 
of the ERM, and knowing where the EMU is today, one cannot deny at least their short-
term success. The monetary turmoil experienced in 1995, largely caused by the slide in 
the value of the dollar, in fact strengthened the member states' political determination to 
go ahead with EMU. (Strange 1998, 69-70; ‘The second stage of the EMU’ at Europa 
website.)  
Yet, clearly the power of financial markets is tearing on the strengths of the EMU, 
considering the recent loosening of the stability pact. It seems, as Strange (1998, 74) 
had predicted in 1998, that German monetary hegemony in the EU has doomed 
European economies to prolonged slow growth, high unemployment and low 
competitiveness. This in turn means that there is an incentive for governments to lower 
taxes in order to boost growth, yet tax money is needed on a short-term basis to finance 
                                                 
19 The assertion is a contested one: Some scholars emphasize the role of supranational actors like the 
ERT, the Commission and the ECJ, while others argue that the single market was the product of 





the welfare systems. The EUSTD in this sense represents an ideal solution for 
governments struck by slow economic progress (notably Germany and France, but not 
the UK); an immediate source of income without the burden of de jure raising taxes. 
One can note an increased tendency by the member states to see action by the EU and 
the Commission as an answer to the immoderations of globalization (Bonte 2002, 5). 
* * * 
The EUSTD's origin in European integration, in particular in 
the free movement of capital - one of the four freedoms of the 
internal market - and in the EMU is undisputed. Loukas 
Tsoukalis (2000, 175) writes: 
‘Monetary union carries implications for a wide range of other policy domains 
(…). The regulation of financial markets is one field of potential spill-over, 
especially given the rapid restructuring in this sector, partly a consequence of 
the move towards a single currency. Questions of tax harmonization, or of the 
prevention of harmful tax competition, are creeping on to the EU agenda’ 
This is reflected in a 1996 Commission motivation for the necessity to introduce an EU-
wide tax package ('the Verona paper'). The Commission had identified a structural 
change in the EU member states' tax systems, with the less mobile labour tax base being 
taxed more heavily than the more mobile capital tax base. The Commission expressed 
increasing concern that the burden on labour cannot be made any heavier, pending the 
risk of the tax base erosion through the underground economy, but also not to worsen 
the already negative effects on labour costs and employment. The diversity of national 
tax regimes for capital income, and particularly the generally favourable treatment 
given to interest paid to non-residents, produces economic distortions both within and 
between member states, and were/are seen as non-compatible with the notion of a single 
capital market within the EU. Counteracting the erosion of member states’ tax revenues 
was seen as a particularly crucial objective as they were, and still are, making efforts to 
meet the Maastricht requirements on fiscal discipline. (Commission of the European 
Communities 1996, 2-5, 9.) 
The smooth functioning of the internal market is of course essential for the 
competitiveness of the European Union. The EU and its member states increasingly see 
the European project as one of competition with the rest of the world. In the early days 
of integration, there was a desire to remove barriers and unnecessary bureaucracy 
between member states - 'negative integration'. As progress has been made in many 
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such areas, there has been a move to 'positive integration', a desire to build something 
innovative and uniquely European.20 This is not least proved by the rhetorical emphsis 
laid on the implementation of the EU's Lisbon and Gothenburg Strategies on European 
competitiveness and development, even though significant divergiencies on how to 
actually implement the strategies remain. 
While the European project started out as a peace-building project, it has moved 
increasingly in the direction of a competition project, profiling the EU against the rest of 
the world (Cooper 1999, 18-19). As the security structure has moved to the background, 
first the production structure and then the financial structure have emerged at the front 
of the European project. The difference in quality of the relations with the US could not 
be clearer. The relatively strong euro in relation to the dollar gives the EU increased 
political muscle (although serious internal political divergences that prevent it from 
being used remain). Recently the EU has moved into profiling itself on foreign and 
security policy ever more actively, a venture that the US has received with mixed 
feelings and scepticism. As the security structure has re-emerged as a determinant of the 
European project, the reversed parallels to the Cold War times speak for themselves. 
These macro-level bargains, combined with the dynamics of the markets and the state 
system, and the acceptance of these by the member states is what got the EUSTD on the 
political agenda of the EU already back in 1989. Together the dynamics and macro-
level bargains are similar to what Helen Wallace (2000, 41) calls ‘forces of magnetism’:  
 ‘Sometimes forces of magnetism are so strong that they create a propensity to 
settle policy at transnational level, while at other times the country-based forces 
of magnetism keep policy-making located at the country level.’ 
Different countries are differently affected by economic integration, and their economic 
structures are in many ways different from each other, even though they now rely on an 
integrated base. In the long run, what is bad for the EU as a whole in terms of 
competitiveness is also bad for all member states. In the short run, this may not be so, 
and this - in part - has created the basic divergences surrounding the EUSTD 
negotiations. The story of this chapter has showed the structural positions and self-
perceptions in the conjunctures21 evolving towards being more favourable for EUSTD-
type regulations. The EUSTD appeared on the agenda deeply embedded in historical 
dynamics. 
                                                 
20 For a comprehensive overview of theories of regulation in the European context see e.g. Hix 1999. 
21 The concept was used by Braudel to place within an understanding of time simultaneously the long and 
short duration: in other words, structural process and event. (see Braudel 1969) 
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4 Intergovernmental and IGO Bargains 
The previous chapter provided an overview of longue durée structural issues of offshore 
activity. In the subchapter 3.1 a first move towards a conjuncture, i.e. where structures 
meet events, was observed. It represented a conjuncture of the structres of power and 
events in the EU's general developement and integration. As such it represents an 
essential background for understanding the specific conjuctures of structures and events 
of the EUSTD negotiations.  
The study now moves on to an analysis of the bargaining and structural issues of the 
specific events of the EUSTD negotiations. These may be conjuntures of the lognue 
duree and specific EUSTD events or connections between an EUSTD event and some 
other conjuncture, such as the EU's or a member state's general development. 
Bargaining between governments are the most animated, as is evident from the 
prologue, and dominate this chapter - domestic and private sector bargains will be 
discussed in chapter five. Intergovernmental bargain analysis should not be 
misinterpreted as a state-centric approach. The finance lobby is an imprtant actor and in 
particular, the market dynamics, and also the significance of technology, affected and 
influenced the negotiations at all levels.  
The chapter aims to set the events of intergovernemntal into a context where causal 
connections between other related events become clear, and to display the way these 
events have been influenced by structural power. This often happens from a point of 
view of a historical analysis that extends further than simply the events of the 
negotiations themselves.  
 
4.1 War of Words: Setting the Agenda 
Although it is not the most essential of bargains, and uncovers only a few facts of what 
goes on in politics, the setting of the agenda in the EU is a good starting point for the 
analysis of bargains struck between governments. The appearance of the EUSTD on the 
Commission's agenda is the apparent beginning of the EUSTD. Before that, any 
bargains struck with an effect on the proceedings of the EUSTD were tacit bargains 
between market and authority (see chapter 3).22 The EUSTD has stayed on the EU's 
                                                 
22 There had been discussions in the EU about the necessity of co-operation in direct taxation since the 
1960's but these led to no start of a bargaining process (Fraenkel 2005, 39-44) - so essentially the 
EUSTD started from a clean table as far as specific events are concerned.  
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agenda for an extremely long time considering it is a negotiation process over one 
directive, albeit combined with the two other elements of the tax package.  
The reasons why the push for the EUSTD began can be derived from some of the 
dynamics described in chapter 3. With a considerable variance in the top income tax 
rates of EU countries, high taxing jurisdictions are likely to perceive greater gains from 
greater co-ordination of tax regimes both within and outside the EU. At the same time 
these are some of the most pro-integrationist countries of late (Germany, France, the 
Netherlands). The reluctance and/or opposition displayed by smaller member states 
such as Austria and Luxembourg indicates that they with all likelihood would have 'just 
liked the whole issue to go away.' (Gilligan 2003, 66.) But it did not go away, almost 
inevitably staying on the EU agenda. 
There are two central actors in the setting of the EU agenda; the Commission and the 
member states. The Commission can in principle make directive proposals quite 
independently, though only in accordance with the general political guidelines set by the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers. The EUSTD goes back to 1989, when 
the Commission came up with a proposal for a common system of withholding tax on 
interest income, largely at the instigation of the French presidency (European Voice, 22 
February 1996).23 So in practice the Commission initiatives usually have significant 
support among the member states - there is no sense in the Commission making 
proposals that have no chance of passing. The role of the Commission in agenda setting 
is a debated one though, and its role varies according to the issue at hand. The 
Commission’s reliance on the Council is higher in an issue like the EUSTD where many 
member states are opposed, the issue is political rather than technical in nature, and 
unanimity is required. (Nugent 2001, 188.)  
The rotating presidency of the EU, in quite concrete terms, sets the agenda of the 
meetings of the Council of Ministers. That this really does make a difference is 
confirmed by the fact that the EUSTD reared its head in 1993 and 1994 respectively 
under the German and Belgian presidencies that were in favour of tax co-operation. At 
those instances, however, the EUSTD did not win enough support that it would have 
started a continued process towards a directive. 
                                                 
23 There had been attempts by the Commission to get direct tax harmonization to stick on the agenda 
already back in the 60's and 70's, without any success. The Commission was at those instances, with 
no significant backing from any member state, effectively a non-actor. (Tsoukalis 1997, 106-107.) 
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By pure virtue of its presidency a country can make an issue 
appear on the EU agenda, but it cannot necessarily make it 
stay there.24 The necessary bargains to start a process have to 
be in place in order to set an issue permanently on the EU's 
agenda. In spite of there being three consecutive EUSTD-sceptic presidencies in a row 
(Luxembourg '97, UK and Austria '98) the EUSTD stayed on the agenda after the 
Italians put it there in 1996. With the advent of the EMU the Commission made a new 
and revised effort to motivate why tax co-ordination was necessary, trying to affect 
member states' opinions through its control over the European level knowledge structure 
(the Commission is after all accepted to be a 'eurocracy', in good and bad). For national 
governments, information from the Commission on pan-European issues is an 
alternative to the information provided by the business community (Bernhagen & 
Bräuninger 2005, 59; see also chapter 5). The Commission was aware of this strategy in 
1996 when it took serious steps to relaunch the EUSTD: 
'Even if the unanimity requirement were to be maintained [in tax policy], more progress 
might still be made if greater consideration were given - already in the presentation of 
Commission proposals - to the wide-ranging consequences of failure to adopt the various 
proposals. The costs of accepting certain proposals are often clear to Member States, 
while the costs of rejecting them are less so.' (Commission of the European Communities 
1996, 11.) 
By introducing new arguments the Commission tackled the previous obstacles that its 
EUSTD efforts had encountered in pre-1994 negotiations. In the 1996 the Commission 
report on harmful tax practices (a.k.a. the 'Verona paper') introduced according to 
Radaelli 'an important innovation in that it suggested that the main problems are the 
functioning of the single market, the degradation of the fiscal systems and 
unemployment' (Radaelli 1999, 669). Claudio Radaelli (1999, 672) continues: 
'This narrative magnifies the economic and political gains available to states 
through European co-operation. By contrast the [previous] approach of tax 
neutrality (...) - based on the selective elimination of domestic taxes hampering 
the growth of genuine multinational companies in Europe - highlighted gains to 
be won by companies and costs borne by states.' 
Such a shift of perceived gains is remarkable in a world where 
firms are said to gain power to the loss of states. Clearly the 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, the new 'Constitution for Europe' introduces an elected, not rotating, president for the 
European Council for a term of 2,5 years, and a stronger three-tier co-operation in the Council of 
Ministers' presidency. This complicates the setting of the agenda for an individual member state. 
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picture is much more nuanced. In those instances where decision-takers (usually states) 
actually have arrived at a point where meaningful regulation appears possible, they are 
in a stronger position than other actors. The Commission did thus not (yet) have to shift 
its position vis-à-vis the ultimate goal of preventing tax evasion, but rather undertook a 
rhetorical and technical shift in its approach. The Commission was well aware of this 
strategy of shifting attention: 
‘I am satisfied that the discussions of the past two years have changed the 
climate on tax policy. Ministers have been put under pressure, on the one hand, 
because we have shown them the negative consequences for employment from a 
lack of tax coordination, while on the other, we have convinced them that we are 
not here to achieve full tax harmonisation but instead tax cooperation.’ 
(Commissioner Mario Monti quoted in European Voice, 7 May 1998.) 
The Commission also tried to influence member state positions in a favourable direction 
through media coverage in the member states, thus trying to have its say in essentially 
domestic bargains:  
'The Commission is making a great effort to get its views across to the public and 
press of certain Member States, and in particular to correct a number of 
misapprehensions about its position. In some Member States the issue of 
[qualified majority voting] in the tax field is presented in far too simplistic a 
way, giving the impression that the Commission wants to harmonise corporation 
tax or raise tax levels throughout Europe to finance the construction of a 
"superstate". There is no truth in these assertions. Basing a discussion on false 
premises gets in the way of a proper debate on the issues.' ('FAQ' at European 
Commission website.) 
Considering that general trust for the European Commission, as for European 
institutions in general, has never been particularly high among the European public25, 
the Commission’s quest to get its views heard was and is probably not very successful. 
Eurointerest groups may have an effect on the Commission's knowledge. They may 
initiate new legislative proposals. But they will probably not be able to directly affect 
the Commission in the direction of not putting a nascent issue on the agenda. 
Eurointerest groups in the case of the EUSTD step in only after the issue was on the 
agenda. Commission consulting procedures start only once an issue is on the agenda. 
Consultations take place during the drafting of the directives and discussion papers 
preceding it, and belong in that sense to a later stage of the bargaining process. (Nugent 
2001, 199.) 
                                                 
25 Eurobarometer 2005  
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Narratives, however, do not operate in a vacuum. The general 
policy environment has already been discussed in chapter three. 
Another important point is the institutional setting. In the 
aftermath of the Verona paper the Commission suggested setting 
up the taxation policy group. The idea was accepted by member states, as there was no 
apparent risk of giving agenda setting powers to the Commission.26 The group was 
clearly a very political body, as opposed to earlier expert dominated forums. This made 
it easier to strike deals 'when the political advantage of coming to an agreement was 
greater than the economic cost of renouncing a certain tax scheme.' For e.g. 
Luxembourg the costs in reputation and prestige of vetoing proposals became higher in 
the context of a high-profile political negotiation. (Radaelli 1999, 666, 673)  
Once the process had been started, and a few bargains had been struck, it was difficult 
for the upcoming presidencies to take the issue off the agenda after 1996. Governments 
hesitated to question the established agenda, where it did not suit their immediate 
interests, because they had embedded interests in other policy fields, and because they 
were pursuing other interests through parallel negotiations which they hesitated to put at 
risk (Wallace 2000b, 526).  
At its best, a new presidency had a better chance than others to 
attach the issue to some new bargains, as the Austrian 
presidency tried to do in 1998 by connecting energy use 
taxation to the taxation of savings (European Voice, 5 
November 1998). But in order to get backing for its own priorities and to have any 
chance at 'a successful presidency' in the eyes of the domestic constituency, it is not 
possible for a presidency to take a process set in motion and backed by some of the 
largest member states (with the most to bargain for) off the agenda. Thus it is necessary 
for an issue to have the backing of at least one big state, preferably more, for it to stay 
on the agenda.  
A small member state usually does not have enough functional resources (especially if it 
is alone on the issue) to offer the presidency for the solution of bargains (e.g. Finland's 
effort to keep the 'Northern Dimension' programme on the agenda has been a struggle) 
(Nugent 2001, 188). It is not an understatement that France and Germany pushed the 
EUSTD through. Gilligan (2003, 67) connects this structural power, perhaps a bit too 
simplistically, to budget shares, but the rationale behind his thoughts is correct: 
                                                 









'So have France, Germany and the UK been bullies regarding the EUSTD? The answer is 
almost certainly yes, but given political, economic and social realities what else could one 
expect? (...) It is an underlying economic reality that those who bankroll the larger share 
of the common budget might be expected to have their voice heard in a more active sense, 
and more often, at the negotiating table than those whose budgetary contribution is 
relatively small.'  
* * * 
Issues of tax evasion are of course not limited to the EU 
agenda. There is an alphabet soup of organizations on whose 
agenda the issue can be brought forth (EU, G7, OECD, BIS, 
IMF, FATF, UN), each representing a different mix of 
institutional set-up insiders and outsiders. Those countries with the most sources of 
structural power are the ones that have been able to push the agenda in one direction or 
another (EU, US, Switzerland). The OECD has (in addition to the EU) turned out to be 
the arena of choice for the issue, probably owing to the attitude of its civil servants.  
Developing countries, which presumably suffer the most from capital flight into OECD 
and non-OECD financial centres, have not yet expressed themselves articulately and 
forcefully on international tax matters (Spencer 2003, 17). This is to be expected as they 
have the least control over resources to bargain with and the least to give to have their 
cause listened to on the global stage. The mere fact that third world countries are not 
represented at all or systematically underrepresented in the organizations and their 
institutional set-ups is telling of the situation. And even if they would have equal 
representation that would not be enough: 
'Effective participation requires that the representatives of the developing countries be 
well informed. Because the countries are poor, they simply cannot afford the kinds of staff 
that the United States, for instance, can muster to support its positions at all the 
international economic institutions.' (Stiglitz 2002, 227.) 
But in the area of tax evasion, things are not looking up for the third world countries, 
with the UN27 - where the third world has its best and most comprehensive 
representation - suffering substantial blows to its credibility and being notably sidelined 
by the US (Gilligan 2003, 68).  
                                                 
27 The UN has recommended the establishment of a UN International Tax Organisation (UNITO) which 
would amongst other aims: 'develop international norms for tax policy and administration . . . take a 
lead role in restraining tax competition designed to attract multinationals with excessive and unwise 
incentives . . . develop procedures for arbitration when frictions develop between countries on tax 





The beginning of the EUSTD negotiations is a product of competition between the 
national and (other) transnational arenas to provide effective authoritative results within 
a certain historical setting. Here the word ‘results’ is important; the EU arena gathers 
much of its strength from the extent to which it can deliver more solid outcomes than 
alternative arenas of public policy. (Wallace 2000, 41.) Chapters 4.2 – 4.5 will outline 
in detail those outcomes, results, and opportunities, in addition to the constraints, that 
the EU policy process has offered actors, notably also in comparison to what the OECD 
offered. 
 
4.2 Pleasing the Big Boys: The Intra-EU Negotiations 
The EU member states’ different positions on tax co-
ordination were closely knitted together with the reasons for 
divergences on financial liberalization in the EU, a process 
strongly supported by the UK, but treated with more 
reservation by Germany and France. The major difference between the UK (and other 
opponents of the EUSTD) on the one hand, and France and Germany (and other 
proponents) on the other, lay in the prolonged process whereby successive British 
governments from the 60's onwards had internalized world financial markets as part of 
the domestic financial system. (Story & Walter 1997, 276.) 
Meanwhile, financial institutions in the rest of the EU (with the notable exception of 
Luxembourg) were embedded first and foremost in their domestic context. German and 
French regulatory regimes of the financial markets were geared towards satisfying 
domestic needs, while the British, spearheaded by the Euromarkets, were geared 
towards global needs. (Hirst & Thompson 1999, 253; Story & Walter 1997, 276, 279.) 
Today, the national financial systems of the EU have increasingly been opened up, 
although there is still significant diversity in the types of financial instruments. This 
means that even though there is an increasing amount of foreign participation on the 
national markets, they are still in most countries geared towards the national economic 
space. (European Commission 2004). For example the Royal Bank of Scotland is in 
Germany primarily to satisfy and compete on the German market, but Deutsche Bank is 
in London also to gain access to the global markets. That means that taxation and 
regulation policies take a different point of departure in relation to markets in the 





Throughout the negotiations - and also later - the British reactions to the EUSTD 
proposal and its principles were very reserved: 
'Europe must conclusively rule out tax harmonisation, agree it is a barrier rather 
than a spur to global competitiveness, and resolve that tax competition is the 
basis on which Europe can compete with the rest of the world as well as 
command popular support.' (British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon 
Brown's column in Wall Street Journal Europe quoted in Evening Standard, 
16/10/03.) 
Acting on a global market required more sensitivity to global 
competition by the UK than by most other member states 
participating in the EUSTD negotiations. For the British less 
regulation had been the name of the game in finance since the 
1960s. Much of their success in financial business built on less regulation in comparison 
with the Germans and French. The British were, together with the Americans, at the 
very heart of internationalization - they had created it and benefited from it. Some thirty 
years of steady internationalization had meant that regulatory authorities controlled a 
declining portion of bank activities. This proved particularly serious for German 
supervisors, given the importance attached to the tight control over financial 
institutions. The German authorities have proved eager to extend regulations 
internationally, of which the EUSTD is a prime case in point. (Story & Walter 1997, 
281, 284-286.) 
France, for its part, has emphasized the necessity for reciprocity. There were a number 
of reasons for the French position, all related to a shared view across the French elites of 
the vulnerability of their financial institutions. The fact that due to increased tax evasion 
there appears to have been a unilateral benefit for third countries from the liberalization 
of the European capital markets clearly does not mesh well with the French call for 
reciprocity. The French and the Germans, who were not competing for world market 
positions to the same extent as the British, clearly would have less difficulty in 
introducing trans-European regulation in the form of the EUSTD. 'Tax competition' - as 
global competition in general - was also compatible to the UK's vision of a Europe of 
the states, open to world business. (Ibid., 281, 284-286.)  
From their very different historical positions, the EU member states have nonetheless 
arrived at a common platform of financial integration. They act increasingly in an 
interconnected market environment, but yet see it in very different ways due to their 





(Story & Walter 1997) and now, moving into taxation of capital interest with the 
EUSTD, continues to be so.  
 
4.2.1 Blurring the Facts: The Complexity of Excluding the Eurobonds 
The fact that the British accepted the EUSTD in the end could 
be traced back the UK's transformation of the lightly regulated 
financial cartels 'into regulated and competitive retail and 
wholesale markets'. This has happened simultaneously and in 
connection with European financial integration. To cut a long story short, contrary to 
conventional interpretations, the Thatcher government actually introduced stricter 
regulation of financial market practices in order to introduce more competition, by 
circumventing several cartels through policies introduced by the Conservatives. (Story 
& Walter 1997, 316.) Regulation is thus not necessarily contrary to business interests or 
a globally competitive national economy:  
'With the globalization of trade and financial markets, multinational companies 
and financial institutions have sought intergovernmental assistance in 
developing standardized international tax rules in areas such as transfer pricing, 
global trading of financial instruments, taxation of new financial instruments, 
allocation of interest price expense, electronic commerce, tax treaties, and 
advance pricing agreements. Therefore, multinational companies and financial 
institutions do have an interest in certain internationally standardized tax rules.' 
(Spencer 2003, 7.) 
Additionally, at least on the level of rhetoric, the New Labour government has had 
aspirations of being a world leader in questions of global governance28. Thus the UK 
had some divergent points of departure on the EUSTD question, which created the 
space and possibility of EU horse-trading.  
While including all interest payments to individuals, the mainly 
London-based Eurobond market was predicted to be particularly 
hit by the withholding tax requirements of the 1989 and the 
information requirements of the 1998 draft directive. Many 
special interest associations connected to the City of London's financial institutions 
reacted strongly. Their strongest card was the potential of market chaos caused by the 
                                                 








refinancing of up to $ 40 billion of Eurobonds, a result of the legal-technical 'design' of 
bonds (European Voice, 18 Feb 1999).  
The design and very existence of Eurobonds is a consequence of the historical non-
regulation of the markets. The creation of the Eurobond market in London in the 1960s 
was driven by crucial decisions reached not in Europe, but in the United States. Later, to 
increase London's competitiveness in relation to New York and Tokyo, the British 
pushed for deregulation and free trade in the European financial services market. 
Experts in the finance industry have since had their hands free to develop new and ever 
more complex instruments. (Strange 1998, 36, 40-41, 169.) Now, as our example 
shows, the instruments are in many ways beyond the control of the authorities. The 
control over the financial structure that the markets had gained with increasing speed 
during the 1990s meant that the options open for the authorities were constrained. But 
the opportunities were not completely closed either. Working out a feasible solution to 
the bargains between market and authorities and among states, i.e. finding some 
balanced answer to the cui bono question was the key. 
With the threat of loss of jobs in the UK based finance 
business, it was clear the UK would not accept such a bad 
bargain as the original 1989 withholding tax proposal or the 
1998 first draft directive. The UK's discontent resulted in an 
expression of preparedness to look at 'all sorts of proposals' to tax private investors' 
holdings of international bonds while exempting the wholesale29 market, which is 
thought to cover about 90 per cent of all bond issues (Financial Times, May 26, 1999).  
It was clear that this represented a much better bargain for the UK. Here, the structural 
power of big-money market institutions could not be clearer. The income and jobs that 
depended on their existence were a precious asset for the government. The EU could 
offer the UK nothing to balance this up. The small savers (in the world of international 
finance this is very much a relative term) are the ones who will be taxed, while the big 
boys will get away untaxed. Good or bad for the economy? Who should be taxed and 
how much - a classic question of financial politics. There seemed to be a generally 
accepted feeling that the proposed solution discriminated against small savers: 
                                                 
29 Wholesale: a wholesaler buys goods in large quantities from their manufacturers or importers, and then 









'Eddie George, the governor of the Bank of England, urged other countries to 
look at the new UK proposal and said objections to the UK plans on the grounds 
they discriminated against small savers ignored the very small role of such 
savers in the international bond market.' (Financial Times, Sep 3, 1999.)  
Equally, it can be argued that the inclusion of the wholesale 
market was a flaw on the Commission’s side. The European 
executive had set out in the directive only to tax individuals. 
The wholesale market lies on the very borderline of individual 
and institutional investing and their separation according to any clear cut principle is 
simply not possible, because of the interconnectedness and complexity of the markets.  
The UK ran into this very problem when producing a report on the legal and technical 
issues involved in differentiating between private and professional bondholders. Other 
member states had called for concrete British proposals on how to find an acceptable 
solution for London’s Eurobond market, instead of just being faced with continued 
negative British reactions. Thus the UK circulated a position paper among fellow 
finance ministers in 1999 in the build up to the Ecofin meeting at the end of the Finnish 
presidency in 1999, where it was hoped the first draft directive could have been 
accepted. But other member states saw the British suggestion of restricting the 
withholding tax only to small private investors with bond holdings below € 40 000 or 
focusing the directive only on bank and other deposits as equally arbitrary as the 
Commission’s original broader definition had seemed to the UK (Financial Times, Sep 
13, 1999; HM Treasury 1999): 
‘Everybody is hoping that this [the British position] is just a negotiating 
position. We all understand the special problem of the City, but that does not 
mean we are going to give a total exemption to eurobonds.’ (Diplomat of the 
Finnish presidency quoted in European Voice, 14 October 1999.)  
Both sides were right, there was no way of clearly separating the individual investors 
from other types of actors. 
This is a view echoed by Bird and Wilkie (2000) when discussing the issue of source 
versus residence based taxation in the European Union, the former corresponding to the 
withholding tax and the latter to the exchange of information. In another attempt to 
minimize the effects of the directive on the Eurobond market, the UK issued another 
position paper in early 2000. The paper suggested the principle of a withholding tax 





Instead the UK envisaged the uniform introduction of information exchange throughout 
the EU (HM Treasury 2000).  
Bird and Wilkie regard the two principles as being simply theoretical guidelines 
intended to explain and test the utility of particular allocative or jurisdictional decisions, 
but the decision itself is 'inherently economic in concept and commercial in practice' 
(Bird & Wilkie 2000, 79-80). They conclude that:  
'The fundamental problem is that an economic solution is needed to assess and 
divide the tax base. Any attainable solution will inevitably be somewhat 
artificial. But it need not be as artificial as the present system, rooted in a 
simpler day in which there was, on the whole, a much closer correspondence 
between financial flows and economic activities, when a bond was a bond, a 
dividend a dividend, and a foreign investment was physical – a hole in the 
ground or a building on top of it. Times have changed in all these respects.' 
(Bird & Wilkie 2000, 93-94.) 
Thus any practice should not be judged according to how well it accords with some 
normative principle, but rather how well it works and how likely it is to prove 
acceptable to most major actors in the international tax game. The source-residence 
question is then essentially one of 'who gets how much tax income?' or indeed 'cui 
bono?'  
From this perspective it was hardly surprising that Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands raised the issue of revenue-
sharing in early 1999 right before the beginning of a streak of 
an unprecedented four high-level meetings under the Finnish 
presidency.   Because of the confusion around the British position, it was very uncertain 
which principle was going to be applied. The three countries' finance ministers claimed 
the 1998 first draft directive only gave 'an illusion of legitimacy', implicitly referring to 
the fact that it is not the acquiescence to the normative principle that counts, but the 
share of the cake that each actor gets. (European Voice, 14 January 1999.) The British 
position on international bonds was the 'biggest problem'30 only from the point of view 
that the UK compared to others possibly stood the most to lose from the first draft 
directive, not from any logical point of view of 'first the principles, then the details'.  
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The consequences of the 1998 first draft directive in terms of who gets what on the 
international bond market were highly contested, with the Commission saying that 
British claims of job losses were greatly exaggerated (Financial Times, Feb 11, 1999). 
In the end, the views of the British finance lobby - with the support of research by 
groups such as the International Primary Markets Association (IPMA) and the 
Corporation of London - seemed to have gained resonance among other member states 
(Euromoney, Aug 1998; Financial Times, Nov 3, 1998). Through an effective use of the 
knowledge structure by the lobbying groups affiliated to the City, came the realization 
among member states that the withholding tax might have rendered not only London but 
also the entire EU uncompetitive. This gains more significance when put into the 
context of the EU's metaproject to enhance its competitiveness in comparision to other 
economic powers (chapter 3.1). 
'Recent research [by IPMA] has shown that the concentration of financial 
services in London provides the EU with savings on the cost of financial services 
business of 17 percent. The research also showed that if this concentration in 
London did not exist, less than half of the financial services business lost from 
London would flow to other EU countries. In the global competition for financial 
services business, London is therefore a rival, on behalf of everyone in the EU, 
of Zurich, New York and Tokyo.' (Financial Times, Jan 26, 2000.) 
By contrast, the Commission's position changed little during the 
negotiations of the EUSTD, and new proposals came mainly at 
the instigation of member states. This can be explained by the 
relatively low European level consultation and institutionalized 
interest group activity in the area of tax policy. Research 
conducted by Christine Mahoney shows that as tax policy is a new and only evolving 
area of EU policy it displays relatively low interest group activity. If Commission 
competence would grow in the area, interest group activity on the EU level would likely 
increase. Secondly, she also found a bias towards the trade and business associations in 
Commission consultation. The Commission seems to prefer to consult organizations 
with a broad international membership and a Brussels office (which again indicates the 
power of the money). (Mahoney 2004, 448-454.) If and when EU competence and 
activity in direct tax policy increases, the Commission can be expected to face similar 
dilemmas as the member states do at the domestic level (see chapter five) in 
determining the reliability of knowledge provided by these interest groups.  
knowledge 
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So, among the member states there was by the summer of 
1999, half a year after the publication of the 1998 first draft 
directive, an increasing understanding generated for the British 
position. Italy, France, the Netherlands and Germany now 
spoke in favour of special treatment for Eurobonds in the directive, whereas some 
months earlier the UK had seemed isolated on the matter (Financial Times, Apr 19, 
1999). This - it seems - is a rare situation in which an essentially national finance lobby 
affiliated to the City of London has been able to drive an issue so convincingly that its 
opinions and control over knowledge has affected also other member states. The 
resonance its position found among financial elites throughout Europe quite likely 
played a role (see e.g. Financial Times, Apr 9, 1999).  
The efforts of the British to introduce a sole principle of information exchange were 
accepted on the face of it in the second draft directive of 2001, but in reality the 
inclusion of the possibility for Luxembourg, Belgium and Austria to use the 
withholding tax principle indefinitely instead meant the final directive was a 'co-
existence model' that the UK originally had opposed. The UK itself secured an 
important concession for the City, when the date for exempting Eurobonds in 
circulation from the directive was set for March 1, 2002. (Financial Times, May 3, 
2000; Financial Times, Mar 5, 2001.) The deal de facto represents a gradualist approach 
to tax co-ordination, rather than a holistic one. It is the result of a process of muddling 
through, rather than an attempt to solve the problem by some grand design. Its basis lies 
in that it is acceptable, workable and an improvement. (Bird & Wilkie 2000, 99-100.) 
This is also reflected in the state-state bargain of a 75 per cent transferral of the 
revenues from the withholding tax to the non-resident investor's state of residence, with 
the source state retaining 25 per cent; 'a striking but little remarked-upon feature' (Keen 
& Ligthart 2004, 2).  
 
4.2.2 The Institutional Brew: The Specifics of the Veto  
There is clearly a tendency among individual member states to 
look for compromises that would benefit them immediately. 
Belgium, one of the initiative-takers of the EUSTD in 1989 
and 1996, which is still allowed to stick to the withholding tax 
principle it prefers, nearly derailed the final compromise of the EUSTD negotiations in 
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ordination centres' of MNCs, a plea which if accepted effectively would have 
undermined the Code of Conduct on business taxation that formed part of the tax 
package together with the EUSTD. (International Money Marketing, Jul 21, 2003.)  
The fact that Belgium which before the watering down of the directive could see the 
benefits of tax co-ordination, failed to see it in the parallel context of business taxation 
is an indication of the extreme short-termism that dictates the compromises states make. 
A compromise for e.g. Belgium in one issue means a compromise for another member 
state in another issue, often a connected one. The Commission, always seeing the EU as 
a whole, is almost intrinsically poised to be at odds with a number of member states in 
any one set of negotiations. Which issues that are connected to each other and in which 
way on the agenda, not to mention the issues being on the agenda in the first place, is a 
question of the power of agenda setting (see chapter 4.1). Considering that package 
solutions are widely accepted as increasing the possibility of making necessary 
compromises, Belgium's actions were discriptive of the fact that there are no simple 
solutions to complex issues. 
Clearly much of the structural power also lies in the very politico-technical set-up of the 
EU institutions: who has how many votes, who can veto and on what terms in which 
questions. The EUSTD negotiations were played out in one particular institutional set-
up for tax policy, namely the unanimity requirement. The set-up's immediate 
significance in the form of one veto, one vote is clear in most bargains between member 
states. Direct tax policy in the EU has been left at the level of maximum difficulty for 
passing directives, while many other areas have been moved to the slightly less 
stringent qualified majority voting (QMV) system.  
Each member state in principle has as much to say on the issue of institutional set-up as 
the next, every member state has a veto in institutional questions. But as Luxembourg 
Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker has put it so aptly in typical politico-speak:  
'The institutions are only an instrument of our ambitions. Once you agree on the 
future, the rest flows.' (Financial Times, Jun 2, 1998.)  
Compared to nation-states, where institutional set-ups tend to be quite stable, the fact 
that the EU's institutional set-up is evolving and is so closely connected to the policies 
themselves is a unique feature of the EU. This brings out the more covert structural 
issues connected to the EU's institutional set-up and reform. The institutional set-up is 
not simply a question of the power of saying 'no' and the ensuing 'loss of sovereignty' 
that EU opponents so often emphasize. What needs to be considered is what each 
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country will gain and lose in concrete matters from an institutional set-up. E.g. 
Luxembourg may lose in some issues that are pushed through, but will similarly win in 
other issues that other countries may oppose. Agreeing explicitly or implicitly on some 
principles of into which areas and how deep European integration should go is the key 
to any institutional set-up.  
Consequently it can be concluded that the current institutional set-up is the result of a 
series of bargains struck at a particular time in history.31 Each country has its own 
preference about which areas it would promote a deeper integration depending on the 
perceived gains (security, production, knowledge and finance) from such integration. 
Any decision to proceed with integration in a particular area is a gain for some and may 
be a loss for others, although it is not a zero sum game.  The totality of these bargains 
forms the bargain of institutional reform. Some countries are bound to hold greater 
resources as a whole to bargain with, few can deny that e.g. France would not hold more 
control of the four structures than say Cyprus or Luxembourg. Larger countries thus 
tend to dominate the direction in which European integration is going. But as long as 
these decisions/bargains as a totality continue to give more perceived gain than loss for 
all member states (again, it is not a zero-sum game), deepening integration can 
continue. 
Integration itself and many other historical developments in a feedback-like process 
then change the structures. As structures change there is increasing necessity for new 
bargains to be struck. The changed structures may though not anymore create bargains 
that favour deeper integration, but may well create increased opportunity for 
disintegration. E.g. a macroeconomic shock of some sort could potentially throw the 
common currency project into serious trouble. The enlargement is also an example of an 
event that has changed structures, but arguably slowed down deeper integration. But the 
change of structures may as well (or, depending on one's general view on the current 
benefits of European integration, is even more likely to) induce deeper integration.  
For the moment it seems deeper integration in direct tax policy is not the way the EU is 
going in the immediate future in terms of institutional set-up. In the constitutional treaty 
approved by the heads of state of government following the Intergovernmental 
Conference in June 2004, all tax decisions to be taken at European level are still subject 
to the unanimity rule. The Commission expressed its disappointment: 
                                                 
31 The most recent amendments to the EU Treaty were agreed as part of the latest enlargement in 2004. 
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'A handful of Member States dug their heels in, ensuring that unanimity remains 
the rule for tax related issues. In practice, in a 25-member EU, that would 
probably mean total immobility on tax. This is a pity, all the more so since the 
preparatory work by the economic governance working group chaired by Klaus 
Hänsch made it clear that the great majority of Convention members from 
across the political spectrum agreed that a move towards QMV was necessary.' 
('FAQ' at the European Commission website.) 
The Commission had expressed its support for the enlargement of the use of QMV 'in a 
limited number of tax fields, essentially proposals necessary for the proper operation of 
the Internal market, proposals to combat tax fraud and tax evasion and proposals related 
to the protection of the environment'. The Commission continues to specify that 
'[q]ualified majority voting is necessary for provisions governing mutual assistance, 
exchanges of information and co-operation between tax authorities within the 
Community, notably to curb fraud and tax evasion and facilitate the recovery of tax 
due'. ('Intergovernmental Conference' and 'The limits of unanimity voting in taxation' at 
the European Commission website.) For now, the Commission is left with its power to 
set the agenda (see chapter 4.1). 
 
4.3 Divide and Conquer: The Failure of the OECD Initiative  
The OECD's tax evasion initiative, which is based on the principle of exchange of 
information on demand, effectively fell apart due to continuous opposition from 
Switzerland and Luxembourg from the turn of the millennium onwards. The legitimacy 
of the information exchange based OECD initiative was – once the EUSTD had been 
concluded in 2003 - easy to put into question for the two countries, because the EU de 
facto accepted the withholding tax principle. But Switzerland and Luxembourg could 
have pushed for the OECD initiative to go through, rather than agree to the EUSTD. In 
such a situation there would have been little chance for other EU countries to criticize 
Switzerland and Luxembourg for not being co-operative.  
The OECD initiative would have demanded less rigourous regulatory efforts from 
Switzerland and Luxembourg and created a level playing field that would have included 
Singapore and other OFCs that now are poised to attract business away from the 
European countries. It would also have demanded less co-operation and less 
administrative costs from them. An agreement on the OECD inititative would have set 
the standard for tax evasion co-operation globally. Now the EUSTD came first, and it 
 6363
has effectively shattered the OECD initiative, at least for now. An OECD agreement 
before the conclusion of the EUSTD would presumably have meant the death-knell for 
the EUSTD as it would have been politically very difficult for the EU to break the level-
playing field once agreed. So why did Luxembourg and Switzerland prefer the EUSTD 
rather than the OECD initiative? 
Switzerland and Luxembourg are active in a global market, of which Europe is only one 
part. They, as all other jurisdictions, have arrived to where they are today from their 
particular historical trajectories. Their rather exceptional taxation regimes, together with 
those of the four European microstates, are usually described as 'historical accident'. 
When countries around them in the mid-20th century evolved into welfare states based 
on high taxes and resource transfers, these 'anachronistic formations' failed to follow 
suit. They were therefore unable to co-operate with other states in tax matters, and 
retained tax matters under civil law, rather than criminal law. Consequently they 
became tax havens in which the rich of the world placed their assets. (Palan 1998, 638.) 
They have continued to evolve from this basis and do not want 
more regulation or a level playing field, as their business is 
built on as little regulation as possible. Being part of a global 
market significantly affects the loyalties of banks and firms 
(Palan 2000, 5). Clearly, freedom is more important than regulation for those 
jurosdictions depending on the offshore banking business. By agreeing to the EUSTD, 
Switzerland and Luxembourg have avoided global market regulation from a 
(effectively) global authority, the OECD. Even if the OECD's initiative did not demand 
standards as high as the EUSTD in information sharing, there would have been an 
international standard to work from. From such a standard, new and more rigid demands 
could have been made. Now, because of the EU allowing a withholding tax, there is not 
a standard even in the EU, nevermind globally. Reaching such a standard will now, with 
the EUSTD in force, be significantly more difficult.  
By committing to the EUSTD Luxembourg and Switzerland have divided and 
conquered, and thus avoided global regulation. As members of the EU and the OECD, 
two of the core institutions that shape global financial frameworks, Switzerland and 
Luxembourg have had an important position as veto-holders. With the current 
agreements the Swiss and Luxembourg banking information on Americans and other 
non-European citizens are secured, which they would not have been under OECD 
regulation. Both countries are convinced that the EUSTD will not have too much impact 
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on their economies. Luxembourg's financial industry is actually trying to turn the 
EUSTD to its own advantage and is preparing the ground for the next generation of 
investors by racing to get the EU's latest investment fund legislation on to its statute 
books before its rivals. Its historic success as a financial centre has been based primarily 
on its ability to identify niches and transpose European directives more rapidly than its 
potential rivals in other EU states. (Financial Times, Jun 6, 2002; International Money 
Marketing, Jul/Aug 2004.) 
Unsurprisingly Switzerland really hit paydirt. Not only did this 
alpine confederation avoid global regulation, but, once the intra-
EU principles were becoming clearer and the external 
negotiations started in 2001, the Swiss were also in a position to 
engage in some serious horse-trading with the EU. For any desire to change the global 
financial structure to be successful, it had to include Switzerland due to its key 
position.32 Not least having EU member Luxembourg on its side in the game of 
relational power enhanced Switzerland’s position. Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-
Claude Junker was at the height of the EU's negotiations with Switzerland in 2002 
quoted saying that the big EU members 'are treating Switzerland as an alpine Iraq. I 
won't stand for it.' (BBC News, 8/10/2002.) For Switzerland, the EU was a favoured 
negotiating partner to the OECD. The OECD was able to offer no carrots, and the threat 
of blacklisting an OECD member state like Switzerland seemed unlikely. In 1998 
Switzerland, along with Luxembourg and Singapore (all OECD members) had, 
apparently because of subjectivity, been excluded from an OECD blacklist of tax 
havens (Powell 2000, 5).  
Clearly it could not have been just any actor that could have demanded limitations on 
Switzerland's tax haven status. The EU's partial control over Swiss production, 
knowledge and even security played a significant role. The EU had much that 
Switzerland wanted during the 2001-2004 negotiations, covering areas such as 
environment, trade and freedom of movement. Switzerland wanted to enter the 
Schengen agreement on free cross-border movement, but without judicial and 
administrative co-operation on direct tax fraud which may apply in the future to the 
Schengen group. The EU finally agreed to the Swiss Schengen demands in 2004, thus 
securing the banking secrecy laws in Switzerland. Luxembourg demanded, and 
received, the same concessions as the Swiss if it were to accept the Swiss deal on the 
                                                 
32 In 2002 Switzerland controlled a 27 % share of the private financial management world market, 





EUSTD at all. (International Money Marketing, Jun 9, 2004.)  
Did the EU's failure to see the importance of the OECD 
negotiations mean that the horse-trading was in vain? Probably 
not, as the EU countries stood to gain far more tax revenue from 
the EUSTD, than from the OECD initiative. Switzerland and 
Luxembourg were able to avoid the potential increase in regulation over the global 
financial market, while the EU and most of its member states gained in both financial 
and knowledge power much more from the EUSTD than they would have from the 
OECD initiative. The real losers were many of the non-EU OECD countries. But with 
the EU not playing on their side, using the control it has over financial, production, 
knowledge and even security structures and being able to offer carrots and trade-offs to 
secure the EUSTD, the OECD initiative did not stand a chance. One observer 
commented: 
'The OECD had been expecting the EU's directive would mirror its own 
pronouncement that transparency was what was required not perpetuation of 
measures that assisted tax avoidance. Not surprisingly, it was not impressed the 
EU could declare that apples were really the same as hedge clippers simply for 
the purposes of saving face, and said as much.' (International Money Marketing, 
Mar 7, 2003.) 
On the surface, the wrapping up of the EUSTD certainly 'saved face'. More importantly 
though, because of the EU's structural power, both Switzerland and the EU member 
states maximized for their parts the bargains that were up for grabs in the international 
political economy. 
 
4.3.1 Puzzle Key: The Future of the EUSTD and the OECD Initiative 
The game is not necessarily over yet for the OECD initiative. 
The EUSTD stipulates that the withholding tax that 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Austria, along with Switzerland 
and others, will be levying will gradually increase. This 
retention tax is 15 per cent until 2007 and 20 per cent until 2011. Thereafter the rate will 
be 35 per cent. Many experts believe that when the tax rises to 35 per cent, countries 
will look to switch to exchange of information.   
Many of the smaller OFCs, like Guernsey, saw the adoption of the withholding tax 








industry, in other words ensuring no one would get the upper hand on the financial 
services market. But if EU countries like Belgium and Luxembourg would switch to 
exchange of information, it seems likely others would follow suit. (International Money 
Marketing, Jul 21, 2003.) It remains to be seen how e.g. Luxembourg weighs the 
benefits of information exchange and a 35 per cent withholding tax. Taking into 
consideration that a Europe-wide automatic exchange of information would put the 
EUSTD in line with, or even beyond the OECD guidelines, there is actually more at 
play than just short-term economic benefits or losses in the EUSTD context.  It is a 
balancing act over the importance that should be given to order and freedom, and justice 
and wealth.  
Once the withholding tax vs. exchange of information dilemma 
would be solved, it would open up the possibility for those 
favouring increased co-operation in tax evasion issues to push 
the agenda to new levels. The most obvious is that there would 
be little possibility to resist the OECD initiative anymore. And for the EUSTD it could 
mean tightening up the directive, for any parts that member states are unhappy with its 
functioning. An increase in authority over the global financial market would follow and 
OFCs would be the losers.  
But there are many ifs and buts along the way to such a situation. This is not least due to 
Switzerland. It has been agreed between the EU and Switzerland that the 35% 
withholding rate will remain also after Switzerland has adopted OECD standard 
exchange of information. This is noteworthy, because the same does not hold for the 
three EU members that apply the withholding tax. The three EU countries will, in fact, 
according to the EUSTD switch to exchange of information if the EU decides 
unanimously that Switzerland and the other third countries of the EUSTD, are 
complying with OECD rules on exchange of information on request. (Spencer 2003, 5.) 
Switzerland can thus have the cake and eat it; it can comply to OECD information 
exchange rules while still ensuring that there is no global standard of information 
exchange through its agreement with the EU.  
The Swiss have been able to take advantage of their key position in financial structure 
to the maximum. The fact that Switzerland has the option of holding on to the 35% 
withholding tax, while effectively forcing others to the automatic exchange of 
information if it agrees to the OECD guidelines, could give Switzerland a competitive 





less of a level playing field, with the dependencies and micro-states having to decide if 
they should follow Luxembourg's or Switzerland's example. 
The importance of banking secrecy to Switzerland is not to be underestimated. Each tax 
haven has a slightly different combination of low taxes, lax regulations and banking 
secrecy. There will always be investors who are looking for maximum banking secrecy, 
in combination with a stable currency and a politically stable environment. At the dawn 
of offshore banking, Switzerland became the benchmark jurisdiction and any newcomer 
OFC had to up the stakes. Whereas the Swiss created the numbered account, meaning 
that only one or two officials in the bank know the identity of the account holder, 
Luxembourg has taken the principle a step further, allowing only one bank official to 
know the identity of the holder of a numbered account. In Austria the principle has been 
taken to its logical conclusion: under Austrian law none of the banking officials needs 
to know the identity of the holder; s/he is merely an untraceable number. (Palan 1998, 
640.)  
Secrecy is clearly a very significant ingredient in the competition for high-net-worth 
individuals. How individuals and states weigh off the bargain between 35% source 
taxation and banking secrecy remains to be seen, but it would be fair to predict that 
there is a niche for both approaches. With those changes that the EUSTD could cause to 
the Austrian and Luxembourg systems, Switzerland has the chance to regain a 
competitive advantage in banking secrecy.  
Is there any chance for the EU to get Switzerland in line with the OECD or the EUSTD 
requirements of information exchange? As concluded above, there could be an incentive 
for Switzerland to agree to the OECD guidelines, with an ever more split playing field 
being the consequence. As for any Swiss agreement to automatic information exchange, 
the sources of structural power of the EU relative to Switzerland in this question seem 
to be exhausted; to change an explicitly agreed principle would be difficult. This is a 
common experience within the EU (Wallace 2000, 526). 
Power relations do change, however, over time. The key might lie with the US. The 
Swiss and the Americans have entered an income tax agreement in 2003, providing for 
more extensive exchange of information. Then acting US Treasury Secretary Kenneth 
Dam stated that the agreement is 'a significant step in our efforts to ensure that no safe 
haven exists anywhere in the world for the funds associated with illicit activities, 
including tax evasion'. (Spencer 2003, 12.)  
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If the US were to become more proactive in the area of global tax co-ordination, there 
could be increased pressure on Switzerland to adhere to stricter principles. Together no 
doubt, the US and EU hold a great many structural as well as relational carrots and 
sticks. If they were to have a common goal, they could use their power without risk of 
playing out each other as they undoubtedly are doing now, with the EU making the 
OECD process more difficult and the US displaying indifference towards the EUSTD. 
 
4.4 US Power and Double Standards: The American Response 
The role of the US in relation to both the OECD and the EU 
initiative has shifted with the change of the US administration's 
partisanship. In the waning days of the Clinton administration, 
the Internal Revenue Administration (IRA) proposed to require 
US banks to report the interest they pay to foreign depositors. The goal was to curb tax 
cheating, both by foreigners in their home countries and by Americans pretending to be 
foreigners in order to evade US taxes. This was a remarkable concession and display of 
tolerance towards the EU and zeal towards the cause of curbing tax evasion. In 1998 the 
EU finance ministers had effectively isolated the US in the OECD negotiations by 
agreeing to kick off separate talks on the basis of the first EUSTD draft directive. ‘We 
are too concerned that if we try to work on this at the OECD level, it will take too long 
and there are too many fundamental differences of philosophy,’ said a senior EU tax 
policy official (European Voice, 3 December 1998). 
The US had been a driving force behind the OECD crackdown on tax havens but all that 
changed when George W. Bush took office in 2001. Reactions from Washington to the 
2001 second draft EUSTD were very confusing: 
‘Although senior White House officials continue to assure lobbyists, 
policymakers and Republican congressmen that President George Bush will not 
agree on the proposals , the White House has so far failed to come out officially 
against them.’ (Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, Sep 15, 2002.)  
Eventually the Clinton proposal was withdrawn. Under a revised plan by the Bush 
administration, interest paid to residents of the 12 European countries that apply 
automatic information exchange under the EUSTD, plus Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Norway, will have to be reported. But everyone else, including 
Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium, and countries with the biggest tax-evasion offenders 





thus not quite clear how the US effectively has satisfied the condition of equivalent 
measures of the EUSTD. The US reporting system is significantly narrower than the 
EUSTD (it covers only deposit interest, while the EUSTD covers a broader range of 
interest income) and it provides only for the possible exchange of information with 
foreign tax authorities, not automatic exchange. (Spencer 2003, 10-11.) 
The rather ambiguous approach of the US administration begs for an explanation. Even 
if the EUSTD does not concern US citizens and has a marginal effect on the US 
financial market33, there is an inability and unwillingness by the Americans to come 
forth clearly and firmly on the matter. The US de facto through its own policies accepts 
tax evasion as a problem; it has in 2003 entered into an agreement with Switzerland that 
provides more extensive exchange of information than previous agreements (Spencer 
2003, 7-8). One can conclude that as on other issues of global concern, governments 
find it comparatively easy to draw up an agreement on what needs to be done (less tax 
evasion), but extremely difficult to translate that agreement into political reality 
(automatic exchange or not, bilateral or multilateral approaches, etc.) (Strange 1998, 
141).  
In a broader view,  
'US decisions have usually enhanced the power of market forces, increasing 
volatility and uncertainty. But some have also been consciously system-
preserving, imposing re-regulation rather than deregulation, and undertaking 
new costs and responsibilities in the interests of global financial stability rather 
than simply the shorter term interests of the US economy and its taxpayers.' 
(Strange 1998b, 21.)  
As in the UK, the national government’s direction and 
management of financial affairs has had rather good results on 
the whole (owing to the US's historically defined position at 
the centre of the global financial structure of power), and 
should probably not be lightly abandoned. There most certainly exists a general 
American scepticism of global governance as seen in the many instances in history of 
American unilateralism and protectionism. The EUSTD represents a much stronger 
version of global governance with its built in automatic information exchange, 
compared to the OECD initiative of the much more 'traditional' and diplomatic approach 
                                                 
33 None of the US finance industry lobby groups have used any possible direct impact on the US financial 
market as an argument against the EUSTD. (see e.g. 'The EU and EUSTD' at Center for Freedom and 





of demanding information from another jurisdiction. Global harmonization of taxes 
sends the alarm bells ringing throughout the American lobbying organizations. And 
although the EUSTD does not in that sense concern the US, it does - together with the 
OECD effort - represent a step in that direction and could provide a platform. The 
American finance industry lobbying groups speak of a tax cartel:  
'European politicians may believe that it is unfair for jobs and capital to flee 
from high-tax countries to low-tax countries, but the United States has no 
obligation to prop up Europe's welfare states. The Savings Tax Directive is a 
significant threat to market-based policy and fiscal competition. But most of all it 
is a threat to America's interests.'  (‘Bush Should Reject European Tax Cartel’ at 
the Cato Institute website.)  
The American system of financial regulation is not necessarily a model for other 
countries as it is embedded in social and political attitudes highly specific to the US 
(Stiglitz 2002, 80-81), something those who talk about tax cartels propping up the 
welfare systems clearly fail to see. US governments have so far not been good at taking 
into consideration how their own actions affect others. Whether and how this may 
change as American firms become more and more dependent on the international 
economy is one of the key issues of this century. The EUSTD is just one issue of 
international tax competition on which the EU and US disagree: 
'The EU has waged a bitter dispute against the US foreign sales corporation 
(FSC) system through the WTO. Under the FSC regime, certain US corporates 
located offshore have benefited from benign tax treatment - a system that has 
been used to particular advantage by the aviation industry. Under strong 
pressure from Airbus Industrie, the EU has lobbied successfully with the WTO to 
have the system disallowed. But tax disputes over anything from bananas to steel 
continue to flare up between the two regions.'  (Strategic Direct Investor, 
Nov/Dec 2002.) 
The US patched together some of its divergent demands by 
giving the EU a chance of saying before the 2005 
implementation of the directive, that the US administration 
does fulfil the requirements of the EUSTD, at the same time as 
it could claim to its home core constituencies that it does not. Tax cheating is at least an 
implicitly recognized problem (recognized more by the IRA than by the rest of the 
administration), yet for political reasons the responses to the problem had to be low 
profile in nature. At the same time, the US has taken an unprecedented step in accepting 






ceding some of its authority to the WTO. Additionally the EUSTD has almost certainly 
become a bargaining chip in the economic competition between the EU and the US. 
The future of the international political economy, and of 
international finance, depends on how conflicting interests 
concerning the new economic realities are fought out in the 
political systems of the world's nations (Frieden 1987, 163-
164). Here it is interesting to see that the US has accepted some international level 
management of trade affairs through the WTO and given up some of its own authority. 
Its lame, yet existing, support for the OECD initiative reflects that the structures are 
partially in place for the US to accept some global governance also in financial affairs. 
In relational power terms, however, a significant shift in the administration's policy is 
required for any progress, realistcally through a change of ruling partisanship. The 
political mood in the US Congress seems to have shifted even further towards a 
sceptical position than in the adminstration (Christensen, John, personal 
communication, September 13th, 2005).    
 
4.4.1 Crooks and Books: Synergies with Crime Fighting 
The US finance lobby groups criticized during the negotiations that '[s]ince September 
11, the EU has also tried to bolster its case by jumping on the anti-terrorist bandwagon, 
arguing that financial privacy is an obstacle to law enforcement' ('Bush Should Reject 
European Tax Cartel' at Cato Institute website).  
Was there any truth behind this argument? Susan Strange (1998, 123) points to the 
connection between money laundering and tax evasion, and other criminal activity. The 
fact that serious crimes are enabled by the very same OFCs where tax evasion is taking 
place was confirmed once again when it became clear that the OFCs' banking secrecy 
was a key in providing financing for Al Qaeda (Stiglitz 2003, 227). As a result many 
countries have introduced or reinforced their anti-money laundering laws. At the same 
time, tax authorities are beginning to co-operate globally to an unprecedented degree in 
the fight against tax evasion. It is tempting to believe that, just as there are strong 
connections between the enabling of money laundering and tax evasion, there is a 
strong connection between the disabling of the two. But the connections are not as 






Even before September 11th, substantial momentum had already 
been gathering in support of the global effort against money 
laundering. The extent to which this progress is reflected in a 
similar consensus to combat tax evasion is unclear. Such 
parallels are much down to the control of the knowledge structure and which rhetoric 
connections that are accepted as legitimate. The OECD's Financial Actions Task Force 
(FATF) has 'explored how anti-money laundering systems could contribute effectively 
to deal with tax-related crimes, without undermining the effectiveness of these systems' 
(OECD 1999, 5). Whether this approach is reflected in the FATF's recommendations on 
methods to be used to achieve FATF anti-money laundering standards is unclear. 
There is thus a desire, where possible, to reduce the cost of tax evasion initiatives by 
placing reliance on anti-money laundering documentation. Recent developments in the 
US and the EU highlight this approach, but give little evidence of any real synergies on 
the technical level. While the information needed is similar, it is not exactly the same, 
with tax evasion efforts often needing more information than that needed for anti-
money laundering. Burnie and Fusco (2002, 16) conclude: 
'Money laundering and tax evasion rules are clearly not moving in unison as 
regards their tests for identifying customers. Unlike money laundering, tax law 
requires a method to ensure not only that a person claiming funds is entitled to 
them, but that the person is not claiming tax benefits that are not rightfully 
theirs. The real issue concerns the way tax compliance obligations have been 
and are continuing to be imposed on the financial sector under the false 
assumption that such costs will be low, as most compliance requirements will 
already have been imposed under money laundering rules.'  
On the cross-border level there is another technical aspect of the 
EUSTD which is of more relevance for the negotiations than the 
technical link between money laundering and tax evasion 
combating efforts. Many of the tax havens affected by the 
EUSTD which have opted for the withholding tax are zero-tax rate jurisdictions. This 
means that they previously had no technical systems for the deduction of these types of 
taxes. Many banks and institutions thus had to create mechanisms to deduct the tax from 
interest earnings before July 2005.  
Complicating matters is that individual EU-resident clients may have the option to 
request that details of their earnings be passed to their home tax authorities instead. 
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between the two options in these countries gives them a freedom of choice not allowed 
for customers in those countries opting for the exchange of information. It is a freedom 
accepted by the jurisdictions in question on the basis that their customers are less likely 
to move away if they have the choice of applying the withholding tax principle. But 
clearly it is also a compromise for these jurisdictions; a compromise where the cost of 
the installation of double technical systems to cater for both principles is seen as smaller 
than the cost of losing banking secrecy.  
Unlike the anti-money laundering systems, the double mechanisms now installed in tax 
havens will clearly facilitate any future move to complete automatic exchange of 
information in these jurisdictions. The lack of technology and the cost thereof may have 
constrained the EUSTD negotiations, yet the offered freedom of choice of knowledge 
mechanisms advanced the negotiations. Future negotiations start from a new 
equilibrium, where less freedom is not associated with a compromise in wealth in the 
knowledge structure due to technical costs, but only with the compromise in wealth in 
the financial structure due to the competitive loss of secrecy.  
 
4.5 Rule Britannia: Colonial Policy in the Twenty-first Century 
The Cayman Islands, a self-governing United Kingdom 
overseas territory (formerly dependent territory or crown 
colony), is the world's fifth largest finance centre. The islands 
with a population of 35 000, rank behind only the UK, 
Germany, Japan and the USA in the enormity of their foreign deposits. (Engdahl 2003, 
69.) The lucrative status as one of the world's leading, if not the leading, offshore tax 
havens has been hard to achieve. The Cayman Islands first began to develop its offshore 
industry in the sixties, when - like Jersey, Bermuda, and Gibraltar - it was encouraged 
by London to find new ways of becoming self-sufficient. Some changes along the way 
were not deliberately introduced by the British, but were connected to the change of the 
security structure. Three tax havens - Malta, Cyprus and Gibraltar - are all former 
British naval and air bases. As times changed, the US took over security in the 
Mediterranean. Consequently there was a necessity for new sources of income and the 
solution was an OFC. (Strange 1998, 133.) Taxes were set at virtually zero, and 
disclosure requirements were minimal; in effect, companies and bank accounts could be 





Now, when the world's attention on OFCs and the consequences of offshore banking is 
unprecedented, both the UK and the dependencies have to reconsider their policies. This 
became very evident in the EUSTD negotiations between the UK and its dependencies, 
particularly the fierce EUSTD opponent Cayman Islands. The UK sought after the tax 
income the EUSTD would bring. According to many analysts the UK also wanted to 
improve its image as a 'good European'. Agreeing to the EUSTD would potentially have 
meant a loss of business and revenue for the dependencies. Why did the dependencies, 
including the Cayman Islands, agree to the EUSTD in the end? Things could have taken 
another turn, as apparently there was nothing in relational power terms that would have 
prevented the Caymans from refusing to implement the EUSTD. 
The UK is responsible for the defence and international relations of the dependencies, 
and the Crown is ultimately responsible for their good government. In theory the UK 
could eventually have imposed legislation on the Cayman Islands through what is called 
an Order in Council or through primary legislation in the British parliament. These 
options were discussed and used as a stick towards the Caymans during the 2003-2004 
negotiations. Such a move would have been embarrassing for the Cayman Islands, and 
could possibly have lead to speculation of the secession of the islands from UK 
dependency.34 The Order in Council would have enforced the UK's preference for 
exchange of information, but would have been challenged legally by the Caymans' 
administration. This would have meant a delay in the implementation of the EUSTD as 
a whole. (International Money Marketing, Mar 2004.) 
So rather than actually having diametrically opposed incentives, 
both sides stood to lose from the non-acceptance of the EUSTD by 
the Caymans. The fact that the UK would have stood to lose from 
such a situation is by common sense explained by the loss of 
potential tax revenue and loss of prestige. After all, most would agree that in addition to 
judging the values wealth, justice, security and freedom, politicians (as well as ordinary 
individuals) are also driven by a sense of nationalistic pride. To increase their 
bargaining positions during the 2003-2004 negotiations with the UK, the Caymans were 
ready to introduce - as they ultimately did - the exchange of information principle 
favoured by the British. This position was probably based on assumptions about the 
                                                 
34 Such moves would find significant support in international law, the Cayman Islands along with several 
other Britsih Caribbean dependiencies are listed on the UN decolonization list of non-self governing 





insignificance of European individual investors in the Caymans.35 Also, the withholding 
tax principle poses a problem for the Cayman Islands since it has no tax laws.  
With the UK having so many things that the Caymans were ready to horse trade with - 
especially the UK's control of market access and financial benefits that it could offer the 
Caymans - it was only a matter of time before an agreement could be reached. The 
Caymans' demands included recognition of the Cayman Islands Stock Exchange, wider 
access to EU and UK financial markets, a greater role for the Caymans in international 
meetings that involve their interests, and UK promotion of the islands' tourism industry 
in Europe (International Money Marketing, Mar 2004). In its 2004 bilateral agreement 
with the Cayman Islands, the UK has taken positive steps as a means of striking a 
balance to the potential financial threat of the EUSTD to the Caymans (‘Tax Law to 
Affect Personal Accounts’ at Cayman NetNews Online). 
The result of the process was that the British dependency became more dependent on its 
London-based metropolis, but at the same time its strong relations with America must 
be kept in mind. With the potential loss of revenues that the EUSTD brings about, the 
Caymans have slightly less financial power of their own. Thus, an increasing part of the 
finances of the islands are dependent upon UK efforts such as tourism promotion. And 
with the threat of imposition of legislation, its self-governance has been undermined. 
Although the revenue loss that the EUSTD may cause is only a drop in the sea for the 
Cayman Islands' coffers, it is an indication of the problems that the UK's twenty-first 
century colonial model contains. The UK's requirement that its dependencies be self-
sufficient and its (direct or indirect) encouragement of the establishment of OFCs, have 
increasingly tended to backfire.  
 
4.5.1 Global Cohesion Policy: Other Dependency Arrangements 
While the Caymans’ increased dependence on the UK has come 
with an undermining of the islands’ self-governance, this needs not 
necessarily be the case with dependencies. Overseas territories have 
never been considered integral parts of the UK, and have never had 
representation in the British Parliament, on the grounds that they are separate 
                                                 
35 Indeed Cayman Director of Public Relations, Portfolio Finance and Economics Ted Bravakis has said 
that ‘the impact on the Cayman Islands is not as severe as people may think. In large part the Cayman 
Islands is involved in large instiutional funds. The Directive will affect individuals only.’ (Cayman 





jurisdictions. This is in contrast to other European countries, such as France, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands36, whose dependencies have varying degrees of integration with 
their so-called 'mother countries'. They have received financial support from their host 
governments, the way regions within the mainland of a country get subsidies from the 
central government. ('Crown Colonies' on Wikipedia website.)  
The production structure of these remote dependencies often has limited capacity and 
diversification. Other sources of financing are thus needed. With adequate finances 
available from the 'mother countries' of these dependencies, there has never been a very 
large incentive to start an offshore activity. The UK though, has insisted on the self-
sufficiency of its dependencies, despite their limited production structure. Now the UK 
has to face up to reality, and is forced to act as a responsible host as it considers 
financial assistance with the expansion of Grand Cayman's airport (International Money 
Marketing, Feb 2004).  
The different policies are due to different answers to and 
interpretations of the cui bono question. The EU can play a part in 
the resolution of the question in relation to its own member states. 
With its structural funds the EU is able to influence the 
development of different areas of the economy of its member states. It has the financial 
power to direct investments into areas that could be an alternative for helping especially 
Luxembourg reduce its dependence on the financial industry.37 Luxembourg Prime 
Minister Jean-Claude Juncker suggested Luxembourg should accelerate its adjustment 
to the information revolution as a response to the EUSTD and other changes taking 
place in the finance industry (Financial Times, Jun 2, 1998). The less successful tax 
havens Malta and Cyprus should be even easier to appease.  
The contrast between British and e.g. French policy towards their 
respective overseas territories is also illustrated by the status of the 
territories vis-à-vis the European Union; the French Caribbean 
territories of Martinique and Guadeloupe are part of the EU and 
use the euro. They have a natural access to both the benefits and the duties that come 
with being an EU member. But it is not only the dependencies' relationship with the 
                                                 
36 The Netherlands provided a $97 million aid package to the Netherlands Antilles in 1996 and $127 million to Aruba 
and Suriname 
37 The EU’s cohesion policy is geared towards eradicating the biggest differences in standards of living 
between the EU countries. Although it also is concerned with the ability of regions to implement EU 
directives, Luxembourg falls well outside any regions eligible for support. Also, the directives that 
cohesion policy is concerned with have usually not concerned financial regulation. (Allen 2000, 252.) 
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'mother state' that determines their relationship with the EU. This is confirmed by the 
example of British dependency Gibraltar. Gibraltar's position is different from that of 
other UK territories such as the Channel Islands and the Caribbean dependencies in that 
it has been an associate member of the EU since the UK joined the union in 1973. 
Gibraltar has been able to enjoy the benefits of EU membership in their various forms. 
Gibraltar is represented by the UK in the EU, and thus the information exchange option 
of the EUSTD was imposed on it.38 (International Money Marketing, Jul 21, 2003.)  
The move is a clear indication of how the autonomy of nationally strong but small 
regions is circumvented by EU membership. Previously domestic issues, such as tax 
policy, when moved to the European arena suddenly fall under the title of foreign 
policy, and thus beyond the formal competencies of the dependenices. The structural 
power to decide upon such shifts of policy areas to the European level lies in a 
complicated balance between the Commission and the member state governments, not 
with the autonomous regions. For any dependencies possibly considering EU 
membership (see e.g. ‘Jersey hints at joining the EU’ at Accountancy Age website) as an 
answer to continued clampdown on their tax avoidance schemes, this is an important 
point to remember. Even if they instead of full membership only gain greater access to 
the EU market, and consequently will be more dependent on it, they will have little or 
no authority over it. The claim that 'the EU rather than just the UK may in the future be 
regarded as the Channel Islands' "protecting power"' (quoting leading Jersey lawyer 
Michael Lombardi in Financial Times, Nov 28, 2003) can certainly be questioned.  
Following the many corporate scandals connected to banking 
secrecy, the issue of information exchange and transparency is far 
from being a closed chapter after the long-awaited conclusion of 
the EUSTD negotiations in 2004. The Parmalat scandal was a 
wake-up call for the Commission leading to the production of a Commission paper 
entitled 'Preventing and Combating Corporate and Financial Malpractice' (Commission 
of the European Communities 2004). It calls for concrete actions to ensure that the EU's 
partners (e.g. British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands) are transparent and suggests 
                                                 
38 So far though, Gibraltar has been lucky: As Gibraltar is as far as the EU concerns considered a part of 
the UK, so the reporting of savings income should be submitted via the UK. Yet Gibraltar’s bank 
secrecy has not been, and cannot be according to the Gibraltese argument, removed by the UK. Thus 
no information is currently flowing from Gibraltar to the UK. (Richard Murphy, 9 July 2005.) The 
situation is clearly unstable, and would lead to EU sanctions against the United Kingdom. The 
incentive for the UK to amend the situation quickly is thus there. In anticipation of this, Gibraltar is 
raising a case in the European Court of First Instance for its right to have a different and favourable 





introducing banking transparency into existing EU trade and aid deals with African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and territories.  
This would give Brussels the power to use such things as banana quotas and 
development grants as bargaining chips over access to financial information. Brussels is 
also offering 'economic support' to help 'co-operative' territories that open up their 
financial sectors to scrutiny. OFCs may have few reasons to surrender to such an 
approach but the hope is their need to protect a small number of rich people may be 
dwarfed by the need to access European markets and EU handouts.  
A new set of bargains is being hammered out, with new connections being made 
between the structures of power. Critics often stress that OFCs and tax havens could 
easily be shut down with the help of sanctions, if just the economic giants of the world 
would want to. However, the attitudes of key actors such as the US and the UK have 
been rather accepting. But with the EU now controlling much of the trade ('a 
substructure' to especially production and finance) previously controlled by the 
individual member states, notably the UK, the situation is possibly changing (Bretherton 
& Vogler 1999, 48). The European Commission has a quite different historical 
trajectory behind it than any of the member states and has an explicit target of looking 
at the general European wellbeing. With the significant support of many major member 
states, it seems unlikely the previous stand of the Commission on the issue of tax co-
ordination is going to change any time soon. (See also chapter 4.2.)  
Another way in which the EU has succeeded in making it clear where the dependencies 
stand in the international hierarchy is by requiring them to adopt the 'same measures' as 
EU countries, while the six independent states mentioned in the EUSTD are asked to 
adopt 'equivalent measures'. The difference in terms is of great significance. (Spencer 
2003, 7) As discussed in the chapter on the OECD initiative all EU countries may 
sooner or later be likely to, or depending on Swiss policy even forced to, adopt the 
exchange of information system. In such a situation the EUSTD rules demand that also 
dependencies shift from a withholding tax to exchange of information, while notably 
Switzerland is free to stick to the 'equivalent measure' of a withholding tax. Without 
further carrots offered by the 'mother countries' or the EU, such a demand is poised to 
cause mayhem among the dependencies. The EU and its member states will seriously 
have to consider if it wishes to create such a split playing field, or if it would be more 
fruitful to push the issue gradually through the OECD, possibly combined with a change 
in British overseas policy.  
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5 Domestic Bargains 
Domestic bargains are intimately connected to those made at the intergovernmental 
level. The thesis has already touched upon several domestic bargains such as reactions 
in Germany to national withholding taxes in the 1990s; the American government’s 
considerations of its home constituency in deciding its position on the EUSTD; the 
German emphasis on stability and French emphasis on reciprocity in financial markets; 
and, the prioritisation of wealth over equal treatment in tax havens’ preferential regimes 
for non-residents.  
Exploring all domestic bargains is beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus of the 
thesis is on policy-making through negotiations, not the politics of the EU as such. 
Hence the thesis deliberately does not deal with some topics, such as the electoral 
politics of the EU and its member states.  
Instead some of the general dynamics of domestic bargains will be explored; what 
structural factors influence them in the context of tax co-ordination measures in the EU? 
Within most European countries the political arena encompasses different levels and 
layers of politics; and increasingly that arena is invaded by cross-boundary influences 
and interactions. Meanwhile, the transnational public policy processes are embedded in 
political institutions that are less clearly defined, and much less authoritative, than those 
of a traditional state. An important point to note here is that some political actors have 
easier access to the transnational policy processes than others - be they governments, 
NGOs or special interest groups. There is an imbalance in participation and access. 
(Wallace 2000, 35.) The role of lobbying groups is of much relevance. Thus the first 
subchapter naturally moves to an analysis of private sector bargains and the chapter 
finishes with concrete examples from the EUSTD negotiations. 
 
5.1 Political Supply and Demand: The Formation of EU Policy 
Commenting on tax co-ordination as well as the parallel issue of the institutional set-up 
of EU tax policy decision-making, Hallerberg and Basinger (1998, 339) rightly draw the 
reader's attention to domestic veto-players. They argue that:  
'The higher the number of domestic veto-players, the harder it is to pass laws 
and the greater is the chance that the status quo will be maintained. The 
implication is that states will not be able to respond equally to a chock that they 
all experience together - states with one veto-player will be able to react swiftly 
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to any change in their situation . . .'  
They conclude that in the EU,  
'[s]tates that have more veto players  may become the real losers from further 
integration because they will not be as able to adjust to a rapidly changing fiscal 
playing field. One can imagine a cleavage developing on tax issues between 
states with one veto-player and those with two or more, with states with more 
veto players calling for some form of tax harmonization of rates, whereas 
countries traditionally with one veto player favouring competitive solutions and 
non-intervention.' (Hallerberg and Basinger 1998, 347.)  
While the initial argumentation seems correct, the conclusion does not. Tax 
harmonization (or, comparably, co-ordination) on the EU level is seen by the authors as 
a kind of a non-decision, which does not require a domestic bargain to be struck: As if it 
was an easier decision for countries with many veto-players 'ceding sovereignty' than 
holding on to it. This is of course not true; tax co-ordination represents just one 
response among others to fiscal competition.  
Obviously member states of the European Union have very different ways of forming 
their EU policy - some have stricter domestic rules, some less. All the same, a minimum 
bargain in the formation of an EU policy at the national level is made in the 
government. Hallerberg and Basinger (1998, 339) recognize this and emphasize the 
significance of the size of coalitions, but only in cutting tax levels, not in forming an EU 
policy. But they are indeed relevant for the formation of EU policy too. The conclusions 
of Hallerberg and Basinger, that countries with few veto-players will adapt better, may 
still be correct. This is not because of a difference in domestic institutional set-up, but a 
consequence of the EU's institutional set-up, which makes decision-making difficult. It 
seems we are back to square one; the national position on tax co-ordination and other 
responses to fiscal competition seem to depend more on the perceived gains and losses 
of any particular bargain solution.  
This is not to deny that domestic factors do have an impact. The goals of parties should 
reflect the preferences of their core constituencies. Most would agree though that these 
preferences cannot be perfectly mirrored in the party, because there are interfering 
factors. Among these factors one can include outside party financing and possible 
interpersonal loyalties of the (political, economic and cultural) elite. Further, in 
questions where the constituency does not have sufficient knowledge it is easy for the 
party elite or media to manipulate the opinions in a desired direction. Control over the 
knowledge structure is of great significance here. This is not only a question of who 
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runs the medias, but also of who the media listens to, which institutions do the public 
show respect for, and which are perceived to do a valuable job. Although public trust in 
parties is consistently low and trust in radio and television is usually high throughout 
Europe, the Eurobarometer39 opinion polls unfortunately do not display the levels of 
trust in special interest organizations of industries or civil society organizations. 
Another way in which governmental positions on specific issues are formulated is 
through direct lobbying by special interest groups. How they are allowed to influence 
government policy is of great importance in determining the interest group 
environment. In other words, it is not simply a question of changing structures that 
generates new organized interests ('supply side'), but also of how the government allows 
them to come forward and develop ('demand side'). The state (government) can wield 
influence through (Mahoney 2004, 442): (1) direct subsidies, payments, grants, and 
other financial incentives (financial structure), (2) determining which issues are 
afforded formal arenas of debate and which interests participate in those arenas 
(knowledge structure), and (3) its own growth and levels of activity in different areas of 
policy (multiple structures).  
The third point is quite parallel to the 'supply side' forces, and goes hand in hand with 
the deepening and expansion of integration already discussed in chapter 4.2.2. The first 
point is not of great significance for big-money institutions such as finance lobby 
groups, and governments tend to finance citizen organizations rather than business 
associations. That leaves the second point as the most interesting. Which issues are 
afforded formal arenas of debate and which interests participate in those arenas? Such 
consulting procedures vary greatly between member states, and the different procedures 
might to some extent be reflected in the governments' decision-making in the EU. 
Chances are that corporate interests dominate on the European level because the follow-
up on most issues is likely to be stronger from the corporate sector than from the civil 
society or the general public, who relies on the still - in terms of European coverage - 
underdeveloped nationally based media.  
The weak correlation that Hallerberg and Basinger (1998, 337) found between 
partisanship and the willingness of governments to tax high-income individuals and 
corporations is not as much an indication of different institutional set-ups at the 
domestic level, as it is an indication of a much more complicated set of interdependence 
and cross-border bargains that make up the answer to the 'cui bono' question. Even if the 
                                                 
39 Eurobarometer website, 2005 
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opinions of the core constituencies of parties could be taken for 'pure' un-manipulated 
opinions and even if they would be reflected directly without interference into the 
party's opinions, it still presents problems. Political questions are not (and never have 
been) answered by the constituency according to some international norm of how left 
and right should always structure e.g. taxation, but by the notion of what gains 'us'40 the 
most (in security, wealth, justice and/or freedom). If there ever was international 
uniformity in how the left and right answered these questions, there certainly is not 
anymore.41 Deeper integration on a European level might though, eventually, result in 
more convergence on the perceived benefits of different policies among European 
parties, but for the moment most experts agree that the European field of political 
parties is rather fragmented. 
 
5.2 Whatever You Say, Sir: Loyalties of the Finance Lobby 
Market forces determine much of the notions of what gains 'us'. One of the four basic 
values, the creation of wealth is very much dependent upon markets. The increased 
global market integration and markets becoming more sizable and 'quicker' (and more 
volatile) in their moves, is reflected in the political decision-making. The domestic 
bargains thus very quickly link up with bargains between market and authority. Frieden 
(1987, 121) describes:  
'The response of international banks, bond markets, and foreign currency traders 
must be considered by national governments as they weigh the costs and benefits 
of public works, tax reform, monetary policy, and virtually anything else a 
government might do.'  
The perceptions by the markets of what impact a certain policy might have are of great 
importance. The reactions to a political statement, rather than the later action and 
implementation itself, are immediately reflected in the markets. Policy-makers face 
huge informational problems with regard to economic consequences of policies as well 
as how these are evaluated by citizens, while special interest groups have privileged 
access to the pertinent information. This does not mean that policy-makers are slaves of 
                                                 
40 The notion of 'us' and 'them' in international politics leads us to the area of identity politics. How 
people's and decision maker’s identities are formed is of great importance for their domestic and 
international loyalties.  
41 The recent proposals coming from the G-5 Lula Group (airline ticketing tax) and from the supporters of 
the Tobin tax introduce the interesting possibility of extending redistributive taxes from the national to 
the international domain. An unforseen positioning of the left/right ideological spectrum on an 
international level could consequently take place.  
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the markets - business interests failing to gain their desired policy outcomes in policy 
struggles has frequently been observed. Despite their privileged access to knowledge, 
business cannot exaggerate implications of a certain policy if it wants to retain a 
credible and important role in future consultations. Additionally sometimes the costs of 
lobbying might surpass the benefits of changing or outmanoeuvring a policy.  
In the case of the EUSTD, the finance lobby in the UK did its very best to guarantee a 
minimum of concessions in the wake of the 1996 Verona paper up until 2000. 
Internationally the finance lobby was more split throughout the negotiations, although 
powerful institutions such as the International Primary Markets Association, the 
International Securities Market Association, the International Swaps & Derivatives 
Association and the International Paying Agents Association teamed up to criticize the 
plans for the directive since the very beginning of the negotiations until their very end 
(Euromoney, Aug 1998). Together with the British finance lobby they denounced the 
Commission's consultation practices, which, as expected, had focused on European 
level business organizations, including the European Mortgage Federation (EMF). It 
was said that the EMF represents a plethora of often conflicting European views. This 
may be true and it brings up the question of why the British finance lobby was allowed 
to dominate the views of business to the extent that its views affected even foreign 
governments.  
The members of bankers’ associations in some high-taxing 
European countries one might assume would have gained from 
the directive and could have raised some alternative opinions 
to the British finance lobby. The fact that they laid low in 
1999-2000, while the debates surrounding the EUSTD’s effects on the Eurobond market 
dominated, is the most significant bargain between private interests in the EUSTD 
negotiations. The biggest banks even in the smallest of EU member states are however 
involved in offshore activities, often maintaining branches in Luxembourg42. So even if 
some funds might be repatriated to the onshore banks as a result of the EUSTD, their 
webs of interdependence stretching to the offshore and the risk of losing the richest 
customers did create a divergence of interests for these finance business associations. 
The more or less multinational banks create alliances and informal relationships; this is 
called alliance capitalism in the academic literature (Phillips 2000, 38-39). Thus the 
negative expectations of the British finance lobby - building on the Washington 
                                                 
42 e.g. http://www.nordea.lu/; see also Fraenkel 2005, 48. 
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consensus rhetoric of tax competition - were clearly expressed, while the more balanced 
expectations of other national finance business lobbies were not heard.  
Finance business interests’ values and worldview to some extent 
have a reflexive self-sustaining effect. The authorities can take 
advantage of this reflexivity. Those individual investors that 
anticipated they were going to be hit by the EUSTD, could at 
first instance 'punish' the European governments for their plans by relocating to other 
jurisdictions, as happened in Germany in the early 1990s. But some of the countries that 
are believed to gain the most from the introduction of the EUSTD, namely Italy and 
Belgium, have since the conclusion of the EUSTD both announced tax amnesties for 
individuals (and in Italy also for corporations) who repatriate offshore savings to a 
national bank account. The Italian tax amnesty meant that some € 70 billion were 
repatriated. The Belgian tax amnesty coincided with the introduction of the EUSTD in 
2005. Responses from the market are already positive: 
'All in all, Belgian banks are not unhappy with the tax amnesty, and they are 
keen to advise their clients about the opportunities of the tax amnesty. The 
amnesty tax is relatively low and the reasons for keeping savings offshore may 
not outweigh the taxes they face in Belgium. (...) Foreign banks such as UBS and 
Lombard Odier (Switzerland) and Edmond Rotschild (Luxembourg) have 
already set up an office in Belgium to follow their clients' savings.' (International 
Tax Review, Dec. 2003.) 
An important part of the tax amnesties is that the return cannot 
be used as an indication of undeclared income allowing the tax 
authorities to start an investigation. Justice is compromised for 
wealth. Other countries, such as Germany, were not ready to 
make this compromise. Thus, an EU-wide concerted tax amnesty to increase pressure 
on Switzerland was not possible, though it was considered already in 2002. (Knight 
Ridder Tribune Business News, Nov 10, 2002.) But the compromise favouring justice 
over wealth could be more expensive than thought at first hand. Spencer (2003, 17) 
argues that unless the residence country (e.g. Germany) provides an incentive for 
repatriation, such as through amnesty, the imposition of a withholding tax in the source 
country (e.g. Luxembourg), without automatic exchange of information, 'normally will 
not result in the repatriation of funds not yet declared in the residence country. A 
withholding tax without exchange of information may provide an incentive for more tax 








6 The Non-Actors  
The thesis has so far in many senses been open-ended: Temporally, not taking the 
EUSTD negotiations and the resulting regime as neither independent from its history 
nor its future; functionally, not limiting itself only to dynamics in the financial structure; 
and in terms of actorness, not making the state theoretically superior to others. 
Following from the latter, the study will now further extend its inclusive approach to 
some actors that have been excluded from the bargaining process, despite their wish to 
influence matters.  
The EUSTD, as any policy change, was a reaction to, or a consequence of, changes in 
the structures of power. By and large, the changes, emanating from the dynamics 
presented in chapter three, were a consequence of (re)action by states and substates 
making up the sovereign system of states, by capitalist markets, by lawyers and 
accountants rewarded by companies, and by one IGO in particular, namely the 
European Union as represented by the Council of Ministers and the European 
Commission. The actors also included finance lobby groups claiming to represent 
'market operators'. These 'actors' are also the ones that consequently have figured in 
chapters four and five. The relevance of all these involved actors is based on their 
control over resources of structural power. 
For the 10 applicant countries to the EU, the EUSTD came as part of the enlargement 
package. For the eight central and eastern European countries the EUSTD posed no 
problem, and their position was thus comparable to other small and medium sized 
members of the EU. The net effect for them was expected to be positive. Cyprus and 
Malta, as tax havens, had more to play for in the EUSTD (European Voice, 11 June 
1998). But faced with the complicated bargaining process for EU membership, they 
were faced with a situation where their comparably modest control over any sources of 
power was evident. Other bigger questions, where they could find support among larger 
member states were their best bet for a good bargaining position. For Cyprus it was a 
security question; the reunification with Northern Cyprus that overshadowed their 
accession negotiations and for Malta it was the much controversy causing fisheries and 
agriculture policy. 
Some actors that one might have expected to appear in the process have not done so. 
These include other European Union institutions, namely the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee (ESC), and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
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Notably, there are also civil society movements and organizations, claiming to hold 
knowledge about the issue (e.g. Attac, Tax Justice Network - from here on 'tax justice 
movements'), that have not been part of the EUSTD process in any significant way. 
These 'non-actors' have no or limited control over resources of structural power. Their 
best claim to power no doubt lies in the knowledge structure. The Parliament, the ESC 
and the finance lobby groups all primarily give opinions in issues of direct taxation. But 
contrary to the finance lobby groups, the 'non-actors' cannot with the same impetus 
claim to know market reactions.  
Of the non-actors the ECJ also gives opinions, but its opinions are of course particular 
in that they are binding upon anyone within its jurisdiction. If and how the ECJ could 
have had any role in the EUSTD will not be deliberated upon here. Suffice it to say that 
in matters of direct taxation at large, the ECJ may have a role to play: 'The ECJ has a 
mandate to drive forward a single market agenda (...) and thus it will decide cases 
according to that agenda'.43 (Strategic Direct Investor, Nov/Dec 2002). 
The Parliament and the ESC have a strictly defined mandate of giving opinions to the 
Commission and/or the Council. The ESC is recognized as being an intrinsically weak 
actor (Wallace 2000, 25) and Commission consultations are only to give the consulted 'a 
voice, not a vote'. Although the Parliament's institutional position is growing stronger 
all the time, it does not have much formal influence in questions of tax policy. Its 
increased power over other sources of structural power might though put it in a better 
bargaining position in the future, linking up issues of tax policy with other issues that it 
has some control over. If the legitimacy of the Parliament was to increase in the future, 
so that also the citizens of Europe would feel that the Parliament represents them well at 
the European level, then it could claim to possess some knowledge about the reactions 
of the people to different policies.  
As the Parliament and ESC, civil society organizations also have some chance of 
getting heard by the Commission in consultation procedures. The Commission 
particularly encourages a coherent approach to representation of civil society44 
organizations at European level. But in the EUSTD negotiations the Commission 
                                                 
43 The politics surrounding the ECJ’s jurisprudence in taxation matters is being increasingly recognized as 
an emerging arena of governance, especially as conventional policy-making and decision-taking in the 
EU seems paralyzed at the moment due to both the general identity crisis and specifics in connection 
to the dynamics of tax policy in an enlarged union (Radaelli, 7 July 2005). 
44 Defined as including e.g.: trade unions and employers federations, consumer organizations, 
environmental organizations, human rights organizations, charitable organizations, training and 
educational organizations, youth organizations, family associations, and religious communities. 
(Commission of the European Communities 2002, 6.) 
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consulted only 'market operators'. The Commission emphasizes that it is especially 
important to be able to claim some representation of a specific interest. The same is true 
also for consultations by the national governments. 
Contrary to the Parliament and the ESC, the civil society organizations' 'mandate' is not 
limited to the institutionalized consultation procedure. They can thus potentially use 
their knowledge power in a more constructive way. If a civil society organization can 
generate a change in the knowledge structure, it can set in motion processes that are 
beneficial to the goals of the civil society organization. History displays instances when 
this has indeed happened. The anti-land mine campaign is one of the most high profile 
of recent cases.45 The campaign led to a change in the global knowledge structure. This 
enabled the formation of the new regime.  
The anti-land mine campaign has in common with the tax justice movement that a 
global standard is necessary for the regime to be effective - if not, countries will have a 
military or financial advantage not acceptable to those considering participating in the 
new regime. Many human rights regimes, which also have been generated through the 
knowledge structure, do not possess this property, but they will remain intact and 
functional even if only a few countries participate in them (e.g. minority rights).  
'The diffusion of international norms in the human rights area crucially depends 
on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and 
transnational actors who manage to link up with international regimes, to alert 
Western public opinion and Western governments.' (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 5.)  
The generation of change in the knowledge structure thus quite simply is a question of 
media coverage, lobbying and sufficient research on the subject. It is also necessary 
that: 
'Transnational advocacy coalitions frequently engage norm-violating 
governments in an argumentative process whereby truth claims have to be 
justified and moral convictions are challenged.' (Risse & Ropp 1999, 236-237)  
The difference between human rights and offshore is that the target actors of such 
processes in the context of offshore is hard to pin down. It clearly includes those 
jurisdictions that enable offshore activities, but to which extent should it also engage 
other actors? The individuals and companies that take advantage of such arrangements 
have to be challenged, as do the banks and finance institutions that enable such 
transactions. But what about such (large Western) governments that do not have formal 
                                                 
45 Of less recent cases a comparison to the anti-slavery drive of the 19th century illuminates the 
challenging of existing economic power relationships from an essentially moral perspective. 
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power over offshore jurisdictions, but who all the same encourage them to be used or 
abstain from discouraging their usage?  
It is argued that international norms start with principled ideas being pushed forward by 
transnational actors. The less contested their ideas become, the more international actors 
and states sign up to them. (Risse & Ropp 1999, 266.) Interestingly the land mine case 
shows a norm that has been internalized by a group of countries to the extent that they 
will also pressurize other countries to internalize them, only so that they themselves 
would be able to accept their own norm. The weakness of the tax justice movement can 
thus be turned into its strength, namely its indispensably global character. Progressive 
governments may engage more strongly in the process to make the norm truly global.  
Interestingly the human rights literature often takes the relevance of Western 
governments for granted in affecting the bargaining process on human rights issues vis-
à-vis less developed countries. They do so despite the fact that Western countries may 
have human rights violations of their own. Such hypocrisy might well pass on the 
offshore agenda too. All the same, the ensuing bargaining processes are always very 
context specific. In contrast to Risse and Ropp (1999, 234-266), who present a model of 
human rights socialization, this thesis will not venture into hypothesizing over any 
'model' that 'tax justice socialization' could follow.  
 
6.1 Networking: Empowering the Tax Justice Movements 
When dealing with issues of economy, it seems to be important to be able to connect the 
control over the knowledge structure to control over some other structure. This is 
especially so as the dominant knowledge structure of the international political economy 
is that of the Washington consensus which has a favourable or ignorant approach 
towards tax evasion (i.e. 'tax efficiency'). So far, the only obvious example of such an 
association is the connection between the security structure and terrorist financing 
through offshore secrecy.  
Just as finance interest groups claim to represent 'market operators', other civil society 
organizations need to claim they know some other aspect of market reactions. In the 
EUSTD it is quite obvious that while financial institutions have been consulted, the 
other group affected by the directive - the taxpayers - have not. Just as 'market 
operators' on the European level are a very heterogeneous group, even more so are of 
course the taxpayers. Claims of legitimacy are indeed very complicated in the area of 
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taxation.  
Most European countries have an organization that claims to represent the taxpayers. 
The organized interests in the area of taxation often represent the upper end of the 
income scale. 'British Taxpayers' say that their job is 'to be against the [Inland] Revenue 
on your behalf. If there is a legitimate way for you to pay less tax then we can help you 
find it.' The Taxpayers' Association of Europe is a federation of taxpayers' associations 
throughout Europe. It has even more explicit goals than the British association as it 
'works towards a society with lower taxes and more individual freedom.' (British 
Taxpayers website; Taxpayers' Association of Europe website.) They include freedom 
of the individual from government control as one of the value judgements that are worth 
pursuing, but not justice between individuals. Working for lower taxes is a clear 
statement involving a wealth judgement made completely out of context. 
At the core of the offshore debate is the issue of banking secrecy. It represents a bargain 
between the right to know and the freedom to hide. Transparency International (TI) 
works for the right of the taxpayers to know what happens to their money in order to 
prevent corruption ('About us' at Transparency International website). Like with the 
taxpayers' associations, this is a goal, which concentrates on the relationship between 
government and individuals.  
In contrast to TI and the taxpayers' associations, the tax justice movements can claim to 
know the market result of a certain policy at the inter-individual level. The connection 
of the inter-individual (or inter-corporate) level to the market must be well 
conceptualized. The basic argument must be that secrecy at any level cannot be part of a 
well functioning market46. This is not only the case in 'vertical' market-authority 
bargains, but also in 'horizontal' bargains between private sector actors (including 
individuals). By avoiding an absolute wealth judgement of the desirable absolute level 
of taxes (high or low), the movements will appear less politically loaded and their claim 
to represent taxpayers in general will be more convincing.  
Both Transparency International and the taxpayers' associations have a mix of 
individual and corporate membership. Their corporate membership increases the 
seeming dependency that policy-makers perceive they have on their judgements (see 
chapter five). The fact that offshore activities are in practice only open to rich 
individuals and big corporations, thus giving them an unfair advantage is a point to be 
remembered for the tax justice movement. Including small- and medium sized 
                                                 
46 An argument well developed by several economists, see e.g. Stiglitz 2003. 
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enterprises in their membership would give them increased control over the knowledge 
structure as well as the production structure and a claim to know not only horizontal 
bargain reactions, but also vertical ones between market and authority. Evidence that 
this may turn out to be a viable approach already exists.47 
Out of the EUSTD context, but still in the context of tax evasion, it is possible to 
imagine civil society gaining claims to sources of structural power in other ways. 
Notably, the tax justice movements could function as co-ordinators for non-EUSTD, 
non-OECD, and non-OFC countries (i.e. developing and newly industrialized countries, 
NICs), to help them formulate a coherent and forceful position on the matter.48 Such 
positions could potentially be representative of a significant part of the world’s 
population. Especially if NICs would participate they could make claims to some 
sources of structural power. Realistically speaking, such involvement by these countries 
in the bargaining process seems difficult to orchestrate. They are faced with many 
serious challenges, and because short-termism tends to dominate in difficult situations, 
co-ordination would be difficult. 
In conclusion, one can note that the current non-actors are facing a huge challenge if 
they are to become relevant actors in tax policy change. The European Parliament's role 
may change in due time with changes in the institutional set-up of the EU, while the 
ESC seems condemned to a marginalized consultative role. The civil society 
organizations may improve their position on two levels. Firstly, they may attempt to 
become sources of influence in their role of organizations to be consulted by the 
Commission (and national governments). Secondly, and more ambitiously, they may 
attempt to push new issues to the (global) agenda by generating a change in the 
knowledge structure. Both require claims to control over the knowledge structure and 
other structures, as well as knowledge of market reactions. New claims to legitimacy 
require plenty of new connections - veritable networking. Additionally the change of the 
knowledge structure in a favourable direction requires alerting the public opinion and 
decision makers to the issue. 
                                                 
47 ‘The Forum of Private Business [in the UK] has reported [music store] HMV and the Guernsey 
Government to the Treasury as part of its campaign to stop a host of retail giants exploiting the 
Channel Islands’ tax status to sell cut-price goods – a practice the FPB says is fatally undermining 
high street shops.’ (FPB website, 27 July, 2005.) 
48 Meanwhile, OFCs have been highly effective in creating their own lobbying organization - the 




This thesis set out to answer the questions that were presented in chapter 2.4. The main 
question was: What has generated the change of norms in the international political 
economy that is embodied in the EUSTD? This question was split into a number of 
subquestions through which the aim was to answer also the main question.  
What were/are the different opinions of the actors on the EUSTD?  
The positions on the EUSTD were to some extent polarized, but almost none of the 
member states of the European Union maintained fixed positions throughout the 
negotiation process from 1989 through 2003. As the prologue on the history of the 
EUSTD showed, Germany, Belgium and Italy were some of the prime initiative takers. 
But at times each of them has also abandoned their support for the directive. The 
fiercest opponents among the EU member states were the UK and Luxembourg. The 
finance lobby was particularly outspoken in the UK, warning of the EUSTD's negative 
consequences for British job security and European wealth in general. Luxembourg's 
opposition was initially not so outspoken, but once the UK started pushing for the 
uniform application of the information exchange principle in the directive, Luxembourg 
became much more outspoken in its opposition.  
It was not surprising to find that the third state (and substate) parties that were involved 
in the negotiations were rather unsympathetic towards the EUSTD regime, as they had 
been selected on the basis of being particularly important OFCs. Each of them 
emphasized the necessity of 'a level playing field' and claimed that funds would 
otherwise flow to non-EUSTD OFCs such as Singapore and Hong Kong. The United 
States displayed a peculiar double faced attitude towards the EUSTD by agreeing to 
some of the measures required in the EUSTD, but still claiming to its home 
constituency it was not signing up to the EU's initiative. The OECD could also be found 
among the opponents to the directive. The OECD had engaged in a similar initiative 
based on exchange of information on demand, instead of the combination of automatic 
information exchange and withholding tax that is the basis of the EUSTD. The Paris-
based IGO also emphasized the necessity of a level playing field in the battle against tax 
evasion, and was disappointed to see the EUSTD being ratified. 
How have the different opinions been formulated?  
The different opinions emanated from three interlinked main sources: the different 
historical trajectories of the actors, the anticipated market reactions and the different 
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answers to the 'cui bono' question regarding a level playing field.  
With respect to the historical trajectories presented in chapter 4.2, the position of the 
UK and the US as initiators (through decisions and non-decisions) of the offshore 
realm, and their parallel positions at the centre of the world economy explain their 
reluctance towards the regulatory efforts of the EUSTD. Switzerland and Luxembourg 
arrived at similar positions through non-decisions in that they 'failed' to adopt the 
resource-transfer based welfare structures of the surrounding countries. Germany as one 
of the main initiators of the directive, and France as one of its strongest supporters, had 
a quite different political economic history behind them. German economic success was 
based on strict regulations and principles, while France in both European and global 
economic integration always has called for reciprocity. Their historical trajectories were 
thus much more compatible with the principles of the EUSTD.  
As a consequence of their different histories, the states had also arrived at different 
market positions. The British and Luxembourg finance markets have a particular 
specialization on the global financial markets, while most of the other EU member 
states have finance markets that are geared towards needs at the national level. 
Consequently, the regulation that the EUSTD proposed meant that capital was expected 
to flow away from the parts of the international market controlled by the British and 
Luxembourgers, either into national markets or to parts of the international markets 
controlled by non-EUSTD jurisdictions. 
For this reason the actors also had different needs for 'a level playing field'. Especially 
the UK has been striving to be a good global citizen, and accepts the need for some 
global governance. In addition, regulation is not necessarily seen as the opposite of 
competition. The only way for the UK to combine the necessity to stay competitive in 
the global finance market with global governance, was for it to call for a level playing 
field. The OECD initiative based on information exchange on demand represented an 
initiative based on those principles. Consequently it was important for the British to 
make the EUSTD compatible with the OECD initiative, in addition to the lesser 
administrative costs expected, and thus they pushed for automatic information 
exchange.  
The Americans are in a similar position to the UK in the sense that the US is at the very 
centre of the global financial markets. Their approach has also been a result of fitting 
together divergent expectations. Considering the lesser support for global governance 
and indeed for any regulation in the United States, it was no surprise that the US bargain 
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was one at the very minimum level, and appeared double faced. 
And what have been the opportunities and constraints for raising the issue in the first 
place?  
The most fundamental of constraints and also opportunities for putting the EUSTD on 
the agenda was the tacit bargain between sovereign states and offshore markets 
presented in chapter three. The increased integration of the global economy and 
technology advances, together with changes in moral judgements about offshore, has 
increased the opportunity for offshore activities. These activities build on the legal 
system of the sovereign states and are driven by the unwitting competition between 
them, which in turn is based on the dynamics of the capitalist markets.  
International market integration, taken to its furthest in the European Union, has in the 
European context been linked to increased co-operation among governments. This is 
what lies at the very basis of creating an opportunity for raising the EUSTD issue in the 
first place; the change of market dynamics and a forum on a supranational level in 
which the authorities can react to these changes. The connection to the current EU 
debate on the future of the Union as a 'pure market union' or as a 'political union' is 
evident. 
The EU as a forum has its own opportunities and constraints for raising an issue to its 
agenda. One of the most fundamental of these is that an issue, in order to appear and 
stay on the agenda has to have the backing of both the pro-integrationist Commission 
and one or many of the big member states. These two often correlate with each other; 
the Commission rarely raises issues that have no support among major member states. 
To raise an issue to the European agenda, a country, or a group of countries, must have 
enough control over sources of structural power so that they are able to strike the first 
bargains and set the negotiating process in motion. 
In short, explanations of the beginning of the policy-process depend on ‘the context, the 
functional needs, the motives of those involved, and the institutional arrangements’ 
(Wallace 2000, 48). Changes in the EU’s external environment force changes in 
embedded bargains (Wallace 2000b, 538).  The dynamics work in a feedback-like 
procedure as the EU itself also affects this external environment, or the global context. 
Thus, even though direct tax policy traditionally has been seen by most member states 
as an area where national competence should be retained - and still no one really would 
like to let it go - the EUSTD still changed this bargain that was embedded at the outset.  
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Within which constraints and opportunities have the decisions been made?  
Once the EUSTD was firmly on the European agenda, there were a host of conditions 
that played into the bargains that were struck. It was, in the end, a question of control 
over the four different structures of power; finance, knowledge, production, and 
security. None of these four structures can be said to have been more important than the 
other in the negotiations, nor does any one actor appear to have held a decisive role in 
all the negotiations.  
One particular constraint is the difficulty for regulators to know what the market 
reactions to proposed regulations will be. Policy-makers thus listen carefully to the 
private sector's predictions of market reactions. The subsequent power of finance 
lobbying groups on the issue of EU tax policy was and is, however, somewhat 
constrained, as they are not yet organised on a European level.  Also, lobbying groups 
cannot exaggerate the consequences of a certain policy; otherwise policy-makers would 
not trust them in future negotiations.  
Additionally, the Commission has quite an interesting role vis-à-vis the member states 
as a source of European expertise and is considered to hold knowledge about market 
reactions on a European scale. However, the national and/or a short-term view tend to 
dominate the thinking of national governments, and the Commission is thus almost 
always poised to be at odds with a few of the member states in any particular bargaining 
situation.  
An essentially British based finance lobby succeeded in convincing the member states 
that the effect of the original directive would have been negative for Europe as a whole, 
even though the Commission did not believe this. This was an extraordinary 
achievement and reflects the extremely powerful positions and connections that the 
financial elite wields. Other national 'market operators' failed to express their positions 
as forcefully. This tacit concession was the most important intra-private sector bargain 
of the negotiation process. The positions of other European market operators (except 
possibly Luxembourg) were in practice somewhat different from the British. This was 
evidenced by the positive market reactions to the Italian and Belgian tax amnesties.  
Once the necessity for excluding Eurobonds and thus also for renegotiating the 
principles of the first draft directive had been established among the main bargainers of 
the EU (Germany, France, UK, Italy), the constraint of insufficient control over the 
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knowledge structure emerged again. This was reflected in the difficulty of separating 
the wholesale from the retail market. The innovations and technical advances in the 
finance market had blurred borders to the extent that any clear-cut separation was 
impossible. The technical standards, which had been developed earlier in the fight 
against money laundering, were of little help for the EU tax evasion regulators.   
Another bargain involved the market and the authorities, primarily in the financial 
structure. It was a triangular bargain, and it involved inseparably state-state and market-
authority deals. It was the peculiarity of Switzerland and Luxembourg abandoning the 
OECD initiative, and agreeing instead to the seemingly stricter EUSTD. But by 
agreeing to the EUSTD, Luxembourg and Switzerland avoided the creation of a global 
regulatory platform from which further advances could be made into the area.  
It should not be forgotten that also the EU countries gained financially from this 
arrangement. With its stricter rules the EUSTD will probably bring in more money to 
the governments than would have the OECD's initiative. 
Additionally the Swiss and Luxembourgers received concessions connected to other 
structures, notably in relation to the Schengen, which is part of the security structure in 
which both Switzerland and Luxembourg have very little to offer. The other EU 
countries, with the exception of the UK, did not so much need a global principle, as the 
stricter rules of the EUSTD compared to the OECD initiative, combined with its quasi-
global reach, guaranteed that the British government's coffers would receive at least a 
few extra euros. For the UK, the EUSTD's principled (but in reality almost non-existent) 
commitment to the eventual use of information exchange satisfied its need to patch up 
its divergent interests. 
The UK's positive attitude to the EUSTD appeared most evident in the negotiations with 
its dependencies. The UK's willingness to use its control over financial resources to 
persuade the dependencies, in particular the Cayman Islands, to agree to the EUSTD, 
meant that there was some common ground to be found for both sides. Both sides could 
avoid a lengthy and even humiliating legal battle, and both could gain financially. The 
Caymans benefited from British subsidies and increased market access, and the UK 
from tax incomes. This was actually a three-way deal that also included the markets, as 
tax havens find that too staunch opposition to regulation might give them a bad 
reputation and a worsened market position. Indeed, many take pride in including the 
relevant regulatory information in their legislation as smoothly and quickly as possible, 
once the regulation has been decided upon. Additionally, the Caymans were not and 
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continue not to be very dependent on European money, but rather on American money. 
The aforementioned short-sightedness of the politicians highlights the significance of 
relational power as a compliment to structural power in determining the outcomes of 
politics. How one sees the losses and gains, and which priorities one gives to the four 
different basic values - justice, wealth, security, and freedom - depends not only on the 
prevailing circumstances, but on how one understands them and sees them. Thus as 
change of government may well make a difference for the policies a state pursues. In 
relation to tax evasion this is most evident in the United States, where the Democrats 
have indicated a greater willingness than the current Republican administration to 
promote some kind of global regulation.   
Also, the important issue of the desired extent of European integration is a result 
generated through the combined dynamics of structures as well as relational power. 
Integration is such a vast and complicated bargain, that the total result for a certain 
member state may not be so evident. The way in which a certain party in power 
prioritizes the different values may vary over time. But the prioritization is always 
constrained by structures, any party not giving due consideration to the real effects of 
their policies will eventually perish. (For the Communists in the Soviet Union it took 70 
years, the Chinese Communist party has adapted to the structures of power of the world 
economy, and thus survived.)  
Why does the EUSTD prevail as a norm?  
The EUSTD prevails as a norm both despite and because of asymmetrical power 
relationships. Asymmetrical is not used here in the traditional realist sense, where one 
actor simply has 'more' power than the other. What is meant is that each holds different 
kinds of power in different ways (both qualitatively and quantitatively) and each one is 
affected by different circumstances depending on historical developments and the 
functional issue at hand.  
There are several very difficult problems in international tax policy and all approaches 
are inevitably deficient. Perfection is not attainable, but a pragmatic solution should be, 
and this the EUSTD shows. (Bird & Wilkie 2000, 104.) This muddling through has 
been embodied in the EUSTD’s very visible 75/25 % direct transfer of resources that 
Huizinga and Nielsen (2000, 137) refer to:  
'Since the effects on [participating] tax havens are expected to be negative, some 
transfer of resources to these countries may be needed to persuade them to 
accept an increase in minimum withholding taxes on interest in the EU.'  
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Herein lays also one of the reasons why the withholding tax principle had to be 
included: The exchange of information system is more problematic than the withholding 
tax in the sense that it does not offer a ‘natural’ way of transferring resources to the 
small tax haven countries. But the bargains are much more complicated and also 
involve the markets, an aspect well forgotten by Huizinga and Nielsen. Resisting the 
creation of a global platform for tax co-operation, adaptation to new niches and gaining 
access to alternative markets all played a role in the muddling through.  
There were also 'transfers' of other resources than financial. The Schengen agreement 
with Luxembourg and Switzerland concerned security. There is a security aspect in a 
broader sense also in the smooth functioning of relations between dependencies and the 
mother country. As two economic giants of the world, ever more bargains between the 
EU and the US are almost inevitably going to involve some of the very big questions of 
the world economy and its future. The EUSTD certainly was/is a piece in the 
competition puzzle between the EU and the US, which now includes not only 
production, but increasingly finance (e.g. the euro), knowledge (e.g. human rights) and 
security (the EU's emerging foreign and security policy).  
In conclusion, agreement on the directive was finally achieved because perseverant 
positions among member states, and other involved states and substates, were discarded 
in favour of relevant transfers of resources for security, production, finance and 
knowledge justifiable to all parties.  
In this context it is notable that the Commission has no real competency in the direct 
taxation policy of the EU beyond the knowledge structure. It was not in a particularly 
good position for participating in the bargaining, and became at the latest post-1999, 
when the co-existence model had been reject by the British, somewhat of a non-actor. 
This development is coherent with the developments in other new policy areas of the 
EU, there seems to be a tendency among member states to shun away from the so called 
Community method, to a stronger institutionalization of inter-governmental co-
operation (Wallace 2000b, 637). 
How do the actors see their current opportunities and constraints on the EUSTD issue?  
The Commission is the most visible proponent of further integration in the area of direct 
tax policy. Its attitude also reflects the fact that most member states would be ready to 
advance integration in this area, including changing the institutional set-up so that 
qualified majority voting would be the decision-making system used. Despite the fact 
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that tax policy in the EU is going to remain subject to unanimity voting in the 
foreseeable future, it is not necessarily a closed issue. The Commission is ready to seek 
to affect reluctant member states' opinions by making use of its unique position as a 
European level bureaucracy. Additionally it is ready to push smaller OFCs that are part 
of Europe's Africa-Caribbean-Pacific partners to greater transparency through its control 
over trade and aid. Exploring the possible positions of a wider range of actors, including 
the developing countries themselves and the international development agencies, would 
be a necessary and interesting part of future research.   
The fact that the Commission can push weak non-members, while not being able to do 
much about its own members who are hanging on to the same principles of secrecy, 
highlights the large discrepancies that exist in world politics. It underlines the EU's 
image of a fortress Europe or a 'rich men's club'. It is also an indication of the EU's 
increased significance as an independent actor in world politics.  
None of the actors involved with the EUSTD see it as a closed issue, although some 
certainly would like it to go away. The fact that the regulations of the EUSTD will 
change over time, with the gradual increase of the withholding tax percentage, and the 
ambiguity about what is going to happen if/when Switzerland adopts OECD rules 
causes concern to most EUSTD OFCs. Incidentally Switzerland is probably the actor 
that most sees the EUSTD the as a closed issue. This is very much down to its 
structurally strong position. Switzerland got many concessions from the EU in the 
EUSTD negotiations, notably a deal on Schengen. As a member of the OECD it feels 
little pressure from that organization to adhere to its rules, very much in the same way 
as the Commission has little direct power over EU member states in QMV policy 
questions. So far the Swiss have taken a firm stand, implying that there are no more 
concessions to be made on banking secrecy:  
'The [Swiss Bankers' Association] expects EU member states to abide by the 
principles of the agreement reached with the EU, and that Switzerland's 
professional secrecy for bankers will not come under new attacks.' (Urs Roth of 
the Swiss Bankers' Association quoted in International Money Marketing, Jul 21, 
2003.) 
Switzerland has a key position concerning both the European and OECD initiatives on 
tax evasion. Everyone else has to wait and see what the Swiss are going to do, if they 
are going to do anything at all. 
Making Switzerland move on the issue would likely have to include the United States, 
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and be connected to a truly global effort rather than a European led one. The future of 
tax co-ordination thus relies very much on the perceived necessity for global 
governance. Together with the UK, the US uses tax efficiency and tax competition 
rhetoric which gives little appreciation for tax co-ordination efforts. Yet at the same 
time, they are both accepting that for the international economy to work efficiently, and 
to promote liberal ideas, there is at times a necessity for supranational authority (WTO).  
It seems the UK also has a broader understanding of the necessity of global governance, 
as long as it does not hurt the UK's own industry too much. The direction in which the 
global economy is moving is never going to be a closed issue. For now it would seem 
that tax co-ordination stands a chance if transparency can be connected with the smooth 
working of the global economy. Overall, wealth takes priority over justice in the global 
economy today, and it seems unlikely this will change much in the future despite 
increasing efforts to make the global economy more just. If it can be successfully 
argued and shown that transparency creates more global wealth, then tax co-ordination 
should stand a chance. 
What are the opportunities and constraints for potential (not only actual) actors? 
The developing countries have little or no chance to profile themselves on the issue. 
Third world countries generally do not possess such resources that are necessary for the 
bargaining process and thus are in a structurally much weaker position than e.g. the EU 
in battling the negative effects of tax evasion. There are bleak expectations for the 
combating of tax evasion in the developing countries. They would require strong 
support from the big developed Western countries, which seems unlikely if there is not 
a significant global change in norms. 
The 10 new member states of the European Union were completely sidelined in the 
bargaining process around the EUSTD, faced with a much bigger set of crucial bargains 
embedded in the expansion of the EU. Now that these states are EU insiders, and will 
never again be faced with a bargain bundle the size of the enlargement, they stand a 
better chance to actively participate in the formation of future EU policy. 
The European Parliament and the EU's Economic and Social Committee were sidelined 
too. They are trapped by their institutional positions, though the Parliament's role might 
increase in due time if it is given greater powers in EU tax policy. To some extent the 
Parliament is also trying to work as an opinion builder outside of its institutional role, 
and has a better chance of finding a common position compared to the nationally biased 
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Council of Ministers.  
A better opportunity to affect opinions outside any institutional role that they might be 
given is held by civil society organizations. The finance lobby is notoriously strong, and 
if e.g. tax justice organizations can make similar claims to knowledge about market 
reactions as e.g. Transparency International or taxpayers' associations, they stand a 
chance of generating some change in the knowledge structure.  
To return to the main research question: 
What has generated the change of norms in the international political economy that is 
embodied in the EUSTD? 
Drawing on the elements that mirror-image the enabling of offshore listed at the end of 
chapter three, and in the light of subsequent analysis, one can make conclusions about 
where and why on the continuum the 'regulation-enabling' and 'offshore-constraining' 
bargains have fallen in the context of the EUSTD: 
1) In the negotiations the profits of onshore have been increased relative to offshore by 
a transferral of financial, production, and security resources between states.  
2) The profit of onshore has also been increased through tax amnesties. 
3) Rewards for professionals who carry offshore into effect have not been decreased in 
any significant way. 
4) The negotiations have increasingly been focused on the smaller offshore users, while 
those using more sophisticated instruments and with larger deposits have arguably got 
away painlessly.  
5) The negotiations have built on a legal framework that pertains to European citizens 
only. In comparison to the OECD initiative, this gains EU member states and most 
EUSTD OFC jurisdictions. 
6) In the case of some of the dependency jurisdictions, it can be argued that the 
sovereign rights of the entities in question to write their own laws have been decreased. 
7) There has been no interference in technical systems, although there was an 
unsuccessful ambition to draw on already existing anti-money laundering knowledge 
structures.  
8) The American government has constrained the public knowledge about their policies, 
not directly about tax rates in other countries as was suggested as a possibility. 
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What is it possible to learn from the above listed eight strategies used in the EUSTD 
negotiations, besides their historical relevance for that specific set of negotiations? Do 
we learn something that can be of use for future negotiations in the same subject area? 
Do we learn something more general about the world economy and how it works? It 
would be dangerous to draw broad conclusions outside of the context of the EUSTD 
negotiations, but the eight points do raise some interesting points for discussion. 
The EUSTD affects interest payments from savings and bonds, but not income from 
share dividends, unit trusts or insurance policies, though there is thought to be a desire 
among commissioners and leading politicians to make progress also in this area 
(Engdahl 2003, 121). Most experts agree that tax policy will increasingly fall within the 
EU's competence in the future, with the taxation of corporate interest income being the 
most important target. Already some major EU countries would be more than willing to 
tackle these issues on the EU level, while some experts are suggesting that the watered-
down EUSTD will be tightened up in the future (International Money Marketing, Mar 
2004; International Money Marketing, Jul/Aug 2004).49  The Commission has also been 
instructed to enter into discussions with other important financial centres; with a view of 
equivalent measures to the EUSTD being applied e.g. in Singapore or Hong Kong 
(‘European Union Seeks Expansion of New Savings Tax Agreement’ at Bloomberg.com 
website).  
So a new round of negotiations is already in sight. It seems most likely it would be 
based on a territorial expansion of the EUSTD to Singapore and Hong Kong. What 
strategies could be used in these negotiations?   
For any future negotiations in this area to be successful, negotiators need to focus on the 
real-world outcomes in terms of different resources of the four structures of power 
rather than trying to stick to principles. Concerted action and a view of the totality of 
benefits at stake in the negotiations, in combination with tax amnesties in those 
countries wishing to regulate, constitute a good rule of thumb. Certainly the tax 
amnesties compromise justice, but from the regulator’s point of view considerably 
facilitate the achievement of the goal. 
However, the compromise in justice and prioritisation of wealth have a more basic 
presence in the structures: Any future developments in the area seem likely to follow 
the same pattern as the EUSTD, where the negotiations have increasingly focused on 
                                                 
49 EU authorities have reacted coolly to German calls for greater regulation of hedge funds (European 
Voice, 19 May 2005).   
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the lower level of the offshore hierarchy. Both the relatively smaller investors and the 
hierarchically lower OFCs can be expected to be the target of further regulation, while 
London and New York get away without being significantly hurt. It would not be unfair 
to say this is the clearest indication the thesis has produced of where the most structural 
power of the world economy resides: with the richest people and the richest countries. 
The rather unsurprising systemic bias of the international system is thus unveiled: A 
bias in favour of the international business civilization – 'a transnational class' (Guzzini 
1998, 182; Strange 1989, 170).  
Unused potential for reducing the rewards for professionals who enable offshore do 
exist; civil society in particular can potentially enlarge the emerging discussion on the 
morality of large rewards for hazy corporate activities (see e.g. USA Today, 
18/09/2002). 
The fact that the negotiations have built on an EU-centred legal framework also 
reinforces the picture of the structural power of the richest and the compromise in 
justice that this entails. The two strongest international organizations that have the 
potential of realistically making advances in the area are the EU and the OECD. Both 
are institutions bringing together (mostly) some of the richest countries of the world 
(and exclude the poorer).50 Truly global institutions (notably the UN) are weakened by 
their very divergent membership, and the poorest countries are in any case effectively 
sidelined in them. Regional institutions constituting of poorer countries such as the 
African Union, do not posses enough resources of structural power to initiate similar 
processes as the EUSTD in the EU. 
* * * 
The fact that there has been a particular intensity of institutional and substantive 
experience in EU-level policy regimes in general is undeniable. This has endowed the 
EU with capabilities beyond those of most other transnational organizations. Hence 
there is some plausibility in the argument that policy-makers from EU member states 
will tend to prefer the EU to other international organizations, or will prefer to 
experiment first at the EU level before proceeding to build broader transnational 
regimes. (Wallace 2000, 43.) Does the EUSTD add to this experience and will it follow 
a particular route of development in the future? 
One of the key issues in the future is going to be the relationship between the OECD 
                                                 
50 Over half of the OECD membership consists of EU member states. 
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and EU tax co-operation initiatives. The actual functioning of the EUSTD and its 
consequences for the European economies are going to be all-important. The 
consequences are expected to be rather minimal all round, which might provoke 
arguments of pretty much any sort both in favour of the EUSTD, the OECD or a return 
to nationally based regimes. 
The variety of future possibilities indicates the futility of trying to predict future events 
through political analysis. Indications, however, already exist that the EUSTD and the 
OECD initiatives will both continue to evolve, without as strong conflicts of interest 
between the two international organizations as during the 1990s. After all, there is no 
apparent reason why the two regimes could not exist side by side. 
* * * 
Besides the answers to the main questions on the generation of change in the 
international political economy in the context of the EUSTD, the theoretical framework 
has been potent enough to lead to some 'by-products'. It has provided answers to 
questions that the thesis did not set specifically out to answer, but that have proved to be 
relevant for the understanding of the dynamics in the EUSTD negotiations. 
Firstly, the thesis has confirmed that the separation of the political field into left and 
right on a European level or in a European comparison is obsolete and inapplicable. 
Value judgements are made on a national level about issues that almost invariably have 
an international dimension. The historical trajectory of each nation state is different 
from the next. Thus decisions are going to be based on a purely national, not global, 
conception of what gains 'us' the most.  
It can be argued though, with some evidence, that the left used to be more 
internationalist in its thinking. The one-sidedness of the political lobbying throughout 
the negotiation period tells an interesting story about how the forces on the left, political 
parties, unions, think-tanks and progressive civil action groups, have lost the plot on 
globalization and tax policy issues. Further research into why this problematique would 
be useful. 
Secondly, the thesis has also provided a basic theoretical understanding of the dynamics 
of European integration. It has been argued that integration is the sum of a multitude of 
bargains based on what gains and losses member states perceive they result in. If the 
totality of the bargains included in further integration is perceived as positive, 
integration can continue. If not, there will be no further integration. In this bargaining 
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larger member states will always hold more control over the resources of structural 
power, and they will thus be in a stronger position. It is important to note though that 
member states do not exist in a vacuum, and are influenced in their decisions also by 
non-governmental actors. This view corresponds broadly to the supranational 
perspective in the academic debate about leadership in the European Union (Nugent 
2001, 218), though couched in qualified terms relating to the specificity of each 
negotiation process. 
How integration is perceived is based on circumstances defined by structural power. 
Structures change historically, and will create pressure for new institutional decisions. 
The changes in structures may not necessarily be changes that are promoting favourable 
perceptions of integration, but may well push in the direction of disintegration. The 
existence of Europe as a forum for 'positive' as well as 'negative' integration should not 
be taken for granted: 
'Europe is still at the point where great deal of institutional work needs to be 
done to ensure that its effective economic integration is irreversible. At the 
premitive level, as a single market, integration is probebly irreversible. The 
same does not hold for the development of the extended economic governence of 
this single economic space.' (Hirst & Thompson 1999, 254.) 
Thirdly, the thesis has pointed to some inherent problems in the British policy towards 
its dependencies. The historical dynamics that have lead to the creation of tax havens in 
the British dependencies are a result of British policy. Their creation and political 
separation meant that the tax havens were separated from the general structures of 
power that dominated mainland UK. The connections were almost purely offshore 
connections, and the onshore connections between the mainland and the dependencies 
were comparatively negligible. With the deepening of European integration, the 
'onshore' dynamics in the UK are slowly changing, and they are on a crash course with 
the offshore policies of the dependencies. It seems that a consolidation of British 
overseas policies with its domestic and European policies would be desirable. This 
would have to include a greater responsibility on the part of the UK of the well-being of 
its dependencies.  
Essentially this is the same incoherent approach that the developed world in general has 
towards the developing world. The Western world structurally pushes, even if by 
mistake, the developing world into difficult decisions.  This does not only concern the 
financial structures, as in the case of the UK's relations with its dependencies, but all 
structures of power. When they backfire, e.g. in the form of tax evasion or increased 
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support for extremist movements, the West fails to take responsibility to correct the 
mistakes at their root, yet deplores the situation.  
 
7.1 Theoretical and Methodological Discussion 
The main research question (what has generated the change of norms in the 
international political economy that is embodied in the EUSTD?) is also an inherently 
theoretical question, to which any practical answer is undoubtedly deficient. On a 
theoretical level the question could be answered by saying that: The change of norms 
has been generated by the circumstances where a government, a political movement or 
a corporate enterprise has a range of feasible choices, and by the scenarios that 
emerge, depending on which choices are made. In the EUSTD negotiations each actor 
has made decisions about the prioritization and weighing of the four basic values - 
security, justice, freedom and wealth. Each decision has been constrained by the actors 
control over different proportions and aspects of the sources of the four structures of 
power. Similarly these very same qualitatively and quantitatively asymmetrical power 
relations advance each decision. 
Strange's analytical approach has indeed mostly worked as a mode of thought, making 
the author think about the connections between decisions and the power relations 
embedded in the prevailing and historical circumstances. Thinking about the four basic 
values necessary for societal organization has drawn the attention back to the 
consequences for individuals. In discussions that focus on ‘high-politics’, this has 
proved important so as not to detach the study from ‘the lived experience’.  
The thesis has built on the view that ‘single models are unavoidably reductionist, 
shutting out significant aspects of political interaction in order to achieve the cleanliness 
of parsimonious simplicity’ (Wallace 2000b, 541). I have preferred to illustrate the 
complexity and diversity of policy-making and particularly to provide a larger picture, 
uncovering connections beyond the traditional sphere of financial policy.  
As the used approach is not a theory as such, there have been no preconceived answers. 
Thus the loose connection between theoretical deliberations and the historical passage 
described in the study is understandable. The simplified nexuses have been somewhat 
apart from the text. But, one should not have expected more, after all the nexuses are 
only a theoretical conception of a framework of power that approximates those that 
exist in the real world. It is a web that builds 'below' the level of the text, shaping the 
 106
text, yet not determining it as such.  
The major challenge - as often is the case – has been operationalizing Strange’s 
theoretical framework. The suggested way to do it – bargain analysis – might well lie 
somewhat beyond the spirit of eclecticism of Strange. At a methodological level it is 
quite rigid, setting up a clear-cut model of a recipe for analysis. Yet I would argue that 
the almost infinite possibilities of combinations and a tolerance for own thoughts and 
innovations, give it an air of eclecticism. An interesting, yet utterly non-Strangeian, idea 
would be to operationalize numerically the different weights given to the four different 
values. Thus one could count medians, averages and frequencies of different actors’ 
behaviour, in hope of finding a pattern. The problem with this idea lies in that each 
bargain is made in its own unique setting and that they are not directly comparable with 
each other. Bargains are relative, not absolute and thus meaningful numerical patterns 
would be difficult to find. 
One of the most challenging concepts is involving markets in a power game together 
with states and other socially (more or less) organized actors. How and when can 
market players (e.g. banks), their representatives (e.g. the finance lobby) and the 
dynamics of market be separated from each other? One possible answer could be that 
the socially organized entities (banks, finance lobby) can exercise ‘positive power’, 
consciously forming strategies, making connections about causes and consequences, 
while the market dynamics are a ‘negative’ power force in relation to other actors. With 
negative power I mean a process whereby the market dynamics limit, constrain and 
gnaw into the power of socially organized actors. Yet also socially organized actors 
constrain each other’s capabilities to exercise power.  
Moreover, the notion that markets can only produce negative power builds on a premise 
whereby there is some original balance of power or a situation where all power 
belonged to the state (and none to markets). The power of markets and the relation 
between markets and other actors are important points for further theoretical discussion. 
Palan (2000, 3-4) uses the word 'market' as synonymous to firms. But as Guzzini (1993, 
470) notes: 
'One must in fact expand the small structuralist account of a logic of the market 
not reducible to agency to one of markets as institutions that work with and 
through a specific set of intersubjective rules and practices. These structures 
constitute power practices that are continually allocating and reallocating 
agents to categories that are differently affected by the working of the 
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[structural]  bias.'  
This thesis as well has used such a concept of structural power in relation to market 
dynamics and its agents/actors, whereby there is a conspicuous freerider problem, which 
seems by common sense incorrect. Namely, the basic dynamic of tax evasion is such 
that it also seemingly confers structural power to the small OFCs. Is there any way of 
separating market dynamics from the agents that make it possible/create it?  
Guzzini goes on to suggest a solution of two different but interlinked concepts of 
agency and structures. Roughly speaking, 'power' refers to such structural power that is 
represented in an agent's capacity for affecting resources, which affects social 
relationships, while 'governance' refers to the capacity of intersubjective practices to 
affect outcomes. (Ibid., 471.) Intersubjective practices cannot be reduced to 'market 
dynamics' but rather refer to superior level of how things are perceived. This highlights 
the theoretical supremacy of the knowledge structure, as already discussed at the end of 
chapter 2.2. Yet, as this thesis on the EUSTD negotiations has demonstrated, in a more 
concrete situation than an analysis of the world economy as a system, the theoretical 
supremacy of the knowledge structure might serve to obscure the relevance of the 
structural effects of security, production and finance...  
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